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Abstract 
 
 
This dissertation seeks to generalize and extend the theory of alignment as guided 
adaptation (TAGA) (Ward & Vessey Working Paper).  TAGA is a descriptive theory that 
views alignment from a multilevel, process-oriented prospective.  It is based upon the 
premise that in the short run each alignment factor adapts independently of the others in 
the alignment system.  In the long run, however, the alignment factors are an 
interdependent system.  TAGA was developed based on a small firm that had a non-
strategic view of IS.  This dissertation therefore seeks to generalize the theory to firms 
that have a formal IS strategy and planning process and are large in size.   The 
dissertation also extends the theory by examining the role that changes external to the 
alignment factors play in the alignment factor adaptation process.   
Three case studies were conducted using semi-structured interviews with 31 high-
level business and IS managers as data sources.  The data was coded into change episodes 
demarcated by changes in business strategy (intent and initiatives) and was analyzed 
using alternative templates, visual mapping, and temporal bracketing strategies (Langley 
1999; Ward & Vessey Working Paper).  
The results indicate that TAGA generalizes to large firms and to firms with a formal 
IS strategy and planning process.  Within these additional contexts, TAGA was able to 
explain the patterns of change in the alignment episodes while the traditional view of 
alignment as synchronization could not.  The results also indicate that changes in the 
outer environment such as the level at which the changed occurred in the factor 
     viii 
hierarchy, the magnitude of the change initiating adaptation, and the pace at which 
change occurred influenced the need for change in the internal alignment factors.   
This research has implications for both academic and practitioner communities.  The 
research shows that TAGA is applicable to firms that have a formal IS strategy and 
planning process; and that factors such as the level, magnitude, and pace of changes 
impacts the adaptation process.  From a practitioner perspective, this research provides 
insight into managing the alignment process by redefining how to view alignment. 
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1 Chapter 1 – Introduction and Overview 
1.1 Introduction 
IS alignment is an issue of great importance to the field of management information 
systems.  Recently, IT and business alignment was ranked as the number one concern 
facing CIOs (Luftman & McLean 2004; Luftman 2005) and alignment has consistently 
ranked as one of the top concerns for the last 15 years (Brancheau, Janz & Wetherbe 
1996; Watson & Brancheau 1991; Watson, Kelly, Galliers, & Brancheau 1997).  IS 
alignment is of such importance among the practitioner community that IS alignment has 
been referred to as the “Holy Grail of IT” (Jahnke 2003).   
Despite its perceived importance, IS alignment remains an enigma for both academic 
researchers and IS professionals.  Computerworld reported that 49% of CFOs perceived 
IT and business strategy alignment as being either weak or non-existent (Hoffman 2003).  
This view is supported by academic research that continues to identify only limited 
alignment in practice (Chan 2002). Further, prior alignment research has failed to capture 
the dynamic nature of alignment (see, for example, Chan 2002; Chan et al. 1997; 
Sabherwal & Chan 2001; Sabherwal et al. 2001 among others). 
Traditionally, IS alignment has been addressed as alignment among business and IS 
strategies and structures, which are commonly referred to as the “alignment factors.”  The 
majority of alignment research has drawn upon the work of Henderson and Venkatraman 
(1993) and defines alignment as fit (Venkatraman 1989) or synchronization (Sabherwal 
et al. 2001; Smaczny 2001) among the alignment factors in the model.  It is widely held 
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that appropriate alignment is related to increased organizational performance (Chan 2002; 
Chan, Huff, Barclay, and Copeland 1997; Henderson and Venkatraman 1993; Sabherwal 
and Chan 2001; Sabherwal, Hirschheim, and Goles 2001).  The traditional research 
approaches have, however, had limited success in linking IS alignment to firm 
performance (Chan 2002) and have fallen short in their ability to explain, theoretically, 
conditions actually observed in practice, such as a lack of formal IS strategy (Sabherwal, 
Hirschheim, & Goles 2001; Ward & Vessey Working Paper) and the lack of structural 
alignment (Chan 2002).  
The recent trend in IS alignment research has been to move away from the traditional 
synchronization approach and to examine IS alignment as a dynamic process (Sabherwal, 
Hirschheim and Goles 2002; Sauer & Yetton 1994; Smazcny 2001; Ward & Vessey 
Working Paper).  This approach has led to the development of the theory of alignment as 
guided adaptation (Ward & Vessey Working Paper).   
In the context of midsized businesses with little formal IS strategy, the theory of 
alignment as guided adaptation (TAGA) is more explanatory than traditional alignment 
theory.   First, TAGA views alignment as a process, explaining the lack of alignment 
based on a synchronization perspective.  Second, TAGA explains how firms can survive 
and thrive without a formal IS strategy, a frequent observation from practice that is 
counter to the traditional link between alignment and performance.  Third, TGA is 
descriptive, explaining how alignment actually occurs over time. 
The theory of alignment as guided adaptation views alignment as the ability of the 
alignment factors to allow the organization to adapt to a changing environment while 
moving towards organizational goals.  Alignment is viewed as a process of continuous 
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adaptation among the four commonly-accepted “alignment factors,” which form part of a 
larger alignment process that encompasses strategic goals and the external environment.  
The alignment factors are viewed as being decoupled in the short run, that is, adapting 
autonomously, in an as needed manner, to changed circumstances in the company and its 
environment.  The alignment factors change only when they are no longer able to 
function appropriately given the altered environment in which they operate.   
Based on TAGA, the primary role of information systems is as an enabler of 
organizational goals.  As long as the information systems remain adapted to the 
environment, the IS allows the organization to continue moving towards the 
organizational goals and the IS is aligned with the organization.  TAGA views a company 
that successfully maintains IS alignment as one that is able to anticipate how IS might 
enable or constrain the organization’s goals. 
The development of TAGA motivates additional research that can move us closer 
towards solving the enigma of IS alignment. Because TAGA views the role of IS as 
enabling organizational goals, it is important to determine enabling characteristics of an 
organization’s information systems. Based on this perspective, the overall research 
question addressed is:  
How does IS enable organizations to adapt to change?  
 
1.2 Research Overview 
The research in this dissertation is addressed in two phases, each phase designed to 
progressively move the research towards answering the overall research question.  The 
first phase builds upon the existing theoretical foundation of TAGA by examining the 
generalizability of the theory.  The second phase delves deeper into the adaptation 
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process of the alignment factors by exploring the impact of environmental change on the 
IS alignment factors.   
The first step (Phase I) in addressing the overall research question is the examination 
of initial boundary conditions of TAGA.  A theoretical contribution requires development 
of “temporal and contextual factors” that bound the theory, a step that is particularly 
important to inductively generated theory (Whetten 1989).  The boundaries set the 
limitations in applying theory and are necessary before proper use and testing of the 
theory is conducted (Bacharach 1989).  While the development of TAGA employed an 
iterative process of both induction and deduction, the focus was on inductive 
development of the theory (Ward & Vessey Working Paper) and therefore the boundaries 
of the theory need to be assessed.   
Despite the additional explanatory power exhibited by TAGA over the traditional 
view of alignment, it is possible that TAGA is bound by the context in which it was 
initially developed.  Specifically, the initial development of TAGA addressed a midsized 
organization in which there was no formal IS strategy, and did not address whether 
alignment as synchronization may hold in larger firms that have a formal approach to IS 
strategy.  This research determines whether TAGA is more explanatory than alignment 
viewed as synchronization in larger firms and in firms with a more formalized IS 
strategy.  Phase I thus addresses how the organization’s contextual setting impacts the 
pattern of change in the internal alignment factors.  Specifically, Phase I examines the 
impact of firm size and formalization of IS strategy on the pattern of changes in the 
alignment factors.   
     5 
The second step in addressing the overall research question is to understand how 
environmental change impacts the adaptation process.  Once the boundaries of a theory 
are established, it is important to develop the “what”, “how”, and “why” of the theory 
(Whetten 1989).  The “why,” or theoretical foundation, was established in the initial 
development of TAGA (Ward & Vessey Working Paper).  Thus after examining 
boundary conditions, the next step is to develop a deeper theoretical understanding of the 
adaptation process or, to determine the “what” of the theory.   
The theory of alignment as guided adaptation indicates that changes in an alignment 
factor are motivated by changes in the factor’s environment.  However, little is known 
about what characteristics of change in the environment motivate the adaptation process 
of individual alignment factors.  Phase II addresses this issue by proposing that change in 
the outer environment has multiple dimensions that impact the need for adaptation of the 
alignment factors.   
A multiple case study examining three case sites was conducted.  Semi-structured 
interviews with high-level managers and documentary sources were used as data sources.  
The data covered a ten-year period and was coded into alignment episodes delimited by 
changes in strategic goals (strategic intent) or changes in strategic initiatives.  Alignment 
episodes include change events for all alignment factors that occurred during the time 
period.  The data was analyzed by using alternative templates, visual mapping, and 
temporal bracketing strategies (Langley 1999; Ward & Vessey Working Paper). 
In summary, this research has two specific objectives: 1) to examine the 
generalizability and theoretical boundaries of TAGA, and 2) to understand what 
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characteristics of change in the outer environment triggers adaptation in the alignment 
factors.  
1.3 Contribution of Research 
This research has implications for both the academic and practitioner communities.  
From a research perspective, the research assesses the generalizability of TAGA to 
additional business settings; specifically to larger firms and to firms with a more formal 
IS strategy and planning process.  Given TAGA’s superior explanatory power over the 
theory of alignment viewed as synchronization, TAGA was established as the preferred 
theory, over alignment as synchronization within these boundary conditions.   
By decoupling IS structure and processes from the other alignment factors in the short 
run, TAGA provides an explanation for how an organization can be successful despite the 
lack of perceived alignment or management’s strategic focus on IS.  Further, explaining 
the impact of change on the adaptation process and developing theory related to the role 
of IS in the adaptation process provides the theoretical foundation to answer fundamental 
questions about the role of IS in modern business organizations.   
From a practitioner perspective, this research provides new insight into solving the 
enigma of IS alignment.  TAGA’s generalizability to additional settings shows that the 
difficulty organizations have in aligning their IS with the business is partially the result of 
a lack of understanding regarding what alignment is and how it occurs.  Understanding 
how environmental change drives the adaptation process of the internal alignment factors 
provides the first step in being able to manage the alignment process and leads to an 
understanding of how IS enables an organization to change. 
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1.4 Overview of Dissertation 
The remaining chapters of this dissertation follow the outline of a traditional 
dissertation, as described below: 
Chapter 2 – Chapter 2 provides the theoretical background for the research by 
reviewing the relevant alignment literature and by presenting the theory of alignment as 
guided adaptation.  Chapter 2 is divided into two major subsections.  The first subsection 
presents relevant literature, focusing on the alignment model of Henderson & 
Venkatraman (1993).  An analysis of prior research is presented together with a 
discussion of the limitations that set the stage for the initial development of TAGA.  The 
second subsection presents a detailed introduction to the theory of alignment as guided 
adaptation.  This subsection includes a discussion of the theoretical foundations of TAGA 
and applies these theoretical foundations to develop the theory that explains the 
alignment process, at least in midsized organizations without a formal IS strategy.  
Chapter 3 – Chapter 3 presents the theoretical notions behind the conceptualization 
of the research.  In addressing the generalizability of TAGA, hypotheses establish rival 
patterns of events based on TAGA and alignment as synchronization.  In Phase II 
propositions are developed that examine the characteristics of external change on the 
alignment factors.  The propositions seek to explain the relationship between the 
dimensions of environmental change and the change events of the alignment factors.         
Chapter 4 – Chapter 4 presents the research methodology.  Case study research is 
discussed along with its appropriateness in this specific research context.  This section 
describes methodological details such as case site selection criteria, nature and reason for 
the evidence collected, and methods of data analysis.  Finally, this section addresses how 
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case studies should be judged from the viewpoint of methodological rigor, and how rigor 
is addressed in this research.  
Chapter 5 - Chapter 5 presents the results of the research.  This section begins by 
presenting the three cases.  Then results for testing Phase I hypotheses are presented, 
followed by the results for the Phase II propositions.  Both phases integrate charts and 
tables into the results as vehicles for organizing and presenting the data.  
Chapter 6 – Chapter 6 presents a discussion of the results.  The discussion of Phase I 
and II are presented separately.  A third section presents a discussion of issues unique to 
individual case sites and of issues that apply to all of the propositions.  Finally, the 
limitations and the implications of the research are addressed.   
Chapter 7 – Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation with a summary of the research and 
directions for future research.    
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2 Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
This chapter presents prior literature on IS alignment and introduces the theory of 
alignment as guided adaptation.  The first section focuses on the most influential model 
of IS alignment to date, that of Henderson and Venkatraman (1993) and the stream of 
research that ensued, followed by an analysis of issues raised in the IS alignment 
literature.  The second section presents the most recent theoretical formulation of IS 
alignment, the theory of alignment as guided adaptation. 
2.1 Prior Research on IS Alignment 
While the roots of strategic alignment can be traced back to the classic management 
writings of Chandler (1962), the most prominent work integrating information 
technology into strategic alignment has been the “strategic alignment model” of 
Henderson and Venkatraman. Since its initial publication in 1991, the strategic alignment 
model has served as the foundation for the majority of IS alignment literature.  For this 
reason, this model and certain of the significant number of studies that have addressed it 
are presented as foundational literature for this research. 
2.1.1 Henderson and Venkatraman’s Strategic Alignment Model 
In response to the growing strategic role of information systems in modern 
organizations, Henderson and Venkatraman (1993) developed a framework to 
conceptualize the strategic use of information technology (see Figure 2-1).  Henderson 
and Venkatraman present their work on alignment in multiple versions (see for example, 
Henderson & Venkatraman 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996).  These variations provide the same 
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basic model with only minor modification to the theoretical content.  The discussion 
presented here focuses on the 1993 publication.  When aspects of the model are presented 
that derive primarily from a different version of the model, that publication is cited. 
 
Figure 2-1: Foundational Model of IS Alignment 
(Henderson and Venkatraman 1993) 
 
The strategic alignment model of Henderson and Venkatraman (1993) explains IT 
alignment in terms of two components of strategic management: 1) strategic fit and 2) 
functional integration.  The first component, strategic fit, represents the appropriateness 
of the internal domain to the external domain, or in other words, how well the internal 
structures of the firm fit with the firm’s strategic positioning.  The second component, 
functional integration, represents the fit of the business and IT internal functional 
domains.   
Henderson and Venkatraman identified four internal functional domains or 
“alignment factors”: 1) business strategy, 2) information technology strategy, 3) 
organizational infrastructure and processes, and 4) information technology infrastructure 
and processes.  First, “business strategy” represents both the formulation of firm and 
Business  
Strategy 
IS Strategy 
Organization 
Structure 
IS Structure  
and  
Processes 
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product positioning and the implementation of firm resources to reach the firm’s chosen 
positioning.  Second, “IT strategy” is defined in a similar way to business strategy, except 
that it addresses the information technology domain, rather than the business domain.  
The third alignment factor is “organizational infrastructure and processes.”  This factor 
represents the “choices that determine the internal arrangements of the firm that are 
necessary to execute the business strategy.” (Henderson & Venkatraman 1991, pg. 74)  
The term “infrastructure” is defined by Henderson and Venkatraman (1993) to include 
“structure, roles, and reporting relationships,” while “processes” are defined to include 
work flows related to key activities.  Note that the definition of infrastructure and 
processes also includes the skills of the individuals required to execute the business 
strategy (Henderson & Venkatraman 1993).  Fourth, “IT infrastructure and processes” 
shares a similar definition to the organizational infrastructure and processes, but is 
bounded by the domain of information technology.     
The primary focus of Henderson and Venkatraman’s strategic alignment model is the 
relationships among the four alignment factors.  Henderson and Venkatraman (1994) 
refer to fit between any two of the four factors as bi-variate fit, a situation that they regard 
as “myopic and dysfunctional.”  Alignment among three of the alignment factors is 
referred to as multivariate, or cross-domain, alignment.  Alignment of three factors is 
more effective than bi-variate alignment, but still incomplete.  The ultimate fit according 
to Henderson and Venkatraman (1994) is strategic alignment, which requires 
“simultaneous or concurrent attention to all four domains.”  
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2.1.2 Assessment of the Strategic Alignment Model  
This section assesses Henderson and Venkatraman’s strategic alignment model by 
discussing the foremost implications of the model and the research stream it has spawned.  
The implications address issues with the traditional alignment model and how subsequent 
research has interpreted the model. 
First, derived directly from the concept of strategic fit (Henderson & Venkatraman 
1993, pg. 472) is the assumption that alignment is linked to firm performance.  The 
assumption of strategic fit is that the firm’s performance increases when the internal 
domain is aligned to the external domain; implying that the better the alignment, the 
better the performance.  While there is some support for the notion that alignment defined 
in this way is related to improved performance (see, for example, Chan et al. 1997), the 
findings have not been convincing (see, for example, Palmer & Markus 2000).   
The inability to link alignment conclusively to performance results in two possible 
conclusions: 1) the underlying assumption is not valid; or 2) the equivocal findings are 
the result of the operationalization of the studies to date.  Given the established 
difficulties of research that has attempted to link information technology to performance 
(see for example, Hitt & Brynjolfsson 1993), there is reason to suspect the later.  There is 
also recent research to suggest that, depending on the economics of the industry, 
alignment as defined by the strategic alignment model for information systems may not 
be a necessary and sufficient condition for firms to outperform their peers (Ward & 
Vessey Working Paper). 
A second implication deriving from the concept of strategic fit is that alignment is a 
“process of continuous adaptation and change” (Henderson & Venkatraman 1993, pg. 
473).    And, indeed, a common theme that runs through published studies is that 
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alignment is a dynamic process (Chan 2002; Chan et al. 1997; Henderson and 
Venkatraman 1993; Sabherwal & Chan 2001).  For example, Chan (2002) concludes that 
to use IS appropriately requires flexibility and fluidity and refers to IS alignment as a 
journey that is a dynamic, emergent process.  However, with the exception of the studies 
by Sauer and Yetton (1994), Sabherwal et al. (2001), and more recently, Peppard and 
Breu (2003), and Ward and Vessey (Working Paper), all alignment studies, of which we 
are aware, have used a cross-sectional approach to operationalize the strategic alignment 
model; that is, they have taken snapshots of a number of the factors at a point in time, 
hence viewing alignment as static (see Chan et al. 1997; Jarvenpaa & Ives 1993; 
Sabherwal & Chan 2001, for example).   
Third, although the concept of strategic fit includes the relationship between the firm 
and its “competitive product-market arena” (Henderson & Venkatraman 1993, pg. 473), 
Henderson and Venkatraman do not directly address or develop the relationship between 
the firm and the external environment.  Further, the strategic alignment model does not 
accommodate an external stimulus for change.   There are no “outside” influences in the 
strategic alignment model that would cause the system to go out of alignment; for 
example, there is no discussion of how changes in a broader environment might occasion 
changes in the alignment factors in order to restore alignment.    
The cross-sectional approach to research on the strategic alignment model, combined 
with the lack of a developed relationship between the firm and the environment, has led 
to IS alignment being viewed as “synchronization” in which a change in one alignment 
factor is viewed as leading to changes in each of the other factors (Sabherwal, et al. 2001; 
Smaczny 2001).  The strategic alignment model interpreted as synchronization represents 
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a state of equilibrium among the alignment factors; an equilibrium that is self-
perpetuating.  Changes in the alignment factors are viewed as occurring effectively 
simultaneously, and effective performance is viewed as resulting when all four factors are 
in alignment.  In other words, if one factor changes, all factors should change, otherwise 
the system will no longer be in alignment.   
Fourth, much of the research that has been conducted has focused on assessing the 
relationship between just two of the alignment factors, a bi-variate approach.  Chan et al. 
(1997), for example, examined the relationship between business and IS strategy and the 
effect of the factors separately and together on business performance and IS 
effectiveness.  (See, also, studies by Jarvenpaa & Ives 1993; Fiedler, Grover, & Teng 
1996.)  However, such studies do not treat the four alignment factors as a system in 
which the factors work together to form a larger whole.  Recall that the model of strategic 
alignment views alignment as arising from multiple interactions among all four alignment 
factors (Henderson & Venkatraman 1994) and that strategic alignment “means 
simultaneous or concurrent attention to all four domains.”  Thus research that focuses on 
bi-variate relationships does not represent a complete test of the strategic alignment 
model. 
2.1.3 Evaluation of Literature Based on the Strategic Alignment 
Model 
Despite the substantial body of research on IS alignment, there are issues that remain 
unresolved.  It has not been established conclusively that alignment is linked to 
performance, a foundational assumption of the strategic alignment model.  Nor has the 
dynamic nature of alignment and its implications been adequately explored.  While the 
findings of alignment studies based upon Henderson and Venkatraman’s model have 
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generally supported certain aspects of the model, those studies have largely failed to 
conduct adequate tests of the model.   
Researchers have started to address some of these issues.  Sauer and Yetton (1994), 
for example, conclude that IS alignment should be viewed as a dynamic process that 
recognizes that IS alignment can occur by different paths.  Sabherwal et al. (2001) 
likewise acknowledge the dynamic nature of alignment by applying punctuated 
equilibrium theory to the alignment process. Recently Peppard and Breu (2003) proposed 
studying IS alignment using coevolution as a theory base to examine the process of 
alignment.  
The most recent research to address these issues is the theory of alignment as guided 
adaptation (TAGA) (Ward & Vessey Working Paper).  The theory of alignment as guided 
adaptation is a process oriented; multilevel theory that addresses IS alignment as a 
dynamic process.  In the next section, the theory of alignment as guided adaptation is 
presented in detail. 
2.2 Theory of Alignment as Guided Adaptation 
This section introduces the theory of alignment as guided adaptation (Ward & Vessey 
Working Paper).  First, the theoretical foundation for TAGA is presented to provide a 
conceptual understanding for the theory.  Second, the alignment factors as utilized by 
TAGA and their comparison to the strategic alignment model‘s alignment factors are 
discussed.  Third, the adaptation process of alignment as guided adaptation is 
conceptualized based on the interrelationships between the firm and its environment.  
This section concludes with a discussion of how internal alignment factors adapt 
autonomously within the firm. 
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2.2.1 Theoretical Foundation 
The theoretical foundation of TAGA lies in the concepts associated with the 
evolutionary and ecological theories of strategy process (see, for example, Barnett & 
Burgelman 1996; Burgelman 1991 1994; Hannan & Freeman 1982; Nelson & Winter 
1977; Noda & Bower 1996).  In particular, TAGA draws upon a recent formulation of 
strategy process presented by Lovas and Ghoshal (2000) that characterizes the 
evolutionary process as one of guided evolution.  In guided evolution, the organization is 
viewed as “an ecological system purposefully designed to guide the evolution of 
strategy.”  In contrast to prior evolutionary models, the Lovas and Ghoshal model 
incorporates a role for top management.  Strategy is viewed as having both strategic 
intent (goals) and strategic initiatives (means).  Management can influence the 
evolutionary course of the firm by establishing the strategic intent and implementing 
strategic initiatives to guide the organization toward its strategic intent.   
Note that this evolutionary view of strategy applies to both natural and artificial 
selection environments (Levinthal 1994), and, indeed, its application in strategy process 
research is an example of applying it to an artificial environment.  Building on this view, 
TAGA views an organization as an artificial (man-made) system.  Viewing an 
organization as an artificial system allows the use of Simon’s (1996) concepts of a 
sciences of the artificial as the theoretical foundation to understand artificial systems and 
how they adapt in changing environments.      
Simon characterizes an artificial system, or using Simon’s terminology an “artifact,” 
in terms of its purpose, its internal structure, and the environment in which the artifact 
exists.  An artifact will serve its intended purpose when it is appropriate to the conditions 
in the environment, and vice versa.  When the artifact is well adapted to its environment, 
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it will fulfill its intended purpose.  Hence, the way in which an artifact behaves can often 
be predicted from knowledge of its purpose and its environment.  When viewing an 
artifact from this perspective, it is not necessary to know how the system is structured 
internally for it to function effectively.  Under conditions of adaptation, therefore, the 
functioning of the system can be understood in terms of the environmental conditions and 
the interface between the artifact and its external environment.  Further, according to 
Simon (1996, pg. 11), only a few of the characteristics of the environment will drive the 
adaptation of the artifact to its intended purpose:   
“In very many cases, whether a particular artifact achieves a particular goal or 
adaptation depends only on a few characteristics of the outer environment and not 
at all on the details of the environment.”   
 
Therefore, the key is to organize and structure an artificial system in such a way that 
it is insulated (or buffered) from its environment, and in particular, the few elements of 
the environment that impact it the most.  Within limits, an artificial system properly 
designed for its environment, can remain adapted to its environment and maintain an 
invariant relationship to its environment without altering its internal structure.    
Simon (1996) refers to artificial systems that have “a large number of parts that have 
many interactions,” as complex systems.  Complex systems are hierarchical in nature and 
can be decomposed into subsystems.  The complexity results from interactions that occur 
among the subsystems and among multiple levels of the hierarchical structure.  It is 
therefore necessary, in order to understand a complex system, to differentiate between 
interactions among systems and their environment and interactions within the hierarchical 
structures of the subsystems that comprise a complex system.  Simon proposed that:  
“(1) in a nearly decomposable system the short-run behavior of each of the 
component subsystems is approximately independent of the short-run behavior of 
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the other components; (2) in the long run the behavior of any one of the 
components depends in only an aggregate way on the behavior of the other 
components (pg. 198).” 
 
The complexity limits the ability to predict future outcomes, which in turn, limits the 
ability to make rational choices for the allocation of limited resources (Simon 1996, pg. 
35).  The greater the uncertainty in the environment or the less able a system is to predict 
or forecast its future, the more important it is for the system to be able to adapt to change 
in its environment (Simon 1996).  Adaptation allows a system to correct for incomplete 
information about the environment by allowing the system, via feedback and adjustment, 
to correct its path and continue towards its goals as environmental change occurs.   
A complex artificial system can be viewed as being decomposed into subsystems that 
in the short-run act independently of the other subsystems.  Applying Simon’s logic of an 
artifact and his notion of complex systems to an artificial system composed of the four 
internal alignment factors leads us to alignment as guided adaptation.  
Drawing on both Simon (1996) and Lovas and Ghoshal (2000), the theory of 
alignment as guided adaptation views alignment from a multilevel, process-oriented 
perspective.  The organization is viewed as a hierarchical, complex system that is 
comprised of subsystems (the alignment factors) (see Figure 2-2).    
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Figure 2-2: Conceptual Model of Alignment in Alignment as Guided 
Adaptation 
 
Just as the organizational system adapts to its external environment, so do the 
individual factors, or subsystems, adapt to their own environment. TAGA views an 
organization as a goal-seeking entity that evolves in a continuously changing 
environment.  Management can guide this evolutionary process through the strategy 
selected and implemented, which is operationalized in TAGA via strategic intent and 
strategic initiatives. 
2.2.2 The Alignment Factors of TAGA 
TAGA incorporates two additional factors external to the firm (the external 
environment and strategic intent), known as the alignment environment, in addition to the 
four internal functional alignment factors of Henderson and Venkatraman.  TAGA refers 
to the latter as the internal alignment system.  Alignment is viewed as a process of 
continuous adaptation among the six alignment factors.  Because the factors in the 
internal alignment system are similar to the factors defined by Henderson and 
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Venkatraman (1993), only the differences between Henderson and Venkatraman’s 
conceptualization and that of TAGA are discussed.   
The definition of strategy used in TAGA differs from that of Henderson and 
Venkatraman (1993).  In TAGA, the definition of strategy is consistent with the 
theoretical perspectives of Lovas and Ghoshal (2000).  The business strategy internal to 
the organization is viewed as being addressed by strategic initiatives (Lovas & Ghoshal 
2000), or the strategic business means utilized to reach the corporate goals.  IS1 strategy 
likewise differs from the definition of Henderson and Venkatraman.  IS strategy in 
TAGA follows the definition of Lovas and Ghoshal by referring to the strategic 
initiatives implemented by management to utilize IS.   
Henderson and Venkatraman (1993) used the terms “organizational and IT 
infrastructure and processes” in their model to refer to the operational domains of the 
organization and information technology.  TAGA simply uses the terms “organizational 
structure” and “IS structure” as abbreviated terms to represent Henderson and 
Venkatraman’s definition of infrastructure and processes.   
As we have seen, TAGA also includes roles for the two additional alignment factors 
in the alignment environment:  the external environment and the organization’s strategic 
intent.  The external environment represents the external, and largely uncontrollable, 
forces with which the organization and its subsystems must interact to move towards 
organizational goals (e.g., market conditions, competitors, government regulations, etc.).  
Strategic intent is the interface between the external environment and the internal 
                                                 
1
 The term “information systems” (or IS) as opposed to “information technology” (or IT) will be used in the 
theory of guided adaptation.  While the two terms have occasionally been viewed as interchangeable, IS in 
this research is intended to include a broader definition that includes technology, systems, processes, and 
human resources, as opposed to a more restrictive definition of information technology that in this research 
refers to technology and systems, alone. 
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alignment factors. The strategic intent is the “preferred future position of the firm as 
articulated by its top management” (Lovas & Ghoshal 2000) and as such, provides 
direction to the interaction of the organization and its external environment.  In other 
words, the strategic intent represents the organizational goals set by management.  
Alignment among the four internal alignment factors occurs in response to changes in the 
external environment in light of the company’s strategic intent.     
The alignment factors are related hierarchically (see Figure 2.2).  The external 
environment is at the highest level of the hierarchy creating direct forces on the 
evolutionary path of the organization and impacting the success of the organization’s 
adaptive processes in moving the organization towards its strategic intent.  Management 
determines the strategic intent and then guides the firm towards its goals via the strategic 
initiatives it selects.  The organizational structure supports the business strategy 
(Chandler 1962; Amburgey & Dacin 1994).  Because IS strategy and structure represent 
the domain of IS, they are considered as supporting the chosen business strategy and the 
organizational structure.  IS strategy and structure therefore parallel the overall 
organizational hierarchy of strategy and structure, but are bound by the domain of IS.   
TAGA does not view the hierarchical relationship in a strict sense where all change 
flows down from the top in a synchronized fashion.  The implication of the hierarchical 
relationship is that factors higher in the hierarchy are more likely to trigger changes in 
lower level alignment factors than vice versa.  For example, TAGA views a change in 
strategic initiatives, such as acquiring a competitor, as being more likely to trigger the 
need for change in IS structure than a change from a mainframe to client server 
environment is likely to trigger a change in strategic initiatives.  TAGA does recognize, 
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however, that change in a lower level may trigger changes in a higher level such as 
altering the organizational structure to take advantage of implementing an ERP. 
2.2.3 Adaptation of the Alignment System 
TAGA views the alignment system as an artificial system in homeostasis with its 
external environment.  That homeostasis may be challenged when the external 
environment upon which the internal system depends changes.  When a change in the 
environment can no longer be accommodated by the firm’s current strategies and 
structures, the firm can no longer progress towards its goals, and the firm must alter its 
internal structure (i.e., at least one of the alignment factors must change). With 
substantial change in the external environment, the alignment system may need to alter its 
internal structure.  Change in the alignment system is triggered, therefore, when there is a 
change in the alignment system’s external environment or strategic intent.  Hence, TAGA 
views the alignment environment as the driver of change. 
 An underlying assumption of the theory of alignment as guided adaptation is that 
a system does not alter its internal structure without an external driver.  All change to 
strategic intent or the alignment system is initiated by management and is triggered by 
external change, or triggered by management’s anticipation of external change.   
Changes in the alignment environment, however, will not always lead to change in 
the organization and thus the alignment system.  As long as the changes in the alignment 
environment are not sufficiently substantial, that is, they have relatively little impact on 
the organization, the alignment factors may be sufficiently flexible to adjust to the altered 
environment, in which case the organization may remain adapted to its alignment 
environment and continue to move towards its goals without requiring change in the 
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internal structure of the alignment system.  Therefore change, or anticipated change, in 
the alignment environment is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for change to the 
alignment system.   
2.2.4 Adaptation Among Individual Alignment Factors  
TAGA considers each of the internal alignment factors as a system in its own right 
(Simon 1996; Holland 1995), and as a “subsystem” of the alignment system.  Each of the 
alignment factors has an intended purpose and interacts with, and adapts to, changes in its 
outer environment.2 The outer environment of any particular alignment factor includes 
the other factors; and a change in a single factor represents a change to the outer 
environment for each of the other individual alignment factors.  At some point, the 
changes in the outer environment of a single internal alignment factor may be so great 
that it will no longer be adapted to its outer environment and therefore the individual 
alignment factor itself will need to be modified so that it again assumes a state of 
equilibrium within its current outer environment.  
Whether any other individual alignment factors change or not in response to a change 
in an individual alignment factor is determined by the extent to which the other factors 
are able to support, or adapt to, changes in their outer environment.  If the other 
alignment factors can adapt to their altered outer environments, the internal structure of 
those factors will not need to change.  If, on the other hand, an alignment factor cannot 
meet the needs of its altered environment, that factor will need to alter its internal 
structure and the change will result in a change in the environment of the other alignment 
                                                 
2
 The use of the term “outer environment” as opposed to the term “external environment” is intentional.  
The theory of guided adaptation is a multilevel theory and the use of the term external environment 
specifically refers to the environment external to the alignment system.  The term outer environment is thus 
used to describe the outer environment of any single alignment factor as a system in its own right. 
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factors.  Again, those individual alignment factors that are not able to adapt to these 
changes in their environments may also need to change their internal structures in 
response.  This process of multiple systems adapting to each other is a process referred to 
as coevolution (Axelrod and Cohen 2000).   
Coevolution of alignment factors is the reason the hierarchical relationship is not a 
strict, top down relationship.  A lower level change such as to IS structure still represents 
a change to the outer environment of the alignment factors above it in the hierarchy and 
thus a change to a lower level alignment factor can necessitate a change to the internal 
structure of the higher order alignment factor. 
TAGA then, is a process of alignment as guided adaptation in which change in an 
alignment factor depends on its ability to adapt to changes in its outer environment.  
From this viewpoint, although the internal alignment factors are interdependent and co-
evolving, none is directly determined by any of the other internal alignment factors.  
Note, therefore, that the notion of alignment as guided adaptation is essentially based on 
the short term independence or “decoupling” of the individual factors, a corollary that 
derives directly from Simon’s notions of a science of the artificial. The alignment factors 
are viewed, therefore, as being decoupled, that is, adapting autonomously, in an “as 
needed” manner, to changed circumstances in the company and its environment.  Because 
an organization, and thus the alignment system, is an artificial system created by man, 
managers of the organization can manipulate the system to guide the way in which the 
alignment system adapts to its environment. 
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3 Chapter 3 – Research Model 
In this section, a two phased research program for testing and further theory 
development is presented.  Phase I proposes assessing the theory of alignment as guided 
adaptation in different organizational settings to establish initial theoretical boundaries.  
Phase II deepens the theory.  Specifically, Phase II develops dimensions of change, which 
are predicted by TAGA to drive change in the alignment factors.       
3.1 Phase I – Testing the Theory of Alignment as Guided 
Adaptation 
Phase I focuses on testing the theory of alignment as guided adaptation. The 
theoretical basis for testing TAGA is presented and used to develop testable propositions 
and hypotheses. 
3.1.1 Assessing the Theory in Different Organizational Settings 
Testing the theory of alignment as guided adaptation in multiple organizational 
settings is the next step in the development of TAGA.  The theory of alignment as guided 
adaptation was developed in the context of a midsized firm that viewed information 
systems as a necessary support function, the cost of which was to be minimized.  This 
management perspective on IS leaves the theory of alignment as guided adaptation open 
to the possibility that TAGA might not be applicable in a different organizational setting.   
The need for testing as the next step in the research program can be viewed as an 
issue of generalizability.  Generalizing to theory, or what Yin (1994) refers to as “level-
two inference”, as was done in Ward and Vessey (Working Paper), is only one type of 
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generalizability.  Positivist case study research as employed for this dissertation also 
requires generalizing from the theory to different settings (Lee & Baskerville 2003, pg. 
17).  Generalizing from theory to different settings is arguably the most important form 
of generalizability for business school research because it allows the theory to be applied 
to additional portions of the real world (Lee and Baskerville 2003).  This leads to the 
research question: 
Research Question 1: How does the organization’s contextual setting impact the 
pattern of change in the internal alignment factors?  
3.1.2 Proposition and Hypothesis Development 
This section develops propositions and hypotheses designed to test the effect of the 
organization’s contextual setting on the pattern of alignment among the four internal 
alignment factors.  The specific contextual aspects to be examined are introduced 
followed by the propositions and related hypotheses.  The size of the firm is addressed 
first followed by the formality of IS strategy. 
3.1.2.1 Firm Size  
The firm studied by Ward and Vessey (Working Paper), with revenues of 
approximately $250 million, is classified as a midsized firm.  It is possible that the firm’s 
size limited the need for IS alignment and limited the resources available to align the IS 
with the organization.  The organizational context of the original case site begs the 
question of whether a larger firm would have more sophisticated mechanisms to realign 
the alignment factors due to greater need and greater resources.3  While a pattern of 
realignment in larger firms would be consistent with the synchronized view of alignment, 
TAGA, due to the short term decoupling of the alignment factors, suggests that firm size 
                                                 
3
 Firms with annual revenues in excess of $1 billion are considered large. 
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is not a determining factor in the pattern of alignment.  These arguments lead to the first 
proposition: 
Proposition 1: Firms exhibit decoupled patterns of IS alignment, independent of 
firm size. 
 
Because the theory of alignment as guided adaptation contradicts the prior theory that 
views alignment as synchronization, creating rival explanations based on the two theories 
provides a way to test the theories (Lee 1989; Yin 1994).  One of the hypotheses will be 
ruled out, providing support for the other theoretical explanation. Therefore a hypothesis 
based on each theory is presented.  Hypothesis “a” refers to the theory of alignment as 
synchronization while Hypothesis “b” refers to the theory of alignment as guided 
adaptation.   
Based on proposition 1, therefore, the first hypotheses to be tested are: 
Hypothesis 1a: Large firms exhibit traditional patterns of alignment as 
synchronization where a change in one factor is related to changes in all four 
internal alignment factors. 
  
Hypothesis 1b: Large firms exhibit decoupled patterns of change among the four 
internal alignment factors. 
 
3.1.2.2 Formality of IS Strategy 
Similar to firm size, it is possible that the presence of a formal IS strategy could 
provide the motivation and processes for a synchronized pattern of alignment.  In an 
organization that has a strategic view of IS, one might expect changes in all, or in the 
majority of the factors because the formalized strategy and processes act as an alignment 
mechanism resulting in change in the other factors to bring them back into alignment 
(Sabherwal et al. 2001).   
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Because TAGA was observed in a firm without a formal IS strategy, one might think 
that the lack of synchronized changes in the alignment factors observed by Ward and 
Vessey (Working Paper) may apply only to firms with a non-strategic view of IS.    
However, TAGA suggests that it is the short term decoupling of the factors and not the 
lack of a formal IS strategy that leads to the decoupled patterns of change among the 
alignment factors.  This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: Firms with a strategic view of IS will exhibit decoupled patterns of 
IS alignment.  
 
In this research we examine both IS strategy and IS planning as indicators of a firm’s 
strategic view of IS.  Although related, based on existing literature, we view IS strategy 
and IS planning as representing different aspects of a firm’s view of IS strategy.   
We include IS planning as a part of the strategic view of IS because the strategic role 
of IS in an organization traditionally has been researched as strategic IS planning.  
Strategic IS planning represents a process through which management reviews the role of 
IS and plans its use, typically in order to align the use of IS with the business strategy 
(see for example, Doherty, Marples & Suhaimi 1999; Lederer & Sethi 1996; Henderson 
& West 1979; Raghunathan & Raghunathan 1994).   
We include IS strategy as a part of the strategic view of IS because of its direct 
relevance to the strategic view of IS.  In Section 2, IS strategy was defined in terms of the 
IS specific strategic initiatives.  While frequently inadequately defined in the literature, a 
review of current literature shows that IS strategy most often refers to the way a firm uses 
technology to support its business strategy.  For example, Sabherwal et al. (2001) 
identified categories of how IS was being used to “impact the organization”, while 
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Ciborra (1992) states that strategic IS is, in part, “a set of guidelines indicating how IT 
can support the business.”  Defining IS strategy in terms of the IS strategic initiatives or 
the means by which the firm is using IS to reach its goals is consistent with prior use.  
Because IS strategy is defined separately from IS planning, IS strategy is measured 
separately from IS planning.     
To examine how a firm views IS strategically, we have developed hypotheses to test 
both the degree of formalized IS planning and the degree of formalized IS strategy.  The 
concepts of formalized IS planning processes and IS strategy focus on how formalized 
the IS strategic initiatives and IS planning process are; that is, the degree to which 
management has determined and documented the IS Strategy and IS planning processes.  
As noted above, hypothesis “a” is as predicted by alignment as synchronization and 
hypothesis “b“, is as predicted by TAGA.    
Hypothesis 2a: Firms with a formal IS planning process exhibit traditional 
patterns of alignment as synchronization where a change in one factor is related 
to changes in all four internal alignment factors. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Firms with a formal IS planning process exhibit decoupled 
patterns of change among the four internal alignment factors. 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Firms with a formal IS strategy exhibit traditional patterns of 
alignment as synchronization where a change in one factor is related to changes 
in all four internal alignment factors. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Firms with a formal IS strategy exhibit decoupled patterns of 
change among the four internal alignment factors. 
 
3.2 Phase II –Examining Factors that Influence Change in the 
Alignment System 
Phase II examines the triggers of change in the alignment factors by developing 
dimensions of external change.  Developing dimensions of external change is a necessary 
step in understanding the effect of external change on the internal structure of an 
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alignment factor.  Once the dimensions of change are investigated, the research can move 
forward with a focus on how IS can be structured to enable the adaptation process.4   
The motivation for the research is based on TAGA and the related theoretical 
foundation of complexity theory.  Complexity theory is introduced in the next section.  
Then Phase II research is presented.  
3.2.1 Implications of Complexity Theory for Factors that Influence 
Change in the Alignment System           
TAGA, with its systems theory approach, focuses on explaining alignment via the 
interaction between the alignment factors and their outer environments.  Further 
theoretical insight is necessary, however, to understand the internal structure of the 
alignment factors.  Complexity theory shows promise in this regard.  The combined 
theoretical perspective of complexity theory and TAGA provides a holistic approach that 
can be used to develop the role of information systems in enabling the adaptation process.   
Complexity theory shares TAGA’s roots in evolutionary theory and similarly views 
an organization as a complex system subject to both uncontrollable external forces and 
the guiding forces of human actors.    At the root of complexity theory is the premise that, 
although a single system in isolation may be a simple system, complexity emerges as a 
result of the interaction among mutually-adaptive systems (Axelrod & Cohen 2000).  
Complexity theory provides further theoretical insight in two ways.  First, although 
TAGA includes a role for management, complexity theory is further developed in terms 
                                                 
4
 The terms “enable” and “constrain” will be used to describe the role of IS in the alignment process.  The 
terms “enable” and “constrain” have been use frequently in the literature (Allen & Boynton 1991; Boynton 
1993; Ives et al. 1993; Luftman, Papp & Brier 1999; Luftman & Brier 1999; Weill & Broadbent 2000;), but 
not well defined.  Webster’s New World Dictionary defines enable as “the means to make able or to 
provide with means,” while constrain is defined as “to restrain or hold back.”  In contextual terms, when a 
subsystem is able to adapt to changes in its outer environment, it enables (i.e., supports and facilitates) 
organizational adaptation.  When, on the other hand, a subsystem is unable to respond to changes in its 
outer environment without changes to its internal structure and functioning, then the subsystem constrains 
the ability of the organization as a whole to adapt to changes in its external environment. 
     31 
of separating the role of management from the information systems in that it recognizes 
explicitly that the two interact to influence the evolutionary path the firm travels.   
Second, complexity theory provides a way to view the role of information systems as an 
enabler of, or as a constraint on, the organizational system’s adaptation process.   
Using complexity theory, the role of management in TAGA can be viewed as that of 
a human agent.  Complexity theory views a complex system as a population of agents 
(Axelrod & Cohen 2000).  An agent, frequently a human actor, is something that has the 
ability to interact with its environment or with other agents and has the capability to take 
action that leads towards a goal or goals (Axelrod & Cohen 2000).  The agents have 
varying skills, knowledge, and experience that impact their ability to interact with 
artifacts.   
Artifacts are objects, such as a hammer or a computer, that have specific properties 
but do not have the ability to initiate the interaction with an agent (Axelrod & Cohen 
2000).  Artifacts have characteristics that can evoke certain actions on the part of an 
agent, increasing the likelihood that an agent will initiate a certain interaction (Axelrod & 
Cohen 2000); for example, the characteristics of a hammer increase the likelihood that an 
agent with the goal of driving in a nail would more likely interact with a hammer than a 
computer.     
From the perspective of TAGA, the organization can be viewed as a system (the 
alignment system) composed of subsystems (the alignment factors).  According to 
complexity theory, the inner structure of a subsystem is comprised of human agents and 
artifacts.   Within the subsystem, human agents interact with artifacts to move towards 
the system’s goal or goals.    
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Recall from Section 2.2.4 that the short-term independence between a subsystem and 
its coexisting subsystems, allows the subsystem to adapt to changes in its outer 
environment.  The ability of the organization as a holistic unit to adapt to change in its 
external environment depends on the ability of each of the subsystems, individually, to 
adapt to the changes in their outer environment.  When a subsystem can no longer adapt 
and requires a change to its internal structure, the organization as a holistic unit cannot 
continue towards its goals until the internal structure of the subsystem is altered to meet 
the changing needs of the environment.  Viewing the organization as a complex 
alignment system that depends on the ability of each alignment factor (that is, each 
subsystem) to adapt to change, the alignment factors either enable or constrain the 
organization from moving towards its goals.  
3.2.2 Guiding the Adaptation Process 
Combining the theoretical perspective of complexity theory and TAGA, as described 
in Section 3.2.1, the firm can be viewed as a sociotechnical system that recognizes and 
combines the uncontrollable, changing environment of a firm with the ability of 
management to guide the way the organization adapts to its environment, either by 
reacting to, or anticipating, change in the environment.  Management, as human agents, 
creates and interacts with the organizational artifacts.  Managers can guide the 
organization towards its desired future state by manipulating the internal structure of the 
organization in a way that allows the organization, to the extent possible, to maintain an 
invariant relationship to its environment.   
Successfully guiding the way a man-made system responds to its environment 
requires determining the current state of the system, establishing the desired future state, 
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and developing paths by which the system can move towards its desired future state 
(Merry 1995).  Management must act upon either the outer environment of the alignment 
factor or its inner environment to reduce the distance between the existing state and the 
desired state.  By definition, however, the outer environment is largely uncontrollable, 
leaving the inner structure of the system as the primary focus of management’s 
manipulation.   
Lack of management control over the outer environment does not mean that the outer 
environment is irrelevant.  On the contrary, recall that management must understand the 
outer environment and the interface between the outer environment and the subsystem in 
order to understand how to best structure the subsystem for goal attainment (Simon 
1996).  It is the complexity of the environment and the uncertainty that complexity 
creates that drives the need for adaptation (Simon 1996).  Therefore, understanding the 
environment is essential to determining how adaptable the system must be to maintain an 
invariant relationship with its environment and to pursue the system’s goals in a 
constantly changing environment.   
Adaptability, however, is not obtained without cost.  An organization that is adaptable 
must have characteristics that allow it to be sufficiently flexible to enable change (Stalk, 
Evans & Shulman 1992).  If an organization is too flexible, firm resources will be wasted.  
By understanding the environmental demands the system needs to meet, management 
may be able to make decisions that balance the need for adaptability in its systems with 
the costs required to create the adaptability.  The key role for management, then, is to 
structure and use the subsystems of an organization in a way that matches the nature of 
the inner environment to the nature of the outer environment in which the system must 
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function (Merry 1995). In other words, the more change in the outer environment, the 
more adaptable the inner structure of a system must be to accommodate the change over 
time.   
While the theory of alignment as guided adaptation applies to the entire alignment 
system, the goal of this dissertation is to focus on IS alignment, which can be viewed as a 
subset of overall alignment.  Specifically, IS alignment relates to the use of information 
systems’ strategies and structures and process to support the overall alignment process 
and hence the ability of the organization to adapt to its environment. The general 
argument applied to all of the alignment factors can be applied to the specific factors of 
IS strategy and IS structures, which are viewed as a subsystem of the alignment system.  
This is referred to as the IS subsystem. 
The first step in understanding how information systems enable the adaptation 
process is to examine the characteristics of the environment that the information systems 
must be structured to accommodate.  We must be able to determine the nature of the 
outer environment in order to match the internal structure of the IS subsystem with the 
needs of the outer environment. Only by understanding the nature of external change, can 
we gain an understanding of how information systems should be structured.   
It is therefore proposed that the next step in this stream of research is to examine the 
characteristics of change in the outer environment of an alignment factor by developing 
dimensions of external change that can then be applied specifically to IS.   
3.2.3 Change in the Outer Environment of an Alignment Factor as the 
Trigger for Adaptation 
TAGA suggests that change in the outer environment drives the adaptation of an 
internal alignment factor.  Little is known about what characteristics of change in the 
     35 
outer environment trigger adaptation in an alignment factor.  The lack of knowledge of 
the characteristics of environmental change leads to the following research question for 
Phase II: 
Research Question 2: What characteristics of change in the outer environment 
impact the adaptation of an internal alignment factor?  
 
Recall from Section 2.2.1 that the ability of a system to accomplish its goals depends 
only on a few key characteristics of the alignment factor’s outer environment and not on 
the details of the environment (Simon 1996).  The alignment factor can be designed to 
address the most relevant characteristics and structured to maximize the length of time it 
can maintain an invariant relationship with its environment.  The result is a system that, 
due to its internal design, is better able to achieve its goals even when there is change in 
its outer environment (Simon 1996).   
Also recall from Section 2.2.1 that TAGA suggests that the impact of a change in the 
outer environment on an internal alignment factor depends on how the change in its outer 
environment interacts with the goals and composition of the internal alignment factor. 
The need for change in each of the internal alignment factors depends on the ability of 
each factor to continue to serve its organizational purpose given the nature of the changes 
to its outer environment.  An environmental change that requires one alignment factor to 
alter its internal structure may not be great enough to require other individual alignment 
factors to change concurrently.   
To accommodate the view of change as the trigger for adaptation, we need to 
understand what aspects of change are important in assessing the impact of external 
change on the structure and function of the alignment factor.   Change, therefore, might 
be best examined from the perspective of the characteristics of change, referred to here as 
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“dimensions,” that can measure the significance of a change in the outer environment on 
the internal structure of an alignment factor.   Understanding the dimensions of change 
facilitates predicting whether an alignment factor can adapt to the change or will require 
change to its internal structure to accommodate the change.  Understanding when the 
internal structure of an alignment factor requires change is the first step towards 
understanding how to structure the alignment factor to enable organizational adaptation.  
The following four sections identify theoretically based dimensions of change by 
drawing upon prior research and the theory of alignment as guided adaptation to develop 
these dimensions.  Specifically, it is proposed that change varies by level, magnitude, and 
pace, as well as by the three dimensions combined.   
3.2.3.1 Level of Change (Hierarchy)   
The first dimension of change that is seen as important in determining the impact on 
the alignment factors is the level of change.  TAGA is a multilevel model that examines 
alignment at a system level (the alignment system) and at a subsystem level (the internal 
alignment factors).  TAGA’s multilevel approach establishes a hierarchical structure to 
the alignment factors (see Figure 2.2). 
According to TAGA, the level of change likely to require change in other alignment 
factors is change that is initiated higher in the alignment system hierarchy.  Adaptation 
occurring at the organizational level is triggered by change in the external environment or 
in the strategic intent.  Adaptation occurring at the level of the individual internal 
alignment factors is triggered by the changes in the outer environment.  Change in the 
outer environment of the individual internal alignment factors includes change to any of 
the other internal alignment factors. For example, a change in strategy is more likely to 
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trigger internal change in the lower level alignment factor of organizational structure than 
vice versa (Amburgey & Dacin 1994; Chandler 1962).   
As noted in Section 2.2.2, the hierarchy is not a strict hierarchy in which a higher- 
level change is required to initiate change in a lower level alignment factor.  TAGA 
recognizes that the other dimensions may dominate the interaction between the external 
change and the alignment factor.  For example, a lower level change may be of such great 
magnitude (see Proposition 4) that it causes a change in a higher level.  Proposition 3 
indicates that a higher level change is more likely to result in changes in lower levels than 
vice versa but does not indicate a direct causal relationship between the higher level 
change and changes in lower level alignment factors.   
The following impact of level of change is proposed:  
Proposition 3: The higher the level in the alignment hierarchy at which change 
occurs, the greater the likelihood that the internal structure of an alignment 
factor will need to be altered. 
 
3.2.3.2 Magnitude of Initiating Change 
The second proposed dimension of change is magnitude.  The most common attempts 
to define and measure change are via its magnitude (for example: Amburgey & Dacin 
2001; Huff, Huff, & Thomas 1992; Huff & Huff 1995).  The magnitude of change 
represents the size of the change (Huff & Huff 1995).  The magnitude of change has been 
used in examining changes to business strategy (Huff & Huff 1995).  Amburgey and 
Dacin (1994) also determined that the magnitude of change in strategy increases the 
likelihood of a corresponding change in structure and vice versa.  
The theory of alignment as guided adaptation indicates that a change in any one of the 
alignment factors perturbs the environment of the others.  Thus it is expected that the 
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magnitude of the motivating trigger (change) increases the likelihood that change in one 
alignment factor will necessitate change in the internal structure of other factors.  For 
example, implementing a new enterprise wide application is more likely to trigger 
changes in other alignment factors than upgrading a CAD program that only affects the 
engineering department. 
Proposition 4: The greater the magnitude of change in the outer environment, the 
greater the likelihood that the internal structure of an alignment factor will need 
to be altered. 
3.2.3.3 Pace of Change (Frequency) 
The third dimension of change proposed is the pace of change.  The pace of change 
represents the rate at which change in the environment occurs.  The pace of change in the 
outer environment is likely to be positively correlated with the need for alignment factors 
to alter their internal structure.  To measure change from a process perspective requires a 
dimension that can capture the “rate” or the number of occurrences of change over a unit 
of time.  Tushman and Romanelli (1985) proposed a similar concept indicating that the 
greater the rate of change in the environment, the more likely the organization would 
need to change its strategy, power, structure, and controls.  Hidding (2001) suggested a 
similar dimension, stating that the speed of change in the environment determines the 
length of a product’s competitive advantage.  The underlying argument of both Tushman 
and Romanelli (1985) and Hidding (2001) is that the rate of change in the environment 
impacts the rate of change within an organization (i.e., changes to strategy, organizational 
structures, or product life).    
Proposition 5: The greater the pace of change in the outer environment, the 
greater the likelihood that the internal structure of an alignment factor will need 
to be altered. 
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3.2.3.4 Dynamism of Change 
Although each dimension is proposed as a separate measure, the dimensions apply 
concurrently.  Change in the outer environment, therefore, can be characterized by all 
three dimensions: the level, the magnitude, and the frequency of the change in the outer 
environment.  The combined dimensions can be viewed as a measure of how dynamic the 
environment is; the more dynamic the environment, the more likely that the internal 
alignment factors will no longer fulfill their purpose, resulting in a need for the internal 
structure to change.   
Consider an outer environment that has small but frequent changes.  Any specific 
change may be of such limited magnitude that is does not have a substantial impact on 
the internal structure of an alignment factor, but if the change is high in the alignment 
hierarchy and occurs frequently, the combined nature of the changes could trigger the 
need for the internal structure of an alignment factor to change.  The interaction of any 
combination of level, magnitude, or frequency is likely to have a greater effect on the 
need to alter the internal structure of an internal alignment factor than any single 
dimension in isolation.   
Proposition 6: The more dynamic the outer environment (greater the level, 
magnitude, and pace of change), the greater the likelihood that the internal 
structure of an alignment factor will need to be altered. 
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4 Chapter 4 – Research Method 
To address the research questions presented above, multiple case studies were 
conducted using a positivist approach (Yin 1994).  A case study is the preferred research 
method for several reasons.  First, the primary research question is explanatory in nature, 
requiring examination of change events to understand how information systems can be 
used by an organization to adapt to its environment.  A case study is appropriate when a 
“how” question is being asked (Yin 1994; Benbasat, Goldstein, & Mead 1987), 
particularly when the research is examining events over which the researcher has little or 
no control.   
Second, this research focuses on identifying patterns of change events occurring over 
time and examining the relationships between the factors related to each change event.  It 
is best to derive this understanding and knowledge of the patterns of change events 
through in-depth interviews with individuals familiar with the company and through 
examination of documentation, which can be used to triangulate the change events.     
Third, a case study design is appropriate in the early stages of theory testing for which 
there are no prior existing measurement instruments (Yin 1994).  The theory of alignment 
as guided adaptation is in the early stages of theory testing and there are no prior existing 
instruments for measuring the constructs. 
Finally, a case study provides a rich environment that allows the researcher to 
understand the nature and complexity of the phenomena (Benbasat et al. 1987).  Other 
research methods such as survey or experiment would not permit the identification of 
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patterns of change events and the rich description and detail required to understand the 
relationships between the change events and alignment factors. 
4.1 Testing Propositions and Hypotheses Using Pattern 
Matching 
We used controlled deductions based on empirical data (Lee 1989) for testing the 
theory of alignment as guided adaptation.  These controlled deductions take the form of 
theoretically-derived propositions that can be falsified, as seen in Chapter 3.  Propositions 
are essential for a rigorous case study research design because they link the research 
questions to the data to be collected and keep the research focused on answering the 
research question (Yin 1994).  The data is linked to the propositions using “pattern 
matching” (Yin 1994; Lee 1989), a technique that allows a theoretically-predicted pattern 
to be matched with the pattern empirically derived from the data.  
In addition to the use of propositions in all phases of the research, Phase I also tests 
falsifiable hypotheses using pattern matching (Yin 1994; Lee 1989).  Phase I uses 
hypotheses because the independent and dependent variables have been developed in 
sufficient detail in prior research to allow testing of hypotheses (Ward and Vessey 
Working Paper) and because the use of rival hypotheses allows one of the hypotheses to 
be ruled out (Lee 1989; Yin 1994).      
Propositions, only, are stated in Phase II.  First, Phases II represents a new area of 
investigation.  Although the variables are operationalized in Section 4.4, there is no prior 
research to provide validated measures for the development of hypotheses.  Second, it is 
important to note that the process orientation of the relationship among variables is 
probabilistic and not causal.  We looked, therefore, to establish a relationship between 
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variables based on a “preponderance of evidence” (see later) and not on statistical testing, 
making the higher level of abstraction of a proposition appropriate.   
4.2 Site Selection 
We selected our research sites based on our theory in such a way that we achieved 
both theoretical and literal replication (Yin 1994).  Theoretical replication represents the 
selection of case sites so that they produce “contrasting results but for predictable 
reasons” (Yin 1994).  Theoretical replication is similar to conducting multiple 
experiments where the expected outcomes vary based on variations in testing the 
boundaries of the theory.   Literal replication (reliability) represents the testing of theory 
in an essentially similar setting to determine whether similar results are produced across 
cases.  Literal replication is similar to conducting multiple experiments with the same 
predicted outcomes (Yin 1994).  The combination of theoretical and literal replication 
“provides the vehicle for generalizing to new cases (Yin 1994),” the most important form 
of generalizability for business school research (Lee & Baskerville 2003).    
 Studies were conducted at three organizations.  The first case site (PlumbCo) was a 
midsize corporation with a formal IS strategy and planning process.  Testing TAGA in 
organizations with formal IS strategy and planning processes resulted in theoretical 
replication.5  The potential confounding with organizational size was controlled for by 
focusing on an organization of similar size for the first case site.  Hence differences in the 
alignment process from the original case are attributable to the effect of formal IS 
strategy and planning processes.   
                                                 
5
 The original case site in which the theory of alignment as guided adaptation was developed is not 
examined in this research.  It is included only to serve as a base-line upon which the additional case sites 
can provide theoretical and literal replication of the research conducted in the development of TAGA.  
Details of the original case can be found in the paper by Ward and Vessey (working paper) 
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To test the proposition that the alignment pattern is independent of firm size, case 
sites 2 (PartCo) and 3 (MotorCo) were large firms.  Larger firms may have more 
sophisticated processes by which alignment as synchronization may occur, processes that 
may be lacking in a midsize firm.  The second case site (PartCo) was a Fortune 500 
supplier to the automotive industry and provides theoretical generalizability of TAGA, to 
firms of much larger size.  The third case site (MotorCo) was a division of a Fortune 200 
company.  An embedded unit of analysis was used at case site 3 where a division of the 
company was examined.  The two large companies, combined with the original case site 
and case site 1, provides theoretical and literal replication based on both the size of the 
organization and the formality of IS strategy and planning.  
4.3 Data Collection 
The primary source of evidence for this study was semi-structured interviews with 
archival documents used as a secondary source.  Interviews were conducted with ten 
high-level business and IS managers at case sites 1 and 2.  Eleven high-level business and 
IS managers were interviewed at case site 3.  See Tables 4-1a, b, and c for titles and 
tenure of those interviewed.  The interviews were conducted on site, and in private, that 
is, one-on-one with the interviewee.  All interviews were strictly confidential; only the 
researchers have the ability to associate the confidential information with its source.   
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Title Tenure with Company 
Director of Information Technology 9 
Director of SAP Center of Excellence 10 
Director of Logistics 10 
Director of Supply Chain Systems 28 
Manager of Supply Chain, SAP Center of 
Excellence 
28 
IS Manager, FI/HR 17 
IS Manager, SAP COE, Sales/Marketing 10 
Corporate Accounting Controller 20 
Human Resource Manager 10 
Business Systems Analyst 14 
Table 4-1a: PlumbCo Interviewees 
 
 
Title Tenure with Company6 
Senior V.P. and CIO 5 
V.P. Information Technology 6 
V.P. of Technology Infrastructure and Operations 6 
V.P. Worldwide Operations 21 
V.P. and G.M. CVE& Specialty Products 3.5 
V.P. Truck & Industrial Products 25 
Director, Technology Integration 15 
Director of LVS Finance 14 
Director of Program Management Office; LVS IT 20 
Manager of Business Systems Solutions, North 
America 
7 
Table 4-1b: PartCo Interviewees 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 The tenure date for employees of PartCo includes their time with the companies that merged in 2000 to 
form PartCo. 
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Title Tenure with Company 
V.P. of Information Technology 33 
Director of Engineering Administration & Systems 20 
Director of Information Technology  21 
Director of Marketing and eBusiness 10 
Director of Oracle Application Development 26 
Director of eBusiness 8 
eBusiness Leader  8 
Director of Oracle Programming 15 
Manager of Engineering Systems 19 
I.T. Program Manager   7 
Program Manager, Engineering/Configurator 11 
Table 4-1c: MotorCo Interviewees 
 
A semi-structured interview guide (see Appendix A) consisting of open ended 
questions and references for the interviewer was used to guide the interviews.  The use of 
a semi-structured interview guide served to standardize the data collection from the 
interviews, increasing replicability, and minimizing interviewer bias, thus increasing 
reliability across interviews and cases (Yin 1994).  The questions required respondents to 
identify change events and their impact on the alignment factors.  The interviews were 
recorded and transcribed. 
Additional data was obtained from different types of documentation.  SEC and other 
regulatory filings, when available, were used to gain a better historical perspective on the 
company and to triangulate events and dates described during the interviews.  Company 
promotional material such as brochures and the company web sites were also examined 
to triangulate evidence from the interviews.  
4.4 Operationalization of Variables 
This section operationalizes the variables in the propositions and hypotheses.   The 
variables are presented according to the phase in which they are used. 
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4.4.1 Phase I 
This section operationalizes firm size, formality of IS strategy and planning, and the 
alignment pattern for both alignment as synchronization and alignment as guided 
adaptation.  Firm size and degree of formalized IS strategy and IS planning are the 
independent variables in this phase of the research.  Firm size was operationalized based 
on firm revenues.  Firms with revenues between 20 million and 1 billion dollars were 
defined as “midsized” and firms with revenues over 1 billion dollars were defined as 
“large.”   
Formalized IS strategy and IS planning were operationalized using an instrument 
adapted from Segars and Grover’s (1999) profile of strategic information systems 
planning.  The instrument was used to assess the degree of formalized IS strategy and 
planning processes at each case site.  Respondents were asked to complete a short survey 
with ten questions (See Appendix A).  The first five questions were taken directly from 
Segars and Grover’s (1999) validated instrument to assess the formality of IS strategy 
and planning.  Although this instrument does not specifically address the degree of 
formalized IS strategy, the domains of IS planning and IS strategy are similar and the 
second five questions were an adaptation of Segars and Grover’s instrument designed to 
prompt the interviewee to respond to similar inquires regarding the degree of formalized 
IS strategy.      
The dependent variable is the pattern of alignment.  The pattern of alignment was 
operationalized based on the patterns of change events in the alignment factors.   
Interviewees were asked to identify change events in the alignment factors.  A change to 
either strategic intent or strategic initiative was considered as initiating an alignment 
episode (Ward & Vessey Working Paper) and the pattern of change in the internal factors 
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4.4.2 Phase II 
Testing propositions three through six required the operationalization of the 
dimensions of change as the independent variables; change, however, is not a well 
defined concept (Huff & Huff 1995).  There is limited guidance in the literature on how 
to measure change effectively and while a case study can be used to investigate a 
phenomenon that is not well defined, it still requires criteria by which the success of the 
research can be determined (Yin 1994).   Thus this section operationalizes Phase II 
measures for the level, magnitude, pace, and dynamic nature of change.  However, the 
lack of prior research limits the detail with which the measures can be defined.  
Proposition 3 reflects the level of the initiating change as the independent variable.  
While we are not aware of prior research that measures the level of external change on 
alignment, the level was ascertained directly from the interview data as the level of the 
hierarchy at which the change occurred (see Figure 2-2).  The dependent variable for 
Proposition 3 is the number of related changes in the levels resulting from the initiating 
change event.  The dependent variable for Propositions, 4, 5, and 6, is operationalized as 
the number of related changes per alignment episode in the levels surrounding the 
initiating change event (both higher and lower levels).  
Proposition 4 required the operationalization of the magnitude of change as the 
independent variable.  To define magnitude of change, we drew on the research of Huff, 
Huff & Thomas (1992).  According to Huff et al. (1992), change can be measured via 
magnitude which can be represented by the tension formed by the combination of 
“stress” and “inertia”.  Stress is directly related to change because poor performance 
requires change if the firm is to survive.  On the other hand, inertia is inversely related to 
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change because it represents the existing sociological and structural aspects of the firm 
that resist change (Huff et al. 1992).   
Thus a survey instrument was used to collect data on the magnitude of change events.  
Specifically, after the list of change events was established following the interviews, a 
follow-up survey was used requesting the interviewees confirm and provide feedback on 
the accuracy of the change events and to classify the magnitude of each event as either 
“high,” “medium,” or “low.”  Consistent with Huff et al. (1992) the interviewees were 
ask to consider the stress the change put the company under and the level of resistance to 
the change in determining the magnitude of each change event.  A copy of the follow-up 
surveys can be found in Appendix A. 
Proposition 5 required the pace of change to be operationalized.  The pace of change 
represents the rate of change over a unit of time and was operationalized as the number of 
changes that occur at each level during a change episode.   
Proposition 6 combined the independent variables from Propositions 3, 4, and 5 into 
an overall measure of environmental dynamism.  The factors were combined by 
considering the magnitude and pace at each alignment level of each episode.   
Additional detail on the measures for propositions 3, 4, 5, and 6 along with examples 
of how they were analyzed are provided in the following Data Analysis section and in the 
Chain of Evidence (Appendix B).      
4.5 Data Analysis 
The interviews were transcribed, reviewed manually, and then coded using N5 
qualitative software.  The transcripts were coded by grouping data related to the same 
change event and then by grouping these change events into episodes.  The transcripts 
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grouped paragraphs and groups of sentences large enough to convey sufficient 
information so that they could be clustered into a change event without losing the 
contextual meaning.  The coding was reviewed iteratively and recoded until no changes 
were being made to the groupings.   
Change events were identified for each of the alignment factors.  Events that occurred 
external to the firm, such as a change in a market condition or changes in regulatory 
environment, were coded as external events (see Table 4-2).  Changes in strategy were 
coded either as a change in the strategic intent (goals) of the organization or as a change 
in a strategic initiative (Lovas and Ghoshal 2000).  Changes in organizational structure 
were coded by looking for changes in corporate structures such as the creation of a new 
legal entity or a new operating entity.  Changes in processes such as re-engineering or 
changes in manufacturing processes were also coded as organizational structure change 
events.  Change events in the IS domain that relate to IS strategy and structure were 
similarly coded.     
EE External 
Environment 
Changes that occurred external to the firm 
SG Strategic Intent Changes in company goals  
SI Strategic 
Initiatives  
Changes in business strategy that represent significant 
changes in the way the company does business 
OS Organization 
Structure 
Changes in the way the organization is structured; 
defined as changes in organizational structure (as 
represented, for example, in the organization chart) or 
changes in significant management responsibilities 
IS IS Strategy Changes in strategic initiatives that represent 
significant changes in the way the company utilizes IS 
IT IS Structure Changes in IS structure and/or processes 
Table 4-2: Definition of Events 
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The change events were coded into episodes.  An episode represents a time period 
delimited by a change in the organization’s strategic intent or strategic initiatives (Ward 
& Vessey Working Paper).  An episode was initiated by a change in either strategic intent 
or strategic initiative and lasted until the next change in strategic intent or strategic 
initiative which began a new episode.   
The episodes and change events were organized as a time ordered matrix (Miles & 
Huberman 1994), an analysis process referred to as a temporal bracketing strategy by 
Langley (1999).  The data in the tables were also charted graphically by alignment factor 
with lines connecting related change events (see Figure 4-1).   
Coding the data in table and figure form reduces the complexity of the change events 
and their inter-relationships by reducing them to a condensed, logically coherent, 
framework that makes it easier and quicker to understand (Miles & Huberman 1994).   
The interview data was the primary data and was analyzed based on a “preponderance 
of the evidence.”  The use of case study methodology, the lack of validated measures, and 
the process orientation of TAGA, prohibits the use of statistical analysis and requires the 
researcher to use discretion and judgment in analysis of the qualitative data.  The multiple 
interviews as sources of data required the researcher to make decisions as to whether the 
data supported or not the propositions when perceptions of interviewees conflict.   
4.6 Case Analysis 
The first phase of the case analysis was the development of case write-ups.  The case 
write-ups were used to triangulate change events and resolve conflicting data from the 
individual interviews.  The case write-ups, derived from a summary of all of the data 
collected for each case site, provided detailed information on the case and was provided 
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to the primary contact at the case site to confirm its accuracy.  Discrepancies were 
resolved by reviewing the data and when necessary, by referring back to the original 
source for clarification until the discrepancies were resolved. 
The second phase of the case analysis was the pattern matching to test the 
propositions and hypotheses.  The patterns of change proposed by the propositions were 
matched with the actual patterns observed in the data.  The patterns of alignment are 
summarized in tables and graphical displays.  These displays were then examined to 
determine whether the change events within an episode represented a pattern of 
alignment as synchronization or alignment as guided adaptation.  
The third phase of the case analysis was the analysis of the dimensions of change.  
The preponderance of the evidence approach described in Section 4.5 requires the 
researcher to examine the data in its entirety and to draw conclusions based on the totality 
of the evidence.  It was unlikely, given the lack of direct causality and path dependence in 
process oriented research, that all of the episodes and event data would exhibit similar 
patterns.  Therefore the researchers looked for similar patterns in the majority of episodes 
and events to determine whether the data did or did not support Propositions 3, 4, 5, and 
6.      
The researchers recognize that there are many ways to analyze qualitative data.  The 
following section, therefore, provides the basic logic used in analyzing Propositions 3, 4, 
5, and 6.  The Chain of Evidence (Appendix B) provides detailed examples of how the 
data was analyzed for each proposition.  
Analysis of Proposition 3 was analyzed based on the dimension of level to determine 
the number of related changes in the levels above and below the initiating change event.  
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The data was presented graphically similarly to Figure 4-1 to examine the level at which 
change events occurred.  The key to interpreting the data was to compare the number of 
related change events triggered by higher level initiating changes with the number of 
related change events triggered by lower level initiating changes.  If in the majority of 
initiating change events, the higher level initiating changes resulted in a greater number 
of changes in the alignment factors than change events that were initiated at lower levels; 
the data was interpreted as supporting proposition 3. 
Proposition 4 was analyzed based upon the survey of event magnitude.  The 
interviewees’ responses were combined and averaged for each event to determine 
whether the respondents perceived the event to represent a “high,” “medium,” or “low” 
magnitude of change to the firm.  Additionally, secondary sources of data, when available 
were analyzed to allow for triangulation.     
The single change events and related lower level change events were analyzed to 
determine whether Proposition 4 is supported.  The magnitude of each initiating change 
event was compared to the number of related change events associated with each 
initiating change event.  P4 was considered supported when change events of greater 
magnitude were more likely to be related to other change events than change events of 
lesser magnitude.  
 Proposition 5 addressed the pace of change at each level of alignment factor by 
episode.  Proposition 5 was analyzed by comparing the number of change events at each 
level for each episode to the number of related change events.  When an increased rate of 
external change was more likely to result in changes in an internal alignment factor, P5 
was considered supported.   
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Proposition 6 was analyzed by combining the measures of level, magnitude, and pace 
of change.  See Appendix B for an example of how the measures may be combined.  P6 
was considered supported when changes of greater level, magnitude, and pace were more 
likely to result in changes to internal alignment factors than were changes of lower 
magnitude, pace, and level.    
4.7 Methodological Rigor  
As with all methodologies, a case study methodology has criteria that must be applied 
to evaluate the quality of the research.  Positivist case study research shares with other 
forms of positivist research the need to establish construct validity, internal validity, 
external validity, and reliability.  These criteria, as applied to positivist case study 
research, are addressed in Table 4-3.   
 
Data Quality Validation Method Construct Validity 
Internal 
Validity Reliability Generalizability 
Use of Multiple Sources of Evidence 
(Yin 1994) Yes    
Use of Chain of Evidence (Yin 1994) Yes  Yes  
Validation of Case Data Write-up by 
Primary Contact (Yin 1994) Yes    
Examining Change Over Time (Yin 
1994)  Yes   
Use of Pattern Matching (Yin 1994)  Yes   
Use of Case Study Protocol (Yin 1994)   Yes  
Use of Archival Documents (Yin 1994)   Yes  
Case Site Selection for Theoretical and 
Literal Replication    Yes 
Table 4-3: Methodological Rigor 
 
Construct validity is addressed by the use of multiple sources of evidence and the 
review of researcher documentation by key informants (Yin 1994).  Interviews were 
conducted with individuals from different backgrounds (i.e. different areas and functions 
within the company), allowing for triangulation.  By triangulating multiple interviews, we 
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were able to develop a common understanding so as to minimize any one individual’s 
contextual bias.  We also triangulated interview data with evidence from archival 
documents.  Finally, construct validity is increased via the establishment of a chain of 
evidence (Yin 1994), which provided a logical link from the research question to the data. 
(See Appendix B).   
Internal validity is addressed primarily through the use of deduction via pattern 
matching and examining change in the alignment factors over time (Yin 1994).  The 
pattern matching of propositions and hypotheses to the data strengthens the causal links 
between the research questions and the data.  Internal validity is likewise increased by the 
examination of IS alignment as a process that occurs over time which reduces the chance 
of including spurious relationships that may arise when phenomena are examined at an 
isolated point in time (Yin, 1994). 
External validity in case study research is achieved via generalizability to theory (Yin 
1994; Lee and Baskerville 2003).  In a positivist study, a single case site can be viewed as 
a single experiment and a single case site can serve to provide disconfirming evidence of 
existing theory (Lee 1989).  Therefore external validity is addressed directly via the 
research design, which provides both theoretical and literal replication, in the same way 
as do multiple experiments. 
Reliability is addressed by the use of a case study protocol, which included semi-
structured interview questions and outlines documentation for review.  The use of a case 
study protocol allowed the researcher to conduct research in multiple case sites and to 
replicate the interview questions and documentation at each site.  The chain of evidence 
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that allows others to follow the links between the research questions and the data that 
answers the questions also increased reliability (Yin 1994). 
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5 Results 
This section presents the results of the research.  It begins with an overview of the 
case studies conducted in this research and includes a focused summary of the observed 
patterns of alignment by case.  The case results are then applied to the two phases of the 
research.  Phase I results are presented by proposition and hypotheses.  Due to the 
exploratory nature of Phase II, the results are presented by proposition only.  
5.1 Overview of Case Study 
The case study data was analyzed by coding the data into alignment episodes 
composed of change events in the alignment factors.  As previously defined, changes in 
business strategy (strategic intent and strategic initiatives) were used to delimit change 
episodes.  Each change event was identified with the following codes, both in the text and 
in the tables:  EE – External Environment, SG – Strategic Goal, SI – Strategic Initiative, 
OS – Organizational Structure, IS – IS Strategy, and IT – IS Structure.   
Each alignment episode is classified as either coupled or decoupled.  A coupled 
alignment episode exhibits related changes to all four of the internal alignment factors 
and is consistent with alignment as synchronization.  Episodes that do not exhibit related 
changes to all four of the internal alignment factors are considered decoupled.  Decoupled 
changes are consistent with alignment as guided adaptation and are inconsistent with the 
notion of alignment as synchronization. 
The case information presented here is intended as an overview of the company and a 
summary of the alignment episodes and events that form the basis for our findings.  
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Detailed company write-ups are presented in Appendix C.  In total, 12 alignment 
episodes and 69 alignment factor change events were documented across the 3 case 
studies (see Table 5-1). 
Number of Alignment 
Episodes/Events PlumbCo PartCo MotorCo 
Episodes 5 4 3 
External Environment 6 3 12 
Strategic Intent  2 1 1 
Strategic Initiatives 5 4 4 
Organizational 
Structure 
3 4 6 
IS Strategy 2 1 2 
IS Structure 8 2 3 
Total Events 26 15 28 
Table 5-1: Summary of Alignment Episodes and Change Events 
 
5.1.1 PlumbCo   
PlumbCo is a U.S. - based international leader in flow control (plumbing) products 
for both the commercial and residential markets.  It is a closely-held, mid-sized company 
with approximately $450 million in annual revenue. PlumbCo has 12 manufacturing 
facilities including facilities in Mexico and Poland that produce products such as 
plumbing values, fittings, and pipe products out of various plastics and metals.  
PlumbCo’s market is mature, characterized by tough competition that is turning the 
product into a commodity.  Its products are sold through wholesalers and major “big box” 
retailers such as Home Depot and Lowes.  PlumbCo has a formal IS strategy and 
planning process and specifically identifies IS as being a strategic tool for competitive 
advantage.   
There were five alignment episodes at PlumbCo during the ten year period (1995 – 
2004) covered by this research (see Table 5-2 and Figure 5-1). These five alignment 
episodes represent 26 change events in the alignment factors (see Table 5-1).   
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Episode 1 – Developing an Infrastructure for Growth   
“Alignment 
Factor” 
  
Date 
Initiated 
Description Trigger 
External 
Environment 
Early 
Nineties and 
Continuing 
Proliferation of Big Box Retailers (EE-1)  
 
Mid-nineties 
and 
Continuing 
Consolidation of Wholesalers (EE-2)  
Strategic Intent 
(Goals) 
1995 Growth (SG-1) Changes in Market Distribution 
Channels (EE-1)(EE-2) 
Business 
Strategy/ 
Initiatives 
1995 Developing a Technology Infrastructure (SI-
1) 
Growth Strategy (SG-1) 
Organization 
Structure 
1995 Eliminating Divisional Structure and Moved 
to a Functional Matrix Structure (OS-1) 
Developing a Technology 
Infrastructure (SI-1) 
 
1995-1997 Consolidating Distribution from 15 to 4 
Warehouses (OS-2) 
Developing a Technology 
Infrastructure (SI-1) 
IS Strategy 1996 Maintaining a Current Technology 
Infrastructure (IS-1) 
Developing a Technology 
Infrastructure (SI-1) 
IS Structure 1997 Implementing SAP R/3 (IT-1) Developing a Technology 
Infrastructure (SI-1) 
Table 5-2a: Summary of PlumbCo Alignment Episodes 
 
 
 
 
Episode 2 – Leveraging Technology Infrastructure for Cost Savings   
“Alignment 
Factor” 
  
Date 
Initiated 
Description Trigger 
External 
Environment 
Late 
Nineties  
Increasing Competition from Foreign 
Manufactures (EE-3) 
 
 
1999 Buyback of Family-Owned Stock (EE-4)  
Strategic Intent 
(Goals) 
 No Change  
Strategic 
Initiatives 
1998 Leveraging Technology Infrastructure for 
Cost Savings (SI-2) 
Price Pressures (EE-1)(EE-
2)(EE-3) and Buyout(EE-4)  
Organization 
Structure 
 No Change  
IS Strategy 1998 No Change  
IS Structure 1999 Upgrade to SAP Version 4.0b (IT-2) Initial IS Strategy (IS-1) 
Table 5-2b: Summary of PlumbCo Alignment Episodes 
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Episode 3 – Implementing eCommerce   
“Alignment 
Factor” 
  
Date 
Initiated 
Description Trigger 
External 
Environment 
 
 
 
Strategic Intent 
(Goals) 
 No Change 
 
Strategic 
Initiatives 
1999 Introducing eCommerce (SI-3) Up-to-date IT Infrastructure 
(IT-2) 
Organization 
Structure 
 No Change  
IS Strategy  No Change  
IS Structure 2000 Go Live on SAP Human Resources (IT-3) Initial IS Strategy (IS-1) 
 
2001 Upgrading to SAP Version 4.6c (IT-4) Initial IS Strategy (IS-1) 
Table 5-2c: Summary of PlumbCo Alignment Episodes 
 
 
 
Episode 4 – Growing via Acquisition   
“Alignment 
Factor” 
  
Date 
Initiated 
Description Trigger 
External 
Environment 
 
 
 
Strategic Intent 
(Goals) 
 No Change 
 
Strategic 
Initiatives 
2002 Growth via Acquisition (SI-4)  
Organization 
Structure 
2002 Acquired Regional Producer (OS-3) Strategic Initiative for Growth 
Via Acquisition (SI-4 ) and 
Experience Converting Polish 
Sub(IT-5) 
IS Strategy  No Change  
IS Structure 2002 Go Live with SAP at Poland Subsidiary (IT-5) Acquisition Strategy (SI-6) and 
Acquisition (OS-3) 
 
2002 Converting Acquisition  to SAP (IT-6) Acquisition (OS-3) 
Table 5-2d: Summary of PlumbCo Alignment Episodes 
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Episode 5 – Innovating via New Product Development   
“Alignment 
Factor” 
  
Date 
Initiated 
Description Trigger 
External 
Environment 
2000 Increasing Regulation of Hazardous 
Materials Content (EE-5) 
 
 
2002 Inflation in Raw Material Prices (EE-6)  
Strategic 
Intent (Goals) 
2002 Updated SLRP: Growth, Lean, and MAX 
(SG-2) 
 
Strategic 
Initiatives 
2003 Innovation via New Product Development 
(SI-5) 
Continued Price Pressures (EE-6), 
Increasing Regulatory Requirements 
(EE-5) and New Strategic Goals (SG-
2) 
Organization 
Structure 
 No Change  
IS Strategy 2003 Focus on Content Delivery (IS-2) Updated SLRP (SG-2) 
IS Structure 2003 Implementation of Business Warehouse 
(IT-7) 
Content Delivery (IS-2) 
 
2004 Upgraded R/3 to Version 4.7 (IT-8) Normal Maintenance 
Table 5-2e: Summary of PlumbCo Alignment Episodes 
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Figure 5-1: PlumbCo Timeline 
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5.1.1.1 Episode 1 – Developing an Infrastructure for Growth 
Episode Summary - The first alignment episode at PlumbCo was a period of 
infrastructure development triggered by changes in the industry structure.  The trend 
towards consolidation in the wholesalers and the emergence of big box retailers 
threatened PlumbCo’s future by commoditizing the industry (EE-1 & EE-2).  
Management conducted a long-range strategic planning process as a first step in 
countering the evolving market forces.  The long-range strategic planning process 
established growth as the strategic goal (SG-1). The new strategic growth goal, however, 
could not be supported by the current company infrastructure.  PlumbCo established a 
strategic initiative to develop and maintain an up-to-date IS infrastructure that would 
enable it to provide services to customers that could differentiate PlumbCo from its 
competitors and enable growth (SI-1).   
The growth goal and the strategic initiative to develop an IS infrastructure triggered 
changes in the organizational structure.  The organization was restructured to form a 
functional matrix that leveraged the integrated information infrastructure (OS-1).  The 
distribution process was also re-engineered to reduce the number of distribution centers 
and to rely on the technology for effective tracking of inventory and distribution (OS-2).  
Both IS strategy and IS structure were updated to support the growth goal and leverage 
the strategic initiative to develop an IS infrastructure.  An IS strategy was developed to 
support the strategic goal and initiative by maintaining an up-to-date IS infrastructure (IS-
1). The IS structure was established by implementing SAP R/3 (IT-1).   
Alignment Summary - Episode 1 exhibited coupled changes in the alignment 
factors. The changes in the external environment triggered an evaluation and subsequent 
change to the strategic goals of the company. A new strategic initiative was established 
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and the organizational structure, IS strategy, and IS structure, were all altered to support 
the strategic goal.   
5.1.1.2 Episode 2 – Leveraging the Technology infrastructure 
for Cost Savings 
Episode Summary -The second episode involved changes in strategic initiatives 
designed to leverage the new IS infrastructure (SI-2).  Once an ERP infrastructure is 
implemented and the organization has had time to adjust to the implementation, 
frequently organizations will go through a phase to leverage the new system (Markus & 
Tanis 2000).  In PlumbCo’s case, the company developed new strategic initiatives to 
change the inventory process, to develop metrics for measuring quality, and to centralize 
the purchasing process, by leveraging the new infrastructure.   
Changes in the environment contributed to the development of these initiatives.  First, 
the on-going pressures of a changing industry structure were continuing to place pressure 
on PlumbCo’s profit margins (EE-1& EE-2).  Second, during this period, foreign 
manufacturers were threatening PlumbCo’s market share by undercutting price (EE-3).  
Third, PlumbCo is a closely-held company and there were family shareholders who 
wanted to be bought out (EE-4).  The combination of these environmental factors led 
PlumbCo to focus on leveraging their IS infrastructure for cost effectiveness.     
The prior strategic initiative, to develop a strategic IS infrastructure, resulted in an 
organizational structure, IS strategy and IS structure that was robust enough to remain 
adapted to the changed strategic initiative. There was a change in the IS structure, 
however, related to the IS strategy of maintaining an up-to-date IS infrastructure.  The IS 
structure was upgraded to the latest SAP R/3 release (IT-2). 
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Alignment Summary - Episode 2 exhibited decoupled changes in the alignment 
factors.  Continuing and new external pressures resulted in a change in strategic initiative, 
but no change in strategic intent.  The existing organizational structure, IS strategy, and 
IS structure did not require realignment to support the change in strategic initiative that 
triggered Episode 2.  The change in IS structure that occurred during this period was a 
result of the existing IS strategy and not the result of the newly implemented strategic 
initiative.   
5.1.1.3 Episode 3 – Implementing eCommerce 
Episode Summary - Episode 3 involved the implementation of ecommerce at 
PlumbCo (SI-3).  The recent upgrade of the ERP infrastructure (IT-2) provided a portal 
for customers to check inventory availability, pricing, and other order related 
information, and allowed for the exchange of data with customers and suppliers via EDI.  
The increased interaction with customers enabled PlumbCo to manage customers’ 
inventory directly, a process referred to as vendor managed inventory (VMI).  The 
existing IS strategy (IS-1) of maintaining an up-to-date infrastructure provided the 
capabilities to support the strategic ecommerce initiatives and PlumbCo did not alter the 
organizational structure or the IS strategy or structure to support the new strategic 
initiative.  PlumbCo simply leveraged existing capabilities to enable these new services.   
During this episode, two changes to the IS structure occurred that were unrelated to 
the ecommerce initiatives. The first change to IS structure was the implementation of the 
SAP’s human resources module (IT-3).  The second change was a further upgrade of the 
ERP infrastructure in the form of a new release of SAP’s R/3 (IT-4).  Both changes were 
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driven by the proactive IS strategy and did not result in changes to the other alignment 
factors. 
Alignment Summary - Episode 3 exhibited decoupled changes in alignment factors.  
A new strategic initiative leveraged the evolving IS structure and was consistent with the 
strategic intent established in Episode 1.  The remaining alignment factors were still 
appropriately adapted after the change in strategic initiative and did not require 
realignment.  The changes in IS structure were decoupled from the other alignment 
factors and were not linked to any other event changes within the alignment episode. 
5.1.1.4 Episode 4 - Growing via Acquisition 
Episode Summary -The fourth episode was introduced by a new strategic initiative, 
that of growth via acquisition (SI-4) and, similar to SI-3, was consistent with the existing 
growth strategy (SG-1).  The acquisition strategy sought to leverage the excess capacity 
of PlumbCo’s robust IS infrastructure.  The target acquisition was a regional 
manufacturer of related plumbing products.  PlumbCo believed that they could benefit by 
leveraging PlumbCo’s excess IS infrastructure to lower the consolidated overhead costs 
and that the acquired product line would benefit from PlumbCo’s national distribution 
channels thereby increasing the sales volume of the product line.  
The acquisition initiative triggered a change to the IS structure (IT-5) as PlumbCo 
extended their IS infrastructure to PlumbCo’s foreign subsidiary (IT-5).  The decision to 
extend their IS infrastructure to their foreign subsidiary was to prepare the company for 
integrating the acquisition (SI-4) into the existing IS infrastructure.  PlumbCo saw the 
experience and knowledge created by integrating their foreign subsidiary into the IS 
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infrastructure as essential to developing the skills required for making acquisitions that 
represented a greater financial risk of integration failure.   
Once the foreign subsidiary was successfully integrated, PlumbCo moved forward 
with the acquisition.  The acquisition impacted the organizational structure as it was 
integrated into PlumbCo (OS-3).  Likewise the acquisition impacted the IS structure via 
its integration to PlumbCo’s existing IS structure (IT-6).  The acquisition initiative did 
not impact the IS strategy.   
Alignment Summary - Episode 4 exhibited decoupled change among the alignment 
factors.  The strategic initiative triggered changes in the organizational structure and IS 
structure.  There was, however, no change to the IS strategy.  Additionally, the first 
change to the IS structure was not an issue of realignment.  Instead it served as an enabler 
of the acquisition strategy.  The second change to IS structure was related to the change 
in the organizational structure. 
5.1.1.5 Episode 5 –Innovating via New Product Development 
Episode Summary -The final episode at PlumbCo was initiated by an update to the 
strategic long-range plan (SG-2) first introduced in 1995, an update that was heavily 
influenced by environmental factors.  Specifically, continuing pricing pressures (EE-1 & 
2) and regulatory changes (EE-5) combined with inflationary pressures on raw material 
prices (EE-6) to drive changes in the long-range plan. 
The updated strategic long-range plan reaffirmed growth as the primary goal and 
formalized cost cutting as a secondary goal.  In the past, the strategic initiatives to cut 
cost had been a byproduct of leveraging the new IS infrastructure.  The new plan also 
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introduced the goal of meeting new regulatory requirements.  The updated strategic goals 
led to a strategic initiative to innovate new products (SI-5).  
The new focus on innovation filled several strategic needs.  First, new product 
innovation could meet the changing regulatory requirements, a necessity to continue to 
sell products after the regulations are phased in over the next few years.  Second, new 
products allow PlumbCo to grow their market share.  Third, innovation could create 
product differentiation allowing PlumbCo to gain a strategic advantage over their 
competitors. 
There was no change to organizational structure.  PlumbCo did, however, update its 
IS strategy (IS-2) to meet the needs of the updated strategic long-range plan.  The new IS 
strategy change focused on further leveraging the infrastructure to address strategic uses 
of the information generated by means of the IS infrastructure.  In other words, the IS 
strategy changed from simply keeping the infrastructure current to a focus on content 
delivery.   
The updated IS strategy did trigger a change in the IS structure.  PlumbCo 
implemented a data warehouse (IT-7) designed to collect the information generated from 
the ERP infrastructure and provided tools that allowed the information to be applied for 
strategic gain.  Consistent with maintaining an up-to-date IS infrastructure; PlumbCo 
again upgraded their version of R/3 (IT-8).  It was a routine upgrade unrelated to the 
changes in either business or IS strategy. 
  Alignment Summary - Episode 5 exhibited decoupled change among the changes 
to the alignment factors.  The environmental pressures led to a revision of the strategic 
intent.  A new strategic initiative was put in place (SI-5) and the IS strategy (IS-2) and IS 
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structure (IT-7) were updated to realign the IS with the updated strategic intent.  There 
was no change, however, to the organizational structure which remained adapted to the 
changes in its environment.  An additional change occurred to the IS structure (IT-8), but 
this change was decoupled from the update to the strategic intent or the new strategic 
initiative. 
Episode # Pattern of Alignment 
1 (4/4) Coupled 
2 (2/4) Decoupled 
3 (2/4) Decoupled 
4 (3/4) Decoupled 
5 (3/4) Decoupled 
Table 5-3: Summary of PlumbCo Alignment Patterns by Episode 
5.1.2 PartCo  
  PartCo is a large, publicly-held company that provides integrated systems, modules, 
and components for passenger, light truck, and commercial vehicles to the major 
automotive original equipment manufacturers (OEMs).  PartCo was formed from the 
merger of two larger automotive suppliers.  With $8 billion in combined annual revenues, 
PartCo is a global corporation with over 31,000 employees and 120 manufacturing 
facilities located in 25 countries.  PartCo is structured into three divisions: Light Vehicle 
Systems (LVS), Commercial Vehicle Systems (CVS), and Light Vehicle Aftermarket 
(LVA).  PartCo has both a formal IS strategy and a formal IS planning process, 
qualifying them as a case site according to the criteria established in Section 4.2.   
While the other two cases covered a period of ten years, the merger represented a new 
company and employee consolidation and reassignment resulting from the merger made 
it difficult to collect data on either company prior to the merger.  Data for PartCo, 
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therefore, covers a five-year period beginning with the merger in 2000. There were four 
alignment episodes at PartCo during the period from 2000 to 2004 representing 15 
change events in the alignment factors (See Table 5-4 and Figure 5-2).   
Episode 1 –Merging Two Well-Established Manufacturers   
“Alignment 
Factor” 
  
Date 
Initiated 
Description Trigger 
External 
Environment 
2000 Merger (EE-1)  
Strategic 
Intent (Goals) 
2000 Become the #1 Supplier to the Automotive 
Industry (SG-1) 
  
Strategic 
Initiatives 
2000 Focusing on Cost Cutting (SI-1) Merger (EE-1) 
Organization 
Structure 
2000 Merging Management and Organizational 
Structures (OS-1) 
Merger (EE-1) 
IS Strategy  None   
IS Structure 2000 Consolidating IT Infrastructures (IT-1) Merger (EE-1) 
 
2000 Removing of J. D. Edwards at Exhaust 
Division and Moving Back to Legacy 
Mainframe System (IT-2) 
 Merger (EE-1)  
Table 5-4a: Summary of PartCo Alignment Episodes 
 
 
Episode 2 –Assembling Modules   
“Alignment 
Factor” 
  
Date 
Initiated 
Description Trigger 
External 
Environment 
 None 
 
Strategic 
Intent (Goals) 
 No Changes  
Strategic 
Initiatives 
2001 Assembling  Modules (SI-2) Goal to be #1 Supplier (SG-1) 
Organization 
Structure 
2001 Moving Plants Next to Customer Plants 
(OS-2) 
Assembling Modules (SI-2) 
 
2002 Reorganizing the Structure to Three 
Division (Merged ET into LVS and Created 
LVS, CVS, and LVA) (OS-3) 
Merger (EE-1) and Assembly of Modules 
(SI-2) 
IS Strategy 2001 Convergence Strategy (Consolidation and 
Standardization)  (IS-1) 
Merger (EE-1) and Assembly of Modules 
(SI-2) 
IS Structure  No Change  
Table 5-4b: Summary of PartCo Alignment Episodes 
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Episode 3 – Meeting New Federal Emission Regulations   
“Alignment 
Factor” 
  
Date 
Initiated 
Description Trigger 
External 
Environment 
2000 Passing of New EPA Emission Standards to 
Take Effect 2007 (EE-2) 
 
Strategic 
Intent (Goals) 
 
No Changes  
Strategic 
Initiatives 
2001 Developing Commercial Products for New 
Federal Emission Regulations (SI-3) 
New EPA Emission Standards (EE-2) 
Organization 
Structure 
2003 Acquiring Remaining Interest in Joint 
Venture (OS-4) 
Developing Products to Meet 2007 EPA 
Requirements (SI-3) 
IS Strategy  No Change  
IS Structure  No Change  
Table 5-4c: Summary of PartCo Alignment Episodes 
 
Episode 4 – Attempting Hostile Acquisition   
“Alignment 
Factor” 
  
Date 
Initiated 
Description Trigger 
External 
Environment 
2002 Inflation in Raw Material Prices (EE-3)  
Strategic 
Intent (Goals) 
 No  Change  
Strategic 
Initiatives 
2003 Failed Attempt to Acquire Larger Company 
(SI-4) 
Goal to be the #1 Supplier by 2010 (SG-1) 
Organization 
Structure 
 No Change  
IS Strategy  No Change  
IS Structure  No Change  
Table 5-4d: Summary of PartCo Alignment Episodes 
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Figure 5-2: PartCo Timeline 
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5.1.2.1 Episode 1 –Merging Two Well-Established 
Manufacturers 
Episode Summary -The merger was motivated by a changing economic environment 
that resulted in a trend away from vertical integration in the automotive industry.  The 
divestiture of vertically integrated companies by the major OEMs left the industry 
fragmented and in need of consolidation among the lower tier suppliers.  The merger 
allowed two moderate sized manufacturers to become one of the top 25 suppliers to the 
OEMs.  The merger (EE-1) triggered the first episode at PartCo.   
As a result of the merger, a new strategic goal was established for the merged 
company: to become the number one supplier to the OEMs (SG-1).  This strategic goal 
did not lead to any strategic initiatives during the first alignment episode.  Instead, the 
company implemented a strategic initiative to address the immediate needs of the merged 
company.  The initial strategic initiative (SI-1) focused on eliminating redundancy in the 
structures and operations of the merged company to reduce costs.      
The focus on consolidation resulted in changes to the organizational structure (OS-1) 
and to the IS structures (IT-1).  Both change events were triggered partially by the need 
to reduce costs and partially by the logistics of the merger itself.  The merger could not be 
effective with multiple structures for both the organization and IS and eliminating these 
duplicate structures reduced redundant costs.  The need to focus on cost cutting and 
consolidating the companies did not provide an impetus to change the IS strategy.  
Instead, management consciously chose not to address the IS strategy at the time of the 
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merger, choosing instead, to wait for the company to stabilize before moving forward 
with an IS strategy.   
Alignment Summary - Episode 1 exhibited decoupled changes with changes in three 
of the four internal alignment factors.  The merger triggered changes in the strategic goals 
and in the strategic intent during the episode.  The change to strategic initiative that 
occurred, however, was not related to the change in strategic intent.  The changes in 
organizational structure and in IS structure were related to the strategic initiative, but not 
to the strategic goal.  There was no change in IS strategy during this alignment period. 
5.1.2.2 Episode 2 –Assembling Modules 
Episode Summary -The second alignment episode was triggered by a strategic 
initiative to assemble modules (SI-2).  High unionized wages were driving the major auto 
manufacturers to outsource not only part manufacturing, but more and more of the final 
assembly of automobiles.  The purpose of the strategic initiative was to further the 
strategic goal of growth (SG-1) by capturing more of the OEM’s assembly process and 
content per vehicle as the OEMs increased the amount of outsourcing. The strategic 
initiative triggered a change in the organizational structure with PartCo establishing 
plants for assembling the larger modules close to their customer’s plants (OS-2).  The 
size of the assembled modules made it difficult to transport them, requiring PartCo to 
locate close to the OEM’s plants to reduce the complexity and cost of transporting the 
modules. 
The strategic initiative to assemble modules and the need to consolidate multiple 
systems used throughout PartCo influenced the development of an IS strategy.  The 
module assembly required that PartCo be able to coordinate the manufacture and delivery 
     77 
of parts for assembly, requiring coordinated delivery of parts from third party vendors.  
The number of disparate systems in place due to the merger and evolution of the systems 
likewise influenced the need to consolidate and standardize the systems (IS-1).  A more 
integrated IS system with standardized data would allow the easy flow of data across 
divisions and subunits of the organization and reduce cost associated with the numerous 
existing systems.  Neither the strategic initiative, nor the IS consolidation strategy 
triggered immediate changes in the IS structure.  Instead, PartCo chose a more 
evolutionary approach based on consolidating systems when they become obsolete and 
not replacing them for the sake of consolidation.     
Alignment Summary - Episode 2 exhibited decoupled changes to the alignment 
factors with related changes to three of the four internal alignment factors.  Consistent 
with the strategic goal of long-term growth, a new strategic initiative was implemented 
that led to changes in organizational structure and helped to form an IS strategy.  There 
was, however, no change to the IS structure during this period.   
5.1.2.3 Episode 3 – Meeting New Federal Emission 
Regulations 
Episode Summary -The third episode at PartCo was triggered by new government 
regulations controlling motor emissions (EE-2).  The new regulations provided an 
opportunity for PartCo to develop new products to help the OEMs meet the more 
stringent regulations.  Management viewed this as a strategic opportunity and 
implemented a strategic initiative to innovate new products compliant with the impending 
regulations (SI-3).   
The new strategic initiative triggered a change in the organizational structure.  Prior 
to the new regulations, PartCo had engaged in a joint venture with a European company 
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that had a strong engineering department with experience in product development.  This 
joint venture took on added strategic significance in light of the new government 
regulations because of the subsidiary’s engineering expertise in an area that addressed the 
new government regulations.  PartCo thus acquired the remaining interest in the joint 
venture (OS-3).  No other changes were triggered by this change in strategic initiative or 
organizational structure.  There were no changes in IS strategy or IS structure during this 
period.   
Alignment Summary - PartCo’s Episode 3 exhibited decoupled changes to the 
alignment factors.  Changes external to PartCo brought about the change in strategic 
initiative which likewise triggered a change in the organizational structure.  There were, 
however, no changes in IS strategy or structure related to the new strategic initiative.   
5.1.2.4 Episode 4 – Attempting a Hostile Acquisition 
Episode Summary -The fourth episode was triggered by the initial strategic goal of 
growth.  One avenue for growth was through acquisition (SI-4) and PartCo attempted a 
hostile take-over of a larger company.  The acquisition, if successful, would have made 
PartCo one of the largest suppliers to the automotive OEMs.  The acquisition failed, 
however, and thus there was no change to the organizational structure or IS strategy or 
structure as a result of the strategic initiative.   While episode 4 did not exhibit coupled 
changes in the alignment factors, the failure of the strategic initiative to acquire the target 
company likely altered the impact on the alignment pattern.  There is no way to 
determine whether a successful merger would have triggered a tighter coupling among 
the alignment factors.  
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Alignment Summary - The attempted acquisition represented a change in strategic 
initiative and therefore, maintaining consistency across cases, was considered a trigger 
for new episodes.  The acquisition failed, however, and no other changes occurred during 
this alignment episode.  Episode 4, therefore, exhibited decoupled changes in the 
alignment factors.   
Episode # Pattern of Alignment 
1 (3/4) Decoupled 
2 (3/4) Decoupled 
3 (2/4) Decoupled 
4 (0/4) Decoupled 
Table 5-5: Summary of PartCo Alignment Patterns by Episode 
5.1.3 MotorCo  
MotorCo is a division of a Fortune 500 company that manufactures electric motors 
for a variety of applications in the industrial, commercial, and consumer markets.  The 
parent company is a publicly-held, multi-billion dollar firm listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange.  MotorCo represents one of five major divisions of the parent conglomerate.  
MotorCo division has a global presence employing over 100,000 people in 245 plants 
with a presence in 150 countries.  MotorCo has a formal IS strategy and IS planning 
process making them an appropriate research site. 
Data for MotorCo covers a ten-year period from 1995 to 2004. There were three 
alignment episodes at PartCo during the period from 1995 to 2004 representing 28 
change events in the alignment factors (See Table 5-6 and Figure 5-3).   
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Episode 1 – Initiating an eBusiness Strategy   
“Alignment 
Factor” 
  
Date 
Initiated 
Description Trigger 
External 
Environment 
1996 Proliferation of the Internet (EE-1) Technological Innovation 
 
1998 Concerns over Y2K (EE-3) 
 
Strategic Intent 
(Goals) 
  No Change   
Strategic 
Initiatives 
Prior to 
1995  
Continuing Best Cost strategy (SI-1)  
 
1997 Initiating an eBusiness Strategy (SI-2)  Proliferation of the Internet (EE-1) 
Organization 
Structure 
1997 Shifting Manufacturing Plants to Mexico 
(OS-1) 
Continuing Best Cost Strategy (SI-1) 
IS Strategy 1998 Focusing on Y2K compliance (IS-1) Concerns over Y2K(EE-3) 
IS Structure   No Change   
Table 5-6a: Summary of MotorCo Alignment Episodes 
 
Episode 2 – Focusing on The End Customer   
“Alignment 
Factor” 
  
Date 
Initiated 
Description Trigger 
External 
Environment 
1997 Shifting Corporate Level Strategic 
Initiatives (EE-2) 
Slowing Growth and Customer Feedback 
 
1998 Developing Corporate-Wide Procurement 
System and Stated Strategic Importance of 
IS (EE-4) 
 
 
1999 Reorganizing Corporate Business Segments 
(EE-5) 
 
 
2000 Establishing Corporate-wide Shared Internet 
Connectivity (EE-6) 
 
Strategic Intent 
(Goals) 
 No Change  
Strategic 
Initiatives 
2000 Focusing on End Customer (SI-3) Shifting Corporate Level Initiatives (EE-2) 
Organization 
Structure 
2000 Creating the Commercial Industrial Motors 
Division (CIM) (OS-2) 
Shift in Corporate Level Initiatives and 
Focus on End Customer (EE-2 and SI-3) 
 
2000 Off-Shoring of Manufacturing  (OS-3) Continuing Best Cost Strategy (SI-1) 
  
2000 Establishing the eBusiness Group (OS-4) Initiating an eBusiness Strategy (SI-2) 
IS Strategy  No Change  
IS Structure  No Change  
Table 5-6b: Summary of MotorCo Alignment Episodes 
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Episode 3 – Reducing SG&A Costs   
“Alignment 
Factor” 
  
Date 
Initiated 
Description Trigger 
External 
Environment 
2000 Crash in Technology Market and Recession 
in U.S. Economy (EE-7) 
 
 
2000 Increasing Foreign Competition (EE-8)  
 
2001 Creating a Corporate-wide IT Shared 
Services (EE-9) 
 
 
2001 Adopting of Oracle as Corporate-wide 
Enterprise Application (EE-10) 
 
 
2002 Responding to Business Scandal Legislation 
(Sarbanes Oxley Act)  (EE-11) 
 
 
2002 Inflation in Raw Material Prices (EE-12)  
Strategic Intent 
(Goals) 
2000 Shifting Business Unit Level Strategic Goal 
from Growth to Profitability (SG-1) 
Crash in Technology Market and Recession 
in U.S. Economy (EE-7) and Increasing 
Foreign Competition (EE-8) 
Strategic Initiatives 2001 Reducing SG&A Costs(SI-4) Shift in Business Unit Level Strategic Goal 
from Growth to Profitability (SG-1)  
Organization 
Structure 
2001 Outsourcing SG&A Tasks (OS-5) Shift in Business Unit Level Strategic Goal 
from Growth to Profitability.  Reduction in 
SG&A (SG-1 and SI-4) 
 
 2003 Reorganizing CIM into Four Business Units 
(OS-6) 
Consistent with Corporate Level Initiatives 
(EE-2 and EE-5) 
IS Strategy 2001 Centralizing/Leveraging Corporate-wide IS 
resources (IS-2) 
Stated Strategic Importance of IS and 
Development of Corporate-Wide 
Procurement System (EE-4) and Creation of 
Corporate-wide IT Shared Services (EE-9)  
IS Structure 2001 Formatting IT Shared Services (IT-1) Creation of Corporate-wide IT Shared 
Services (EE-9) and Centralization/ 
Leveraging Corporate-wide IS resources 
(IS-2) 
 
2001 Initiating Implementation of Oracle as 
Motor Company’s Standard Enterprise 
Application (IT-2) 
Move to Corporate-Wide IT Shared Services 
and Selection of Oracle (EE-9 and EE-10) 
 
2002 Increasing IT Security and Compliance with 
Sarbanes Oxley Act (IT-3) 
Business Scandals and Sarbanes Oxley Act 
(EE-11) 
Table 5-6c: Summary of MotorCo Alignment Episodes 
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Figure 5-3: MotorCo Timeline 
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5.1.3.1 Prior to First Episode - Continuing Record Setting 
Performance 
There were four periods but only three alignment episodes at MotorCo from 1995 to 
2004, the period covered by this research.  The first two years of the ten-year period can 
best be described as a period of continuing record-setting performance.  The company 
was following a “best cost” strategy first implemented in 1983 that was based on a 
focused differentiation based on product quality and price (SI-1).  However, there was no 
change in either strategic goals or strategic intent to trigger a complete alignment episode.   
5.1.3.2 Episode 1 – Initiating an eBusiness Strategy 
Episode Summary -Episode 1, which represented the first complete episode for 
observing alignment, occurred during 1997 when technological advancements established 
the internet as a business tool (EE-1).  To respond to the business potential of the internet, 
MotorCo established a strategic initiative to develop an ebusiness strategy (SI-2).  There 
was no change in organizational structure during this episode resulting from this strategic 
initiative because the primary focus was on strategy development.  Nor were there 
changes in IS strategy or IS structure triggered by the ebusiness strategic initiative during 
this alignment episode. 
There was, however, a change in organizational structure unrelated to the ebusiness 
strategic initiative.  During this episode, MotorCo shifted manufacturing from the U.S. to 
facilities in Mexico.  The shift was designed to leverage lower manufacturing costs in 
Mexico and was considered an additional step in maintaining the best cost strategy.   The 
change in organizational structure was linked to the existing strategic initiative (SI-1) and 
not the strategic trigger for Episode 1. 
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There was also a change in IS strategy during this alignment episode triggered by 
Y2K (EE-3).  The threat of systems failure led MotorCo to focus on Y2K compliance 
(IS-1).  No business strategy or organizational structure changes drive the change in IS 
strategy, and the IS strategy did not impact any other alignment factor.  Nor were any 
significant changes to the IS structure brought about by the IS strategy.  In fact, it was 
noted that potential changes to the IS structure were delayed until after Y2K. 
Alignment Summary - Episode 1 exhibited decoupled changes to the alignment 
factors.  The strategic initiative (SI-2) that triggered the alignment episode did not result 
in any changes to other alignment factors during the time period covered by the 
alignment period.  No changes in IS strategy or IS structure occurred as a result of either 
the change in strategic intent or change in organizational structure.  A change to 
organizational structure occurred that was linked to a prior strategic initiative; but no 
other related changes in IS strategy or structure resulted from it.  A change to IS strategy 
occurred, but in direct response to external events, not the change in strategic initiative or 
organizational structure.  The new IS strategy did not trigger any other changes in the 
organization.   
5.1.3.3 Episode 2– Focusing on the End Customer 
Episode Summary –Episode 2 was triggered by a change in strategic initiative to 
focus on the end-customer (SI-3).  This end-customer focus was driven by strategic 
changes at the parent company level (EE-2).  The parent company was concerned about 
customers’ perceptions of the difficulty in doing business across the multiple businesses 
units and was concerned that the autonomy of the units resulted in not capitalizing on 
cross-selling opportunities.   
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The focus on the end-customer led to structural consolidation at MotorCo (OS-2).  
This consolidation focused on reorganizing subunits of MotorCo by grouping them 
around markets.  These changes did not trigger any changes in IS strategy or IS structure. 
An additional change to the organizational structure also occurred during this time 
period as MotorCo moved production off-shore (OS-3).  This change was related to the 
best cost strategy implemented in 1983, prior to the beginning of the research (SI-1).  
MotorCo shifted manufacturing from the U.S. to Asian and other emerging markets to 
leverage their lower cost structures, similar to the move to Mexico in the prior episode.  
This change in organizational structure did not impact the other alignment factors. 
Alignment Summary - Episode 2 exhibited decoupled changes among the alignment 
factor change events.  An external event (EE-2) triggered the change in strategic initiative 
(SI-3), which likewise resulted in a corresponding change to the organizational structure 
(OS-2).  There were, however, no further changes to the other alignment factors.  A 
second change to the organizational structure (OS-3) related to a strategic initiative (SI-2) 
from a prior period occurred during this alignment episode and was decoupled from the 
strategic initiative that triggered the alignment episode.   
5.1.3.4 Episode 3 – Reducing Selling, General 
&Administrative Costs 
Episode Summary – Episode 3 was triggered by a change in strategic goals and was 
characterized by a competitive environment and numerous changes in the alignment 
factors.  The technology crash and U.S. recession (EE-7) during 2001 compounded by 
increased competition from foreign manufacturers (EE-8) created a difficult marketplace 
for MotorCo.  MotorCo reacted by shifting from a growth strategy with a secondary 
focus on cost to a focus on cost cutting with a secondary focus on growth (SG-1).  The 
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shift in strategic goals combined with the impact of the existing best cost strategy, led to 
a strategic initiative to focus on cutting selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) costs 
(SI-4).  This initiative triggered a change to the organizational structure with SG&A costs 
being outsourced (OS-5) to China and India.  The changes to strategy and organizational 
structure, however, did not trigger any changes to the IS strategy or IS structure. 
Although unrelated to the changes in strategy and organizational structure, the IS 
strategy did change during this episode.  Prior to this point, there was little strategic value 
placed on IS at MotorCo until a corporate level strategic focus on IS (EE-4) and 
implementation of a corporate-wide IT shared services architecture (EE-9) led MotorCo 
to focus on centralization and leveraging IS corporate-wide resources (IS-2).  This new IS 
strategy triggered a change in IS structure resulting in IS functions being shifted from 
MotorCo to the corporate level.  The changes in IS strategy and structure did not result in 
changes to any other alignment factor. 
During this same episode, an additional restructuring of MotorCo occurred (OS-6) 
resulting from the continued focus on the end-customer (EE-2) at the corporate level.  
Corporate reorganized the corporate structure (EE-5) to better target customers with a 
basket of goods and services.  The restructuring of MotorCo did not lead to any changes 
in MotorCo’s business strategy or in its IS strategy or structure, but internally MotorCo 
did reorganize to group units by product lines. 
Independent of other changes during this same time frame, the Enron and WorldCom 
business scandals resulted in new regulation, the Sarbanes Oxley Act (EE-11).  Sarbanes 
Oxley implemented new standards for information assurance and auditing that required 
structural changes to MotorCo’s information systems (IT-3).  The changes triggered by 
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Sarbanes Oxley were isolated to IT structure and processes and did not impact the other 
internal alignment factors.  
Alignment Summary – Episode 3 exhibited decoupled changes in the internal 
alignment factors.  External environmental changes influenced a shift in strategic goals 
(SG-1), which triggered a change in strategic initiatives (SI-4).  This change in strategic 
initiative triggered organizational structural changes (OS-5).  There was an additional 
change in organizational structure during this period, which was decoupled from the 
shifts in strategy.   Instead, it was due to the prior external, corporate level events (EE-2, 
EE-5).  
No changes to IS strategy or structure directly related to the shift in strategic intent.  
There was a shift in IS strategy (IS-2) driven by corporate level changes (EE-9) that 
resulted in changes to MotorCo’s external environment.  This change in IS strategy and 
the corporate level change also triggered a change in IT structure (IT-1).  Two additional 
changes to IS structure (IT-2, IT-3) occurred that were decoupled from the other changes 
to the internal alignment factors, which were attributed directly to changes in the 
environment (EE-9, EE-10, EE-11). 
Episode # Pattern of Alignment 
1 (1/4) Decoupled 
2 (2/4) Decoupled 
3 (1/4) Decoupled 
Table 5-7: Summary of MotorCo Alignment Patterns by Episode 
5.2 Phase I Results 
Recall that Phase I addresses the research question (RQ1): How does the 
organization’s contextual setting impact the pattern of change in the internal alignment 
factors?  This research question was addressed via two propositions; the first proposition 
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addressing the size of the firm, and the second proposition addressing the formality of the 
IS strategy.  First the detailed results of Proposition 1 and its corresponding Hypotheses 
1a and 1b are presented, followed by the results of Proposition 2 and its Hypotheses 2a 
and 2b, and Hypotheses 3a and 3b. 
5.2.1 Proposition 1 – Firm Size 
Proposition 1 focuses on the impact of firm size on the pattern of alignment, 
suggesting that the existence of decoupled patterns of alignment are independent of firm 
size.  Both PartCo and MotorCo have revenues in excess of $1 billion annually (see Table 
5-8).  By definition, therefore, both PlumbCo and PartCo qualify as larger corporations 
making them appropriate for evaluation of Proposition 1. Thus the data from these two 
large firms are the focus of Proposition 1.   
 
Case Site Annual Revenues7 
PlumbCo $450 
PartCo $8,000 
MotorCo $3,500 
Table 5-8: Size in Annual Revenues by Case Site 
 
Hypothesis 1a, consistent with the traditional view of alignment as synchronization, 
predicts a synchronized pattern of alignment for large firms, while the rival Hypothesis, 
1b, consistent with TAGA, predicts a decoupled pattern of alignment.   
The traditional pattern of alignment as synchronization assumes a vertical or stair-
stepped alignment process that connects all four traditional internal alignment factors (see 
Figure 4-1).  Traditional alignment, viewed as synchronization, implies that when there is 
                                                 
7
 Revenues are estimates and stated in millions of dollars.  Estimate for MotorCo represents the division. 
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a change in one alignment factor there will be related changes in the other internal 
alignment factors in order to align the IS with the business.  TAGA, alternatively, 
predicts decoupled changes with only limited relationships to the other internal alignment 
factors. 
Examination of Figure 5-3 and Table 5-9a indicate that there were 4 alignment 
episodes comprised of 15 change events at PartCo. Based on the number of potential 
binary relationships between the four alignment factors involved in Henderson and 
Venkatraman’s (1993) model as well as strategic intent, there are 10 potential 
relationships per episode.  Therefore, the four alignment episodes observed at PartCo 
could potentially result in a total of 40 relationships.   Only 8 such relationships were 
observed, however (see Table 5-9a).  Further, examination of Figure 5-3 indicates that 
none of the episodes at PartCo exhibited a vertical or stair step alignment process.  All 
three episodes from PartCo exhibited decoupled patterns among the four internal 
alignment factors.   
At MotorCo, the results were similar.  Out of the three alignment episodes, with 30 
potential binary relationships, only seven relationships were actually observed (see Table 
5-9b).  None of the alignment episodes exhibited either a vertical or stair step pattern of 
change (see Figure 5-3).  All of the alignment episodes identified at MotorCo exhibited 
decoupled alignment patterns with two or fewer relationships among the four alignment 
factors. 
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Episode Potential Event Relationships8 # Actual Event Relationships # 
1 SG-ASI-A; SG-AOS-A; SG-AIS-
A; SG-AIT-A; SI-AOS-A; SI-
AIS-A; SI-AIT-A; OS-AIS-A; 
OS-AIT-A; IS-AIT-A 
10 SI-1OS-1IT-1 
OS-1IT-2 
3 
2 SG-BSI-B; SG-BOS-B; SG-BIS-
B; SG-BIT-B; SI-BOS-B; SI-
BIS-B; SI-BIT-B; OS-BIS-B; 
OS-BIT-B; IS-BIT-B 
10 SG-1SI-2 OS-2 
SI-2IS-1 
SI-2OS-3 
 
4 
3 SG-CSI-C; SG-COS-C; SG-CIS-
C; SG-C IT-C; SI-COS-C; SI-
CIS-C; SI-CIT-C; OS-CIS-C; 
OS-CIT-C ; IS-CIT-C 
10 SI-3 OS-4 
 
1 
4 SG-D SI-D; SG-D OS-D; SG-D 
IS-D; SG-D IT-D; SI-DOS-D; SI-D 
 IS-D; SI-D  IT-D; OS-DIS-D; 
OS-D  IT-D; IS-DIT-D 
10  0 
# Links  40   8 
Table 5-9a: Inter-Related Changes in PartCo Alignment Episodes 
 
Episode Potential Event Relationships # Actual Event Relationships # 
1 SG-BSI-B; SG-BOS-B; SG-BIS-B; 
SG-BIT-B; SI-BOS-B; SI-BIS-B; 
SI-BIT-B; OS-BIS-B; OS-BIT-B; 
IS-BIT-B 
10 SI-1 OS-1  
SI-1 OS-3 
SI-2 OS-4 
 
3 
2 SG-CSI-C; SG-COS-C; SG-CIS-C; 
SG-C IT-C; SI-COS-C; SI-CIS-C; 
SI-CIT-C; OS-CIS-C; OS-CIT-C ; 
IS-CIT-C 
10 SI-3  OS-2  
 
1 
3 SG-D SI-D; SG-D OS-D; SG-D IS-
D; SG-D IT-D; SI-DOS-D; SI-D  
IS-D; SI-D  IT-D; OS-DIS-D; OS-D 
 IT-D; IS-DIT-D 
10 SG-1 SI-4  OS-5  
IS-2 IT-1  
3 
# Links  30  7 
Table 5-9b: Inter-Related Changes in MotorCo Alignment Episodes 
 
                                                 
8
 We simply state factors involved in Henderson and Venkatraman’s model as well as strategic intent and 
acknowledge that there are ten binary relationships. 
     91 
The results from the case studies thus support Proposition 1.  Although there were 
episodes with identifiable relationships connecting alignment factor change events in the 
two larger firms, none of the alignment episodes exhibited coupled changes to all four of 
the alignment factors, the pattern consistent with alignment as synchronization.  The 
decoupling of change events among the internal alignment factors during episodes is 
consistent with the theoretically-derived pattern from TAGA, the theory of alignment as 
guided adaptation.  The results of PartCo and MotorCo, therefore, support Hypothesis 1b 
and provide evidence that disconfirms Hypothesis 1a.  The results indicate that TAGA 
generalizes to larger firms and is more explanatory than alignment as synchronization in 
this context, as indicated by Proposition 1 and Hypothesis 1b. 
5.2.2 Proposition 2 – Formality of IS Strategy 
Proposition 2 focuses on the impact of the formality of IS strategy on the alignment 
pattern (i.e., decoupled patterns of alignment will occur independent of the formality of 
the IS strategy).  As with Proposition 1, rival hypotheses were used to compare the 
traditional theory of alignment as synchronization and TAGA.  Two sets of competing 
hypotheses were developed to address Proposition 2, with Hypotheses 2a and 2b 
addressing the formality of the IS planning process and Hypotheses 3a and 3b addressing 
the formality of the IS strategy.   
As addressed in Chapter 4, a survey instrument was adapted from Segar and Grover’s 
Formal IS Planning Instrument to determine the formality of IS planning and of IS 
strategy at the case sites.  All three firms were considered to have a formal IS strategy 
and a formal IS planning process by those interviewed (see Table 5-10), making all three 
cases suitable for addressing Proposition 2.     
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Case Site Responses to IS Planning (Yes/#Responses/#Interviewed) 
Responses to IS Strategy 
(Yes/#Responses/#Interviewed) 
PlumbCo 9/9/10 7/9/10 
PartCo 9/10/10 10/10/10 
MotorCo 10/11/11 10/11/11 
Table 5-10: Responses to Formal IS Planning and IS Strategy 
 
In addition to responding to the question, the interviewees were asked to evaluate the 
degree of formality of both IS planning and IS strategy based on a 7-point Lickert type 
scale with 1 being low and 7 high.  The average responses indicated that all three cases 
exhibited moderate levels of formal IS planning and IS strategy (see Table 5-11),9 again 
indicating that all three case sites were appropriate sites for evaluation of Proposition 2. 
Case Site IS Planning Rating (7 Point Scale) (1=Low, 7=High) 
IS Strategy Rating (7 Point 
Scale) (1=Low, 7=High) 
PlumbCo 4.38 4.18 
PartCo 5.11 5.2 
MotorCo 4.65 4.3 
Table 5-11: Formality of IS Planning and of IS Strategy 
 
Examination of Figure 5-1 and Table 5-12 indicate that, at PlumbCo, there are five 
alignment episodes comprised of 26 change events. Among the five alignment episodes, 
there are a total of 50 potential relationships.  Only 15 relationships were observed (see 
Table 5-12).   
Only one of the five alignment episodes at PlumbCo exhibited an alignment pattern 
similar to that predicted by alignment as synchronization (Episode 1).  In this episode, the 
firm, reacting to a changing industry structure, implemented a long-range strategic plan 
that called for the use of an IS infrastructure to enable the company to compete.  Changes 
in all of the internal alignment factors resulted in the pattern predicted by alignment as 
                                                 
9
 For all three cases, the number of interviewees was too small to perform statistical analysis. 
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synchronization.  All of the remaining four alignment episodes exhibited decoupled 
patterns of alignment. 
The data for PartCo and MotorCo were presented in testing Proposition 1.  Recall that 
at PartCo, four alignment episodes were observed, with all four alignment episodes 
exhibiting decoupled patterns of alignment.  All three of MotorCo’s alignment episodes 
exhibited decoupled patterns of alignment as well.  See Section 5.2.1 for additional detail. 
 
Episode Potential Event Relationships # Actual Event Relationships  # 
1 SG-ASI-A; SG-AOS-A; SG-AIS-
A; SG-AIT-A; SI-AOS-A; SI-
AIS-A; SI-AIT-A; OS-AIS-A; 
OS-AIT-A; IS-AIT-A 
10 SG-1 SI-1 OS-1 
SI-1OS-2 
SI-1IS-1 
SI-1IT-1 
5 
2 SG-BSI-B; SG-BOS-B; SG-BIS-
B; SG-BIT-B; SI-BOS-B; SI-BIS-
B; SI-BIT-B; OS-BIS-B; OS-BIT-
B; IS-BIT-B 
10  0 
3 SG-CSI-C; SG-COS-C; SG-CIS-
C; SG-C IT-C; SI-COS-C; SI-
CIS-C; SI-CIT-C; OS-CIS-C; OS-
CIT-C ; IS-CIT-C 
10 IT-2SI-3 
IS-1IT-3 
IS-1IT-4 
3 
4 SG-D SI-D; SG-D OS-D; SG-D 
IS-D; SG-D IT-D; SI-DOS-D; SI-D 
 IS-D; SI-D  IT-D; OS-DIS-D; 
OS-D  IT-D; IS-DIT-D 
10 SI-4IT-5 
SI-4OS-3IT-6 
IT-5OS-3 
4 
5 SI-EOS-E; SI-E  IS-E; SI-E  IT -
E; 
OS-EIS-E; OS-E  IT -E; IS-E IT -
E 
10 SG-2 SI-5 
SG-2IS-2IT-7 
3 
# Links  50  15 
Table 5-12: Inter-Related Changes in PlumbCo Alignment Episodes 
 
In summary, then, the majority (11 out of 12) of the episodes exhibited relationships 
among the alignment factors that were decoupled.  The conclusion, based on a 
preponderance of the evidence, is that firms with formal IS planning and IS strategy 
display similar patterns of alignment to firms with informal or non-strategic approaches 
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to IS (see Ward and Vessey, working paper).  These findings support Hypotheses 2b and 
3b and provide disconfirming evidence of Hypotheses 2a and 3a. Thus, alignment as 
synchronization is not evident in firms with a formal approach to IS strategy, providing 
support for TAGA in generalizing to these additional contextual settings.  The results of 
the case study support Proposition 2 that the alignment factors change independent of the 
firm’s strategic view of IS.   
5.3 Phase II Results 
Recall that Phase II addresses the research question: what characteristics of 
change in the outer environment impact the adaptation of an internal alignment factor?  
The research question is addressed by four propositions.  Chapter 3 proposed that three 
dimensions of change (level, magnitude, and pace) influence the need for an alignment 
factor to alter its internal structure.  The first three propositions evaluate the relationship 
between the dimension and the likelihood of change in the alignment factors.  A fourth 
proposition considers the cumulative effect of the three dimensions to determine how the 
dynamism of the environment impacts an internal alignment factor’s need to alter its 
internal structure.  First the results for Propositions 3, 4, and 5 are presented as individual 
dimensions of change.  Then Proposition 6 is presented to consider the cumulative impact 
of the three dimensions of change. 
Recall that Phase I examined the impact of firm size and formality of IS strategy 
as the independent variables on the pattern of relationships among the internal alignment 
factors as the dependent variable.  Events that occurred in the external environment do 
not, therefore, form part of the dependent variable for the Phase I propositions.  Phase II, 
on the other hand, focuses on the impact of external changes on the internal alignment 
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factors.  Thus for Phase II, the external events form part of the independent variable and 
are therefore included in the analysis of the propositions.       
5.3.1 Proposition 3 – Level of Change (Hierarchy) 
Proposition 3 addresses the impact of the level at which the initiating change occurs 
on the internal alignment factors.  Specifically, Proposition 3 states that the higher the 
level in the alignment hierarchy at which the initiating change occurs, the greater the 
likelihood that the internal structure of an alignment factor will require change.  An 
initiating change event is one that serves as a trigger for inducing change in one or more 
additional alignment factors.  Consistent with the chain of evidence (Appendix B), each 
initiating change trigger was examined to determine whether the level of the initiating 
event influenced the likelihood of change in factors at a lower level in the alignment 
hierarchy.  
In analyzing Proposition 3, the dependent variable is the number of related changes in 
the levels resulting from the initiating change event.  Tables 5-13 a, b, and c present the 
number of related changes by initiating trigger for each case site.  Following data 
collection, it became apparent that multiple triggers impacted multiple alignment 
episodes resulting in two confounding issues in analyzing Proposition 3.  The first issue 
is that certain dependent variables were triggered by multiple initiating events.  For 
example, the first alignment episode of PlumbCo was triggered by two initiating external 
events (EE-1 & EE-2).  Second, certain initiating change events triggered multiple 
alignment episodes.  Again, using EE-1 and EE-2 from PlumbCo as an example, EE-1 
and EE-2 triggered the initial change in strategic intent and strategic initiative (SG-1 and 
SI-1) that triggered alignment Episode 1.  EE-1 and EE-2 were also the triggered SI-2, 
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which ushered in the second alignment episode.  Because these confounding influences 
could potentially result in double counting initiating events or double counting 
subsequent events, depending on the approach taken, the decision was made to eliminate 
the duplicate counting for both the independent and dependent variables.  The double 
counting of the triggering events was eliminated by counting only the initiating events 
that had not been included in prior episode analysis in the count of the independent 
variable.  This approach eliminated triggers counted in the prior episodes and therefore 
counted only the most recent triggers.  Focusing on the alignment episodes as displayed 
in Tables 5-3 a, b, and c as opposed to mapping out the alignment path for each initiating 
event, eliminated the potential for double counting the events in the dependent variable.   
The results indicate that the majority of initiating triggers were environmental factors.  
Within PlumbCo, there were eight initiating events (EE-1, EE-2, EE-3, EE-4, EE-5, EE-
6, SI-4, IT-2), of which six occurred in the external environment, one occurred at the 
strategic initiative level, and one occurred at the IS structure level (see Table 5-13a). 
Note, however, that coevolutionary forces among the alignment factors as individual 
systems creates a situation where the hierarchical effect is probabilistic and not causal 
and that lower-level changes can trigger higher-level changes in the internal alignment 
factors.  And while we define an alignment episode as being demarcated by a change in 
business strategy (either intent or initiative), a strategic initiative can be triggered by a 
lower level change as is exemplified by the relationship between IT-2 and SI-3 at 
PlumbCo.  A change in a lower-level alignment factor can trigger a change in a higher- 
level alignment factor in the same way that a higher-level alignment factor can trigger a 
change in a lower-level alignment factor; it changes the outer environment of the higher-
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level alignment factor, and hence has the potential to bring about change in any of the 
alignment factors.  For example, implementing and ERP system, which represents a 
change in the IS structure, can trigger changes in the organizational structure (see also 
Chapter 2, section 2.2.2 for additional explanation). 
Initiating 
Level 
Related Changes by Initiating Change 
Triggers (Path) 
Number of 
Resultant 
Changes 
EE EE-1& EE-2SG-1SI-1 OS-1 & OS-2 
& IS-1 & IT-1 & IT-2 & IT-3 & IT-4   
9 
EE EE-1, EE-2, EE-3, & EE-4 SI-2 1 
IT IT-2SI-3 1 
SI SI-4IT-5OS-3IT-6 3 
EE EE-5, EE-6, SG-2SI-5 & IS-2IT-7 4 
 Total Related Changes  18 
Table 5-13a: Number of PlumbCo Related Changes by Initiating 
Change Trigger(s)  
 
PartCo had two initiating change events (EE-1, EE-2), both occurring in the external 
environment (see Table 5.13b).   
Initiating 
Level 
Related Changes by Initiating Triggers 
(Path) 
Number of 
Resultant 
Changes 
EE EE-1 SG-1SI-2 & SI-4 OS-2 & OS-
3IS-1 
6 
EE EE-1 SI-1 OS-1 IT-1 & IT-2 4 
EE EE-2 SI-3OS-4 2 
 Total Related Changes  12 
Table 5-13b: Number of PartCo Related Changes by Initiating Change 
Trigger(s) 
  
MotorCo had 11 initiating changes (EE-1, EE-2, EE-3, EE-4, EE-5, EE-7, EE-8, EE-
9, EE-10, EE-11, SI-1) of which 10 occurred in the external environment and one at the 
strategic initiative level (see Table 5.13c).   
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Initiating 
Level 
Related Changes by Initiating Triggers 
(Path) 
Number of 
Resultant 
Changes 
SI SI-1 OS-1 & OS-3 2 
EE EE-1SI-2OS-4 2 
EE EE-2SI-3OS-2 2 
EE EE-2&EE-5OS-6 1 
EE EE-3 IS-1 1 
EE EE-4&EE9IS-2IT-1 2 
EE EE-4&EE-7&EE-8 SG-1SI-4OS-5 1 
EE EE-9, EE-10 IT-2 1 
EE EE-11 IT-3 1 
 Total Related Changes  13 
Table 5-13c: Number of MotorCo Related Changes by Initiating 
Change Trigger(s) 
 
Aggregated across the cases, there were a total of 21 initiating events that triggered a 
total of 42 lower-level change events and one higher-level change event.  The 18 external 
environment events initiated 37 of the lower-level change events in the alignment factors.  
The two initiating change events at the strategic initiative level resulted in five lower-
level changes.  No changes were initiated at the strategic intent (SG), organizational 
structure (OS), or IS strategy (IS) levels.  One change was initiated at the IT level 
resulting in one upper-level change and no lower-level changes.   
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Level of 
Initiating 
Change 
Initiating 
Changes 
Per Level 
 
Total 
Related 
Changes 
 
EE 18 37 
SG 0 0 
SI 2 5 
OS 0 0 
IS 0 0 
IT 1 1 
Table 5-14: Total Number of Related Changes Per Initiating Level  
 
The majority of changes in alignment factors were initiated by changes in the external 
environment, the highest level in the TAGA alignment model.  The conclusion, based on 
a preponderance of the evidence, is that the level of initiating change does impact the 
likelihood of change in the alignment factors.  Specifically, the higher the initiating 
change, the more likely lower-level alignment factors will need to alter their internal 
structure.  The results support Proposition 3.   
5.3.2 Proposition 4 – Magnitude of Initiating Change 
Proposition 4 addresses the magnitude of the initiating change and its impact on the 
internal alignment factors.  Specifically, Proposition 4 states that the greater the 
magnitude of change in the outer environment, the greater the likelihood that the internal 
structure of an alignment factor will need to be altered.  Magnitude was determined by 
asking interviewees, via a follow-up survey, to rank the magnitude of each event as high, 
medium, or low.  Consistent with prior measures (Huff & Huff 1995; Huff et al. 1992) 
the interviewees were asked to consider both the stress the company was under as a result 
of the change event and the resistance to the change.  Table 5-15 displays the results by 
case site. 
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Case / 
Magnitude 
Number of 
Events 
Number of 
Related 
Events 
PlumbCo   
High 5 20 
Medium 0 0 
Low 4 8 
PartCo   
High 1 9 
Medium 1 2 
Low 0 0 
MotorCo   
High 2 4 
Medium 9 20 
Low 0 0 
Table 5-15: Number of Related Changes by Magnitude of Change 
Trigger 
 
At PlumbCo, the five high magnitude events resulted in 20 lower-level changes; there 
were no medium magnitude events; low magnitude events resulted in eight lower-level 
changes.  PartCo had one high magnitude change that resulted in nine lower level 
changes and one medium magnitude event that triggered two lower level events.  There 
were no low magnitude events at PartCo.  MotorCo had two high magnitude change 
events that triggered four lower level events and nine medium magnitude events that 
resulted in 20 lower level events. 
Aggregating the results over the three cases as shown in Table 5-16, indicates that 
initiating events ranked as high in magnitude were related, on average, to more than four 
alignment factor change events.  Events ranked as having a medium impact on the firm 
resulted, on average, in more than two related changes, while initiating events ranked as 
low in magnitude resulted in an average of two related changes. Hence the analysis of 
magnitude based on the average number of changes related to the different magnitudes of 
the change events supports Proposition 4. 
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Magnitude/Case Number of Events 
Number of 
Related 
Events 
Average 
Number of 
Events 
High    
PlumbCo 5 20 4 
PartCo 1 9 9 
MotorCo 2 4 2 
Total 8 33 4.125 
Medium    
PlumbCo 0 0 0 
PartCo 1 2 2 
MotorCo 9 20 2.22 
Total 10 22 2.2 
Low    
PlumbCo 4 8 2 
PartCo 0 0 0 
MotorCo 0 0 0 
Total 4 8 2 
Table 5-16: Cross-Case Analysis – Number of Related Changes by 
Magnitude of Change Trigger 
 
5.3.3 Proposition 5 – Pace of Change (Frequency) 
Proposition 5 addresses the pace of change in the outer environment and its impact on 
the internal alignment factors.  Specifically, Proposition 5 states that the greater the pace 
of change in the outer environment, the greater the likelihood that the internal structure of 
an alignment factor will need to be altered.  As noted in Section 3.2.3.3, pace represents 
rate of change.  Because TAGA is a process-oriented theory, it is appropriate to address 
change over time.   
As described in the chain of evidence (see Appendix B), Proposition 5 is analyzed as 
the ratio of alignment factor change events per alignment episode.  TAGA suggests that if 
there are multiple changes in one alignment factor during an episode, there are likely to 
be multiple changes in the other alignment factors because changes in one factor results 
in changes in the outer environment of the other alignment factors.  Multiple changes in 
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the outer environments of the other alignment factors increases the likelihood that the 
internal structures of the alignment factors will no longer be adapted to their 
environment.  Thus the greater the number of change events in one alignment factor, the 
more likely there will be a corresponding increase in the number of changes in the other 
internal alignment factors during this same period of time (episode).   
The number of change events per alignment factor per episode can be compared to 
determine whether there is evidence of this relationship, creating, in essence, a set of 
comparative ratios among the number of changes for each alignment factor during an 
alignment episode (e.g., EE:SG:SI:OS:IS:IT).  For example, during Episode 1 at PartCo, 
there were two changes in the environment (EE-1 and EE-2), one change in the strategic 
intent (SG-1), one change in strategic initiative (SI-1), one change in the organizational 
structure (OS-1), no change in IS strategy, and two changes in the IS structure (IT-1) (see 
Table 5-17, Figure 5-2, and Section 5-1.2 for additional details).   The resulting 
comparative ratio of alignment factor change events in hierarchical sequence 
(EE:SG:SI:OS:IS:IT), is thus 2:1:1:1:0:2.  
Table 5.17 presents the number of changes per alignment factor per episode for each 
company.  Table 5-17 can be traced back to Figures 5-1, 5-2, and 5-3 and the company 
totals can be traced back to the respective alignment factor in Table 5-1.  Table 5-18 then 
presents this information in a comparative ratio format.  
As described in the chain of evidence, the set of comparative ratios for each episode 
were examined for consistent patterns.  A consistent pattern can represent a consistently 
high rate of change across the different levels of alignment factors, such as 7:7:7:7:7:7 or 
6:5:7:6:5:5.  Such a pattern is supportive of Proposition 5.  Alternatively, a consistently 
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low rate of change across the different levels of alignment factors, for example, 
1:1:1:1:1:1 or 1:2:1:1:1:2, also represents a consistent rate of change across the alignment 
factors and likewise supports Proposition 5.  Patterns across episodes that represent 
numerous changes in one alignment factor without a similar number of changes in the 
other alignment factors such as 8:0:0:0:1:0 or 1:0:0:1:7:1 do not support P5 because this 
pattern indicates that the pace of change in one alignment factor did not result in 
increases in similar changes in the other alignment factors.  Based upon this standard, the 
set of comparative ratios presented above for Episode 1 of PartCo (2:1:1:1:0:2) would be 
considered to support Proposition 5 because the changes among the alignment factors are 
consistent during Episode 1. 
The determination of a “consistent ratio” requires discretion on the part of the 
researcher, that is, any cutoff point presents a subjective dichotomy.  The ratios are 
presented in Table 5-18, and described below.  The reader can examine the ratios and 
analysis for reasonableness of the researcher’s conclusions regarding the consistency of 
the sets of ratios.   
At PlumbCo, all five episodes had consistent ratios (see Table 5-18), an effect that 
was also apparent in PartCo’s four episodes (see Table 5-18). At MotorCo, two of the 
three alignment episodes had consistent ratios.  Episode 1, however, had a higher 
incidence of change in the external environment than in the internal alignment factors 
(6:0:2:1:1:0).     
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 PlumbCo PartCo MotorCo 
Alignment 
Factor 
E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 T10 E1 E2 E3 E4 T E1 E2 E3 T 
EE 3 1 1 1 0 6 2 0 1 0 3 6 2 4 12 
SG 1 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
SI 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 4 2 1 1 4 
OS 2 0 0 1 0 3 1 1 2 0 4 1 2 3 6 
IS  1 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 2 
IT 1 1 2 2 2 8 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 3 3 
Table 5-17: Number of Alignment Factor Changes per Episode 
 
The analysis of the ratio of changes per episode indicates that 11 of the 12 episodes 
support Proposition 5, while Episode 1 at MotorCo did not.  Hence Proposition 5 is 
supported based on a preponderance of the evidence. 
Episode Changes Per Alignment 
Factor Level PlumbCo EE:SG:SI:OS:IS:IT 
E1 3:1:1:2:1:1 
E2 1:0:1:0:0:1 
E3 1:0:1:0:0:2 
E4 1:0:1:1:0:2 
E5 0:1:1:0:1:2 
  
PartCo EE:SG:SI:OS:IS:IT 
E1 2:1:1:1:0:2 
E2 0:0:1:1:0:0 
E3 1:0:1:2:1:0 
E4 0:0:1:0:0:0 
  
MotorCo EE:SG:SI:OS:IS:IT 
E1 6:0:2:1:1:0 
E2 2:0:1:2:0:0 
E3 4:1:1:3:1:3 
  
Table 5-18: Ratio of Changes Per Episode 
         
                                                 
10
 T represents “Total” 
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5.3.4 Proposition 6 – Dynamism of Change 
Proposition 6 combines the individual dimensions of change from Propositions 3 
through 5 to propose a composite construct that represents the overall dynamism of the 
outer environment.  Propositions 3 to 5 each individually identifies a specific dimension 
of change: level, magnitude, and pace, respectively.  These influences do not, however, 
occur in isolation.  Instead, the environment can be influenced by all three dimensions 
during any given period of time.  Based on this interaction, Proposition 6 suggests a 
relationship between a composite construct of all three individual dimensions of change 
and the likelihood that the internal structure of an alignment factor will require change.  
Proposition 6 thus formally states that the more dynamic the outer environment (greater 
the level, magnitude, and pace), the greater the likelihood that the internal structure of an 
alignment factor will need to be altered.   
As presented in the chain of evidence (Appendix B), Proposition 6 is examined by 
creating a composite measure for dynamism by combining the individual measures used 
to test Propositions 3 to 5.  This composite measure can then be compared to the number 
of changes in the alignment factors during the same alignment episode.  In essence, this 
measure is a ratio that compares the measure of dynamism in the outer environment of 
the internal alignment factors to the number of changes in the internal alignment factors.   
The numerator of the ratio is derived by assigning a point value to the perceived 
magnitude (High=5, Medium=3, Low=1) (independent variable from Proposition 4) for 
each initiating change then multiplying each magnitude value by the level (EE=6, SG=5, 
SI=4, OS=3. IS=2, IT=1) (independent variable from Proposition 3) in which the 
initiating event occurred and then summing all of the change triggers for each alignment 
episode ((magnitude of change event 1 X level) + (magnitude of change event 2 X 
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level)…. +(magnitude of change event n X level)).  Note that summing the initiating 
change events for each alignment episode incorporates pace (independent variable from 
Proposition 5) into the composite measure.   
For example, there were two triggering events (EE-1 & EE-2) for Episode 1 at 
PlumbCo.  Both of these triggering events were perceived to be of high magnitude by the 
interviewees at PlumbCo and each event was thus assigned a value for magnitude of five.  
Both of these triggering events occurred in the external environment which is the sixth 
level in the TAGA model (see Figure 2-2).  The two triggering events for Episode 1 at 
PlumbCo were calculated as follows: EE-1 = 5 X 6 = 30, EE-2 =5 X 6 = 30.  To factor in 
pace, the magnitude and level scores for each of the events were summed (30 + 30 = 60) 
to produce a composite measure of 60 for the dynamism of the outer environment during 
Episode 1 at PlumbCo.   
The denominator of the ratio, which represents change in the internal structures of the 
alignment factors, is the sum of the related alignment factor changes in each alignment 
episode.  For example, during Episode 1 at PlumbCo, there were six changes in lower 
level alignment factors (SG-1, SI-1, OS-1, OS-2, IS-1, and IT-1) resulting from the two 
triggering changes.  The denominator for the ratio is therefore 6.  The composite measure 
for dynamism for Episode 1 at PlumbCo is therefore 60:6. 
Support for Proposition 6 is indicated by a ratio where the greater the dynamism in 
the outer environment (level, magnitude, and pace) the greater the number of related 
changes in the internal alignment factors.   Therefore, a ratio with a high numerator and 
high denominator such as 100:6 or with a low numerator and low denominator such as 
10:1 is supportive of Proposition 6.  Numerators with a low numerator and high 
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denominator such as 10:6 or a high numerator with a low denominator such as 100:1 
would not support Proposition 6.  The ratio of 60:6 from Episode 1 at PlumbCo was thus 
interpreted as supporting Proposition 6.  Table 5-19 presented the detailed calculations 
for each alignment episode, while, Table 5-20 presents a summary of the findings.   
As with the measure in Proposition 5, the determination of support for Proposition 6 
requires discretion on the part of the researcher, that is, any cutoff point for determining 
support for Proposition 6 is subjective.  The reader can examine the ratios and analysis 
for reasonableness of the researcher’s conclusions as to the consistency of the sets of 
ratios.   
The analyses revealed that MotorCo exhibited a pattern consistent with Proposition 6, 
but that PlumbCo and PartCo did not (see Table 5-20).  At PlumbCo and PartCo, there 
was no obvious pattern to the ratios by episode (see Table 5-20).  Episodes 1 and 5 at 
PlumbCo supported of Proposition 6, while Episode 2 exhibited a large numerator (120) 
and a low value (2) in the denominator.  Episodes 3 and 4 at PlumbCo exhibited a small 
numerator indicating that the environment was not dynamic, but had denominators of 3 
and 4, respectively, in the denominators.  At MotorCo, all three episodes were consistent 
with Proposition 6.  Specifically, Episodes 1 and 2 indicated that the environment was 
only moderately dynamic with four and five related changes in the denominators, 
respectively, while Episode 3 exhibited a dynamic environment and eight changes to the 
internal structure of an alignment factor.     
The aggregate analysis showed no discernable pattern.  Based on a preponderance of 
the evidence of both the within case analysis and aggregate-case analysis, there is no 
support for the notion that the dynamic nature of the environment as evaluated here is 
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related to the need for the internal structure of an alignment factor to change.  Proposition 
6 was not supported. 
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Table 5-19: Calculation of Magnitude 
 
By Trigger/Episode 
Calculation: (magnitude X level) + (magnitude X level)…..= a measure of the likelihood of 
change. Therefore the greater the measure, the greater the likelihood of change in the internal 
alignment factors. 
Values 
 
Magnitude: high=5, medium=3, low=1  
Level: EE=6, SG=5, SI=4, OS=3, IS=2, IT=1 
Case Episode 
Episode 
Trigger Magnitude Level Total 
Number of Lower Level 
Alignment Factor Change 
Events 
PlumbCo 1 EE-1 5 6 30      
  EE-2 5 6 30      
     
60 6 
SG-1, SI-1, OS-1, OS-2, IS-
1, IT-1 
           
 2 EE-1 5 6 30      
  EE-2 5 6 30      
  EE-3 5 6 30      
  EE-4 5 6 30      
     
120 2 SI-2, IT-2 
           
 3 IT-2 1 1 1 3 SI-3, IT-3, IT-4 
           
 4 SI-4 1 4 4 3 OS-3, IT-5, IT-6 
           
 5 EE-5 1 6 6      
  EE-6 5 6 30      
     
36 5 SG-2, SI-5, IS-2, IT-7, IT-8 
           
PartCo 1 EE-1 5 6 30 5 SG-1, SI-1, OS-1, IT-1, IT-2 
           
 2 EE-1 5 6 30 2 SI-2, OS-2 
           
 3 EE-2 3 6 18 4 SI-3, OS-3, OS-4, IS-1  
           
           
 4 EE-1 5 6 30 1 SI-4 
           
MotorCo 1 EE-1 3 6 18      
  SI-1 3 4 12      
  EE-3 3 4 12      
     
42 3 SI-2, OS-1, IS-1 
           
 2 EE-1 3 6 18      
  SI-1 3 4 12      
  EE-2 3 6 18      
     
48 4 SI-3, OS-2, OS-3, OS-4 
           
 3 EE-2 3 6 18      
  EE-4 3 6 18      
  EE-5 3 6 18      
  EE-7 3 6 18      
  EE-8 5 6 30      
  EE-9 3 6 18      
  EE-10 5 6 30      
  EE-11 3 6 18      
     
168 8 
SG-1, SI-4, OS-5, OS-6, IS-
2, IT-1, IT-2,  IT-3 
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Case Episode Ratio 
PlumbCo E1 60:6 
 E2 120:2 
 E3 1:3 
 E4 4:3 
 E5 36:5 
 
  
PartCo E1 30:5 
 E2 30:2 
 E3 18:4 
 E4 30:1 
 
  
MotorCo E1 42:3 
 E2 48:4 
 E3 168:8 
Table 5-20: Ratio of Calculated Dynamism to Changes in Alignment 
Factors By Case 
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6 Discussion 
In this chapter, we review the results of our research to identify key findings and to 
discuss their relevance and applicability to research and practice.  Recall that we 
examined the research question: How does IS enable organizations to adapt to change?  
Taking a positivist approach to a multiple-case study, we developed and tested 
propositions that, first, compared the theory of alignment as guided adaptation with the 
theory of alignment viewed as synchronization.   Second, as the first step to 
understanding the role of IS in enabling organizations to adapt to change, we examined 
the impact of external dimensions of change on the alignment factors.  
The findings for Phase I are presented followed by those for Phase II.  Next, relevant 
issues not attributable to a particular phase are discussed.  Finally, the contribution of the 
research is presented. 
6.1 Discussion of Phase I Results 
The purpose of Phase I was to assess TAGA in multiple organizational settings.  
TAGA was developed based on data from a firm that was mid-sized and that had a non-
strategic view of IS.  Phase I was, therefore, designed to address these boundary 
conditions to assess whether TAGA would generalize to additional business contexts.  
Proposition 1 examined the pattern of alignment in two large corporations.  As predicted 
by Proposition 1, Hypothesis 1b, the pattern observed in both large company case sites 
was consistent with TAGA.   None of the alignment episodes for our large firm cases 2 
and 3 exhibited a pattern similar to that predicted by alignment as synchronization.  
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Instead, TAGA was more explanatory than alignment as synchronization in all of the 
observed alignment episodes. 
Proposition 2 examined the pattern of alignment in firms with a formal IS strategy 
and planning process.  All three case sites, that is, both larger firms and the mid-sized 
firm, were appropriate for examining Proposition 2.  As predicted by Proposition 2, 
Hypotheses 2b and 3b, the pattern was consistent with that predicted by TAGA and not 
with the pattern predicted by alignment viewed as synchronization.  Out of the 11 
alignment episodes observed over the three cases, only one, the first episode of PlumbCo, 
exhibited a pattern similar to that predicted by alignment as synchronization.  The 
remaining four alignment episodes at PlumbCo and the seven episodes observed at 
PartCo and MotorCo did not exhibit a pattern of alignment as described by alignment as 
synchronization.      
Alignment viewed as synchronization explains one alignment episode but fails to 
explain the patterns observed in the other 11 episodes.  TAGA, on the other hand, with its 
short-term decoupling of alignment factors and long-term interdependence of the 
alignment factors argues that the pattern observed in Episode 1 at PlumbCo is not a 
necessary pattern to achieve alignment.  TAGA, therefore, explains the pattern of 
alignment observed in all 12 alignment episodes.    
The conclusion is that TAGA generalizes to these additional contexts of larger firms 
and to firms with more formal IS strategy and planning processes.  A good theory 
explains why we would expect certain relationships in the data (Whetten 1989). Applying 
Whetten’s (1989) premise, TAGA’s additional explanatory capabilities extend the range 
of applicability of TAGA as a descriptive theory of alignment.     
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6.2 Discussion of Phase II Results 
The purpose of Phase II was to understand the effect of external change on the 
internal structure of an alignment factor.  An understanding of this nature provides a 
foundation for management to design the alignment factor in a way that allows the 
internal structure to remain adapted to its environment, given the characteristics of the 
environment in which it must function.  Understanding these characteristics provides a 
basis for lengthening the period during which the alignment factor enables organizational 
goals.  
Specifically, then, Phase II was designed to further develop the theory by exploring 
constructs related to the characteristics of the environment and was designed to 
accomplish two purposes.  The first purpose was to investigate a number of factors 
influencing change referred to here as the dimensions of change.  TAGA proposed that 
the environment could be characterized by the following dimensions: level, magnitude, 
and pace of change.  TAGA further proposed that a composite measure of the level, 
magnitude, and pace of change represented the dynamic nature of the environment.  
Support for Phase II propositions would indicate the role for IS should be to enable 
organizational change and therefore to minimize periods when IS constrains the 
organization from moving towards its strategic goals.   
Phase II was also designed to explore initial measures for these dimensions.  TAGA, 
in its current stage of development as a theory, supports the dimensions theoretically. 
These relationships, however, must satisfy the need to be falsified (Popper 1959).  
Although constructs and propositions can be tested at a higher level of abstraction, it is 
preferable to operationalize them as variables and hypotheses that are more readily 
observable and thus more accurately measured and tested (Bacharach 1989). 
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In the following sections, each proposition is discussed and the support for the 
dimensions and the initial measures developed here are discussed. 
6.2.1 Discussion of Proposition 3 – Level of Change 
Proposition 3 examined the level at which the change was initiated.  TAGA proposes 
a hierarchical relationship among the alignment factors, consistent with prior research 
that indicates structure tends to follow strategy (see, for example, Amburgey & Dacin 
1994; Chandler 1962).  Recall, however, that TAGA is based on a probabilistic 
theoretical base and not a causal theoretical base.  TAGA does not indicate change must 
flow down the hierarchy.  Instead it indicates that change is more likely to flow down the 
hierarchy.  TAGA allows for the possibility that lower-level change may result in 
changes to higher-level alignment factors because each alignment factor is a subsystem of 
the alignment system and changes in a lower-level alignment factor represent changes to 
the outer environment of all the alignment factors in the alignment hierarchy.   
This research examined the data from the cases sites for evidence of the hierarchical 
relationship among the alignment factors.  The majority of change events in the case sites 
were triggered via higher-level change events.  The external environment proved to be 
the most frequent trigger of change.  There was only one event where a lower-level event 
triggered a change at a higher-level in the alignment hierarchy.  This was event IT-2 at 
PlumbCo where the upgrade to the ERP infrastructure provided additional functionality 
that facilitated the introduction of ecommerce services.  As described above, these results 
were consistent with TAGA.      
PlumbCo specifically states that their use of technology and infrastructure is a 
strategic asset designed as a platform for developing services to customers that their 
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competitors cannot provide.  The IS strategy of maintaining an up-to-date infrastructure 
provided new infrastructure functionality that PlumbCo exploited for competitive 
advantage.  PlumbCo’s use of technology thus exemplifies how IS can be structured to 
enable the rest of the organization to reach organizational goals.  Hence, TAGA suggests 
how to use technology to enable the organization to reach its goals and how not to 
constrain the organization by limiting its ability to adapt to its environment. 
When the average change per level was examined, the highest average was observed 
for changes triggered by strategic initiatives.  Specifically, the combined results from the 
three case studies indicated that change events initiated at the highest level – the external 
environment -  resulted on average in 2.11 lower-level changes, while initiating changes 
at the strategic initiative (SI) level resulted in an average of 2.5 related lower-level 
changes (see Table 5-14). While a higher average change at the strategic initiative level is 
inconsistent with Proposition 3, two factors may explain the results.  First, as noted in the 
results section, several lower-level change events were triggered by compounding effects 
of multiple triggers thereby diluting the average number of changes associated with the 
external environment effects by increasing the denominator in the ratio. Second, out of 
the 21 initiating trigger events observed over the three cases, all but three occurred at the 
level of the external environment.  Thus the lack of lower-level initiating changes is a 
direct indication that higher-level change is more likely to initiate change in the internal 
structure of lower-level alignment factors.   
The conclusion from this research is that the level at which change occurs impacts the 
necessity for change in the internal structure of the alignment factors.  This research, 
therefore, supports the notion that level can be measured based on the hierarchical nature 
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of the TAGA model.  Note, also, that the ability of lower-level changes to trigger higher-
level changes as the data for IT-2 in PlumbCo indicated is consistent with TAGA’s non-
determinist theoretical stance that predicts that the hierarchical level increases the 
likelihood that change will occur, but is not a necessary and sufficient condition for 
change. 
6.2.2 Discussion of Proposition 4 – Magnitude of Initiating Change 
The second dimension of change, as stated in Proposition 4, is the magnitude of the 
change.  Magnitude has been identified in prior literature as a way to measure change 
(see, for example, Huff, Huff, & Thomas 1992; Huff & Huff 1995).  The greater the 
magnitude, the more likely that the internal structure of an alignment factor will require 
change.    
In this study, events reported as being of greater magnitude were indeed related to a 
larger number of change events of internal alignment factors compared with events 
reported as being of medium or low magnitude. Hence the findings support Proposition 4.  
Examining the data by individual case reveals, however, that at MotorCo there was a 
large number of initiating change events reported as medium and these triggers had a 
higher average number of internal alignment factor changes associated with them than 
did the higher magnitude triggering events. There are two explanations for this 
inconsistency.  First, magnitude is a composite construct derived from both the stress the 
organization is under and the organization’s resistance to change. Stress is predicted to 
induce change, while resistance to change is predicted to restrain change.  Thus 
magnitude is constructed from two opposing forces, neither of which has been well 
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validated as a measure that may be contributing to the results (again, see, Huff, Huff, & 
Thomas 1992; Huff & Huff 1995).   
Prior research indicates that resistance to change is related to the length of time the 
core beliefs, structures, control systems, etc., have been in place (see, for example, 
Gersick 1999; Tushman and Romanelli 1985).  MotorCo forms part of the largest and 
oldest firm examined in this research.  In fact, MotorCo is the founding division of the 
firm, dating back to the late 1800’s.  It is possible that the maturity of the division created 
an environment where deeply rooted core structures and beliefs created a substantial 
resistance to change.  This may have resulted in a period where the stress was not great 
enough to overcome the resistance to change resulting in more frequent, smaller changes, 
a situation observed by several researchers (again see, for example Gersick 1991; 
Sabherwal, Hirschheim and Goles 2002; Tushman and Romanelli).11  The early stage of 
development of the construct measure does not allow for a more detailed analysis to 
properly explore how the two opposing forces may have caused this situation and further 
research is warranted. 
Second, there could be an issue of scale anchoring.  MotorCo may have experienced 
much greater changes prior to this research period that influenced the individual’s 
perceptions of the magnitude of change.   MotorCo also had the most changes in its 
external environment of any of the three case sites.  It is possible the high frequency of 
environmental change could have influenced the individuals’ perceptions of the 
magnitude of change.   
                                                 
11
 The references cited all used punctuated equilibrium theory to explain the series of smaller changes.  
Ward and Vessey (working paper) address the phenomenon of punctuated equilibrium as a special case of 
TAGA.  See that paper for additional explanation. 
     118 
Third, the case study data in this study did not permit statistical analysis.  It is 
possible that the difference between the averages is not statistically significant and the 
main conclusion to draw is that further research into magnitude as a measure is needed, 
particularly research where the study methodology supports statistical analysis to 
determine whether there is a significant difference among changes of different 
magnitudes. 
One final point with respect to magnitude is that the chain of evidence for Proposition 
4 indicated that the results of the magnitude relationship would be triangulated with 
financial results.  This was not possible due to a lack of data, however.  PlumbCo is a 
closely-held corporation that does not publish financial data and only limited financial 
information could be obtained during the study.  PartCo had financial data only for the 
five year time period following the merger, making the rolling five-year examination 
inappropriate.  MotorCo was a division of a public company that had gone through 
several corporate and subunit reorganizations, making it impossible to compare annual 
financial data. 
6.2.3 Discussion of Proposition 5 – Pace of Change 
The third dimension represents a measure of change over time, or “pace.”  
Proposition 5 indicated that the greater the pace of change in the outer environment, the 
more likely that the internal structure of an alignment factor will require change.  While 
the data from the case studies supported Proposition 5, there are three issues regarding 
the data that need to be discussed.  First, the short episode duration may have limited the 
impact that pace might otherwise have had on the alignment factors.  Most alignment 
episodes were of short duration with a low number of change events per episode.  There 
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were a total of 12 alignment episodes identified over the combined 25 years of the 
histories of the three companies.  Thus the average episode lasted a little over two years.   
Second, it was unclear how to determine a “standard” or “cutoff point” for evaluating 
the alignment episode change ratios.  Any specific cutoff point would include a 
subjective dichotomy that is difficult to support theoretically.  Note that this is similar to 
the criticism of punctuated equilibrium theory with respect to how to determine whether a 
change is evolutionary or revolutionary in nature.     
Third, there were potentially confounds in the measurement of pace.  Because pace is 
a function of time, it was necessary to have a specified time frame to delimit the measure.  
The alignment episodes were the most consistent way to do so.  In all three cases there 
were alignment factor change events triggered by events that occurred in prior alignment 
episodes.  Using episodes to delimit the time frame, however, resulted in events related to 
a change trigger that occurred outside the alignment episode, being excluded from the 
measure and thus reducing the number of changes in the lower level alignment factors.       
6.2.4 Discussion of Proposition 6 – Dynamism of Change 
Proposition 6 examines the effect of the three individual dimensions (level, 
magnitude, and pace) into an overall measure of the dynamism in the outer environment.  
The three individual measures were quantified and then combined to create an overall 
measure.  Using this composite measure, Proposition 6 was not supported.     
There are two potential explanations for the lack of support for Proposition 6.  First, 
the most conservative conclusion is that there is simply no cumulative effect of the three 
dimensions with respect to the need for the internal structure of an alignment factor to 
change.  Second, it is possible that the lack of support is the result of the exploratory 
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nature of the measurements of the dimensions; that is the triggering events and related 
change events by episode may not be an appropriate way to address the relationship. The 
formula used to calculate dynamism may also be inappropriate.  There is reason to 
suspect the latter.  The measures are imprecise and thus combining them into a single 
measure may have lead to further imprecision so that no pattern could be determined.  
With general support for the three individual dimensions, it seems likely that the lack of 
support for a cumulative measure is the result of the exploratory nature of the measures.  
The conclusion is that further research is needed to examine whether this is a valid 
construct and, if so, how it can be measured.   
6.3 Methodological Considerations 
The specific data analyses conducted were chosen for consistency.  This approach 
focused on using initiating changes for analysis and focusing on the bi-variate 
relationships between alignment factors.  As with all data, a number of alternative 
approaches could have been used.  The alternative approaches are based on different 
assumptions as to the definition of initiating change events and on whether to focus on 
episodes or relationships.   
Initiating change events, for example, could have been defined as any change event 
related to a change in an internal alignment factor as opposed to the initiating change 
events for an alignment episode.  By this alternative definition, every change that was 
related to another change could be considered to be an initiating change and included in 
the calculation of measures associated with the dimensions of change measures. Another 
alternative approach would have been to restrict relationships to those that occurred 
within an episode rather than examining them both within and across episodes as was 
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done for all propositions except 5, which specifically limited the relationships to a single 
episode to examine pace.   Using this approach, any event that was related to another 
event in a different episode, would not have been included as part of the alignment 
pattern.  By including the relationships even though they crossed episode boundaries, 
more relationships were included in the analysis, which resulted in a more conservative 
analysis, particularly for Propositions 1 and 2.   
The additional analyses based on differing definitions and alternative calculations 
were conducted and reviewed as part of a thorough analysis of the data and an attempt to 
learn about potential measures for the constructs.  The alternative approaches did not 
reveal substantially different results and the added complexity did not warrant altering the 
presentation of the results from that proposed in the chain of evidence.  The alternative 
approaches available are an indication, however, that, while the data indicated initial 
support for the dimensions of change (level, magnitude, and pace), the measures require 
additional development and research. 
One final note on the difficulty in analyzing the data is that underlying TAGA is the 
notion that the constraints on an internal alignment factor can be minimized by proper 
design of their internal structure.  While every attempt was made to ensure reliability and 
validity in the data, at this stage in the research it was not possible to determine how well 
designed and thus adapted to its environment any one alignment factor was.  Thus the 
degree of adaptability of the internal structure of the internal alignment factors is an 
uncontrolled variable that may have confounded the data.   
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6.4 Limitations of the Research 
While every attempt was made to conduct rigorous and relevant research, as in all 
research, this research has its limitations.  The main limitations of this research can be 
related back to the early stage of theory development and the infancy of the related 
research stream.   
First, the early stage of theory development and the infancy of the related research 
stream of this research dictated case studies as the appropriate methodology.  Case 
studies generalize to theory and to the additional business contexts in which TAGA was 
examined.  While TAGA does generalize to the additional contexts of larger firms and 
firms with more formal IS strategy and planning processes, these are only two additional 
contexts out of many possible.  Additional research is required to continue to test 
boundary conditions and increase the generalizability of TAGA.  Further note that 
statistical generalizability does not apply to case study methodology (Lee and Baskerville 
2001).  Determining the statistical generalizability of TAGA is likewise left for future 
research, to be conducted when the constructs can be measured more accurately for 
which surveys and experiments are the preferred methodology. 
A second limitation was the use of high-level constructs for Phase II.  Using high-
level constructs limited the depth with which the theory could be examined. Hence 
propositions rather than hypotheses were used to describe the relationships among the 
constructs.  It was necessary to use higher-level constructs and propositions because no 
prior measures existed.  This lack of existing measures is one of the reasons case study 
methodology was appropriate (Yin 1994).  And while every attempt was made to collect 
data in a reliable and valid fashion, it is important to point out the limitations of these 
attempts to measure the constructs and to consider them within the context of case study 
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method.  Recall, that one of the goals of the research was to explore ways to develop such 
measures for future research. 
A third limitation of the research is the use of interviews to examine prior events.  
Perceptions and memories of individuals are known to contain inaccuracies and to change 
as time passes, thereby reducing reliability in any one individual’s responses.  As noted in 
Chapter 4, several methodological techniques were used to minimize this known 
limitation to interviewing.  First, the timeframe was limited to a ten-year period.  Second, 
a structured interview guide was used to standardize the collection of data across 
individuals.  Third, interviewees were selected from multiple areas of the firms to provide 
triangulation and to minimize the potential of bias.   
A fourth limitation relates to the data analysis.  Due to the nature of qualitative data 
and the early stages of the research, a “preponderance of the evidence,” similar to that 
used in a civil law suit, was used to interpret the data.  Every effort was nonetheless taken 
to collect and develop reliable and valid data.  There remains, however, the risk of 
subjective interpretation.  The results therefore have the potential for variance in their 
interpretation.  Hence additional research is required to develop quantifiable measures for 
the constructs explored in this research, which together with statistical analysis, would 
decrease the subjectivity in the interpretations of the results.  As noted earlier, however, 
the lack of measures was a limitation due to the early stage of theory development and 
not a flaw of the research design. 
Finally, this research examined strategy taking into account differences between goals 
and initiatives and, within the confines of the MotorCo case, corporate level versus 
business unit level strategy.  Strategy, however, is a complex construct with a substantial 
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body of supporting research.  Examining goals and initiatives and corporate and business 
unit level strategy are only two of the many aspects of strategy that require examination.  
For example, no distinction was made between strategy and tactics and no other 
categories or attempts to classify or measure strategy (e.g., Miles and Snow’s Defenders, 
Analyzers, and Prospectors or Porter’s value chain or industry position) were conducted.    
6.5 Further Insights into the Adaptation Process 
Several additional issues arose that did not fit into the proposition structure, either 
because they were unique to an individual case or because they addressed issues that 
impacted all of the Propositions.  Those issues are discussed in this section.   
6.5.1 Discussion of PlumbCo as a Revelatory Case 
PlumbCo was a revelatory case as defined by Yin (1996).  PlumbCo was the only 
company where there was an episode that exhibited a pattern of traditional alignment 
where change in all four alignment factors occurred.  This was the first episode we 
examined at PlumbCo.  PlumbCo’s market structure was changing and PlumbCo’s size 
($450 million) put the firm at risk in the evolving environment.  As a reaction necessary 
for survival, PlumbCo set a goal to grow large enough to survive and realigned its 
organization to accomplish this goal.  As noted, this period exemplified the traditional 
pattern of alignment and illustrates how alignment theory has been interpreted as 
“synchronization” with the company changing across all factors to realign with its 
changing environment.  Note, however, that the following four alignment episodes at 
PlumbCo did not require a synchronized pattern of change for the company to maintain 
alignment.  This fact is consistent with TAGA, which predicts that when change occurred 
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in the following alignment episodes, it was only the alignment factors that were no longer 
adapted to their environment that changed while the other factors remained adapted. 
The alignment episodes and patterns at PlumbCo highlight a theoretical issue 
important for supporting TAGA that is difficult to examine in IS alignment research.  
This issue is: “how do we know whether the company was out of alignment and that 
change to an alignment factor or factors brought them into alignment, or whether a 
change in an alignment factor resulted in the organization moving from alignment to an 
out-of-alignment period?”  The implication for both alignment as synchronization and for 
TAGA is determining whether an isolated change to an individual alignment factor may 
be moving the company in to or out of alignment.      
From the PlumbCo case data, it seems clear that in 1995 PlumbCo was out of 
alignment.  Their market (external environment) was changing and PlumbCo’s existing 
position left them facing severe business difficulties.  The alignment episode that 
followed demonstrated a traditional pattern of alignment as synchronization where all of 
the alignment factors were “realigned” in order to meet the needs of the changing 
environment.  Thus the first episode of PlumbCo provided a baseline period of alignment 
from which the additional changes to the alignment factors can be compared12. 
As previously discussed, none of PlumbCo’s following four episodes exhibited the 
process of alignment as synchronization, exhibiting instead, decoupled alignment 
patterns.  The argument based on alignment as synchronization would be that the 
additional alignment factor change events left PlumbCo out of alignment.  But this was 
                                                 
12
 Although this alignment episode exhibits a pattern consistent with traditional alignment as 
synchronization, TAGA likewise provides a theoretical explanation of this alignment episode as well as the 
other alignment episodes as discussed in detail in Section 6.1 
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not the case.  In fact, PlumbCo has been very successful since the traditional pattern of 
alignment occurred starting in 1995.  Consistent with TAGA and not the theory of 
alignment as synchronization, the additional decoupled changes to PlumbCo’s alignment 
factors allowed them to remain adapted to their environment and served to maintain 
alignment, demonstrating that decoupled changes occur as predicted by TAGA. 
Another revelatory aspect of the PlumbCo case is that starting with their strategic 
long range planning in 1995 IS became part of their overall business strategy.  In other 
words, PlumbCo did not have just a formal IS strategy.  By focusing on using IS to 
provide a competitive advantage, PlumbCo, in effect, elevated IS to a business level 
strategy.  It is possible that this distinction is a substantial one and one that is 
theoretically consistent with TAGA.   
Instead of having IS react to changes in the external environment and other alignment 
factors, which appears to be a common approach (as observed at PartCo and MotorCo), 
IS was altered in a proactive fashion, enabling flexibility in the organizational and IS 
structure.  Thus when changes at higher levels occurred at PlumbCo, it was less likely 
that lower-level changes were required.  To express this in the theoretical terms of 
TAGA, the lower-level alignment factors of the organizational and IS structure were 
designed in a way that they not only remained adapted to the changes in their outer 
environment, but enabled the business to leverage the infrastructure for competitive 
advantage.  In other words, their internal structure was sufficiently flexible to 
accommodate the dynamism in their environment.  This effect was observed on several 
occasions at PlumbCo and is exemplified by Strategic Initiatives 2, 3, and 5.  All three of 
these initiatives resulted in no changes to lower-level alignment factors, while in the other 
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two case sites, out of seven alignment episodes, only SI-4 at PartCo, the failed hostile 
takeover, did not result in lower-level changes.  It is suspected that the difference is due 
to PlumbCo’s enabling approach to IS, while the other two companies focused on using 
IS in a supporting role, subservient to the business strategy.   
6.5.2 The Role of IS Strategy 
As noted above, the three firms had different IS strategies, but the overriding goal for 
IS strategy was to support the business, an approach that tended to remain consistent over 
time.  Over the 12 alignment episodes across the three firms, there were only five 
changes in IS strategy, the lowest number of changes in the internal alignment factors. 
At PartCo, the one IS strategy mentioned was a convergence strategy.  Immediately 
after the merger, there was no formal IS strategy, simply a focus on integration to 
consolidate the two company structures.  After the immediate consolidation needs were 
met, PartCo turned its focus to convergence.  The role of technology at the company was 
very much a support role and, while it had a well developed IS strategy and planning 
process, the goal of the process was to support the business needs and to minimize costs.  
Hence the business goals drove the convergence strategy because it was difficult to cost-
effectively support the increased cross-organizational information sharing needs with 
multiple, disparate systems. 
MotorCo was similar to PartCo in that it had a sophisticated IS strategic planning 
process, but IS again functioned as support for the business goals.  The first IS strategy 
evidenced at MotorCo came in 1999 when an IS strategy was implemented to make sure 
the company did not face catastrophic systems failure as a result of Y2K.  The second 
change in IS strategy was due to the organizational goals shifting to focus on cost cutting 
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in SG&A costs.  This change led the company to institute an IS strategy focusing on 
centralization.   
As described in detail in the previous section, PlumbCo was the most progressive of 
the three case sites in its strategic use of technology.  PlumbCo experienced two changes 
to IS strategy over the ten years.  The first was during the first alignment episode when 
PlumbCo, in effect, focused on IS as a strategic initiative.  The IS strategy that followed 
was to maintain an up-to-date IS infrastructure that could support innovative services for 
the customer.  PlumbCo’s second strategy evolved from the first strategy.  It focused on 
supporting the strategic goals of the business by delivering more useful information from 
their data. 
In two of the three cases (i.e., PartCo and MotorCo), the IS strategy was not essential 
to business; instead it played a role not unlike that of the accounting and finance 
departments or the manufacturing departments.  IS was important, but only from the 
standpoint that it supported the business; that is IS is not the primary focus of the 
business at PartCo and MotorCo.  PlumbCo was the exception.       
All three of the companies examined were successful, prospering businesses despite 
the differing roles and views on the importance of IS.  The conclusion is that, as 
demonstrated by PlumbCo, IS can be a key strategic asset, but as indicated by TAGA and 
as demonstrated by PartCo and MotorCo, this is not a necessary and sufficient condition 
for success.  IS is only one tool that can be used to accomplish the goals of an 
organization. There are multiple paths to accomplish business goals and IS may or may 
not be a dominant part of this.  
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6.5.3 Additional Alignment Factors 
Prior research (see Ward and Vessey working paper) and the data analysis conducted 
here indicated that future research may want to examine the potential for additional 
alignment factors to accurately reflect the theory of alignment as guided adaptation.  The 
data indicated that alignment factors for corporate level strategy and management may 
provide further explanatory power to TAGA.  First, a corporate level change was 
considered an external environmental change for the analysis of MotorCo, which was a 
subdivision of a Fortune 500 company.  Further research is required to determine if this is 
sufficient or whether an additional external alignment factor should be identified for 
corporate level influence on business units.  The influence of corporate structure and a 
corporate level strategy on a business unit is not an uncommon occurrence in today’s 
large corporations.  The impact of this influence on alignment needs further research and 
development. 
Second, while TAGA specifically argues for the role of management in guiding the 
alignment process, the current model does not specifically identify the role of 
management.  There are indications from the data that such a construct should be 
examined more closely.  For example, in both PartCo and MotorCo, changes in high-
level executives were mentioned as substantial change events and as influencing the 
direction the companies took.  Additionally, management’s proactive changes can alter 
the internal structure to meet perceived changes in the environment before the actual 
environmental trigger occurs as was frequently the case with companies implementing 
ERP in anticipation of Y2K.   Future research needs to focus on the role of management 
and whether it is an internal or external alignment factor. 
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6.6 Contributions of the Research 
Our research makes several contributions to the literature.  The implications of the 
research to the IS field is discussed first, followed by a discussion of the implications for 
practice. 
6.6.1 Implications for Research 
First, this research further develops a descriptive theory of alignment between 
business and IS.  Existing research, in particular that of Henderson and Venkatraman 
(1993), and research that built on that work, has tended to focus on prescriptive aspects of 
alignment and falls short in providing a description of how alignment actually occurs 
over time.  The theoretical approach of Henderson and Venkatraman (1993) further fails 
to explain why some companies can be successful despite an apparent lack of IS 
alignment.  TAGA on the other hand, specifically addresses the question of how 
alignment actually occurs and provides an explanation for how firms can be successful 
despite a non-strategic approach to IS.  As a result, TAGA represents a significant 
contribution to the literature on IS alignment. 
Second, this research established initial measures for the characteristics of change in 
external environment.  Specifically, this research established that level, magnitude, and 
pace of change in the environment influences change in the internal alignment factors.  
These measures are exploratory and require additional research, but initial support 
suggested that these measures can be used as a basis for designing information systems 
that match the IS capabilities with the environment in which they must operate. 
A third theoretical contribution of TAGA is that it recognizes that the alignment 
process can be guided.  Prior research focuses on management having total control over 
the company.  TAGA, on the other hand, considers the impact of largely uncontrollable 
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external influences and the ability of management to guide the firm via its goals and 
strategic initiative. 
By providing a theoretical basis for describing how IS aligns with the business, 
TAGA provides a theoretical foundation for future research in IS.  This represents a 
fourth theoretical contribution of this research.  For example, the concepts of flexibility 
and agility are at the forefront of today’s discussions of IS infrastructure for which 
theoretical approaches such as dynamic capabilities and the resource-based view of the 
firm have been used as justification.  The theoretical basis of dynamic capabilities or the 
resource based view of the firm provides few guidelines, however, as to how the IS 
should actually be structured to support these notions.  TAGA on the other hand, provides 
a theoretical foundation upon which the role of IS in enabling an organization can be 
developed to adapt to changed circumstances.  TAGA could therefore bring a new 
theoretical perspective to research on IS adaptability and infrastructure flexibility.   
6.6.2 Implications for Practice 
Our research has several implications for practice.  First, because the theory of 
alignment as guided adaptation reflects the way in which companies actually address 
alignment issues, our research provides practitioners with a more realistic framework 
within which to address their future technology needs.  Rather than attempting to align IS 
with the business, that is, seeking to have IS react to business changes as quickly as 
possible once they arise, our theory suggests that IS management should seek to 
implement platforms that enable a range of possible future scenarios.   
Second, our research suggests that practice could use our notions of alignment as 
guided adaptation as a basis for planning their IS needs into the future.  TAGA indicates 
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that it is less important to focus on maintaining alignment and more important to focus on 
how IS may enable or constrain the ability of the organization to adapt to future changes 
(and hence the organization’s ability to reach its goals).  Thus managers may wish to shift 
their focus from building alignment processes into an organization’s IS strategy and 
planning processes and focus more on the enabling characteristics of their IS structure 
and processes, and on limiting their constraining aspects.  For example, instead of 
reviewing whether the business and IS strategies are aligned, managers may want to 
review potential limitations of the existing IS structure and processes to see if they can be 
overcome before they restrict the organization from adapting to future changes.    
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7 Conclusion  
This research addresses an issue that has been of primary importance to both business 
and IS over the past two decades, the process of aligning IS with the business.  The 
theory of alignment as guided adaptation, or TAGA, has its theoretical roots in the 
evolutionary and ecological theories of strategy process (see, for example, Barnett & 
Burgelman 1996; Burgelman 1991 1994; Hannan & Freeman 1982; Nelson & Winter 
1977; Noda & Bower 1996) and in particular, the formulation of strategy process 
presented by Lovas and Ghoshal (2000) that characterizes the evolutionary process as one 
of guided evolution.  TAGA further draws upon the theoretical work of Simon, 
incorporating concepts of a sciences of the artificial, to explain how a business and its 
subsystems adapt to its environment. TAGA’s key theoretical concept is that by viewing 
the alignment factors as subsystems of the larger alignment system, in the short run, the 
alignment factors behave approximately independently of the behavior of the other 
components even though, in the long run, the alignment factors are interdependent.   
TAGA thus indicates that, in the short run, each of the four internal alignment factors, 
business and IS strategy and structure, adapts to changes in their environment to the 
extent possible and therefore only needs to change their internal structure and functioning 
when they are no longer adapted to their external environment.  This implies that, even 
when there are changes to the alignment system, alignment can be maintained without 
corresponding, individual changes to all of the internal alignment factors.  This view 
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contradicts prior work that implies alignment can only be maintained by altering (i.e., 
realigning) all of the alignment factors in response to change.    
This research shows that TAGA can be generalized to additional business contexts 
and, like the study from which the theory was developed, demonstrates its superiority 
over the traditional view of alignment as synchronization in describing how alignment 
actually occurs. This research, based on the corollary that change is initiated in the outer 
environment of an alignment factor, also supports the notion that change in the external 
environment can be characterized by the level, the magnitude, and the pace at which 
change occurs.  Further, this research shows that these dimensions can describe the 
likelihood that the internal structure of the alignment factors will need to be changed.   
The goal of this research was to further develop TAGA, not only as a descriptive 
theory of alignment, but as a foundational theory to develop the role of IS in 
organizations.  In extending TAGA to additional contexts and in developing 
characteristics likely to lead to change in the internal alignment factors, this research also 
paves the way for the conduct of research into how to sustain alignment over time. 
7.1 Directions for Future Research 
While the three cases examined in this research provide support for TAGA and the 
impact of the dimensions of change on change in the internal alignment factors, this was 
merely the next step in the development of TAGA.  There are several possible avenues 
for future research. 
First, research needs to continue to test TAGA in different contexts thereby extending 
the generalizability of TAGA and establishing its boundary conditions.  Future research 
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should examine boundary conditions such as business and IS strategy and tactics, IS 
governance approaches, impact of industry, and position in the value chain.  
Second, future research also needs to further develop the dimensions of change.  In 
particular, magnitude and pace require the development of more precise measures.  
Additional research also needs to further examine whether the three dimensions can be 
used as a composite measure of the overall dynamism of the environment.   
Third, research is required that addresses the potential impact of additional alignment 
factors on TAGA.  The role of management needs further exploration and represents a 
stream of research that has the potential to make a contribution to areas such as IS 
governance and IS strategic planning.  Corporate level influence likewise represents a 
potential alignment factor that needs further development and research.   
Fourth, determining enabling and constraining characteristics of the internal 
alignment factors, and in particular IS, represents a valuable avenue for future research 
that directly impacts the role of IS in the business organization. Such a notion, itself, 
leads to a number of possible research directions.   This information can be used to 
design information systems that support the level, magnitude, and pace of change in the 
outer environment in a way that better enables a company to achieve its goals.  It is 
equally important to understand how adaptations to IS structure and processes may 
ultimately constrain the organization, and how to limit those constraints.  This stream of 
research needs to determine how to transition an organization from a state that is 
constrained by its IS to one that is enabled by its IS.  Research could therefore be 
conducted to investigate how IS constrains organizational alignment, as well as the 
factors that play a key role in constraining the adaptation process.     
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Fifth, TAGA applies not only to “systems,” in general, but also to the infrastructure 
that forms part of those systems, the theory, therefore, could be used as the basis for 
addressing infrastructure issues.  IS infrastructure is an area addressed in a significant 
amount of IS research (see, for example, work by Broadbent and Weill 1993).  TAGA 
provides a theoretical basis for examining the resources used to create a flexible 
infrastructure.  Specifically, how can the flexibility be matched directly to the level, 
magnitude, and pace of change in the environment in a way that allows the IS to enable 
business goals?  This understanding of adaptation provides a solid foundation for 
understanding, flexibility, and agility, and matching the flexibility and agility of the IS 
infrastructure to the needs of the business.     
Sixth, it is clear that additional work is needed in the area of IS strategy.  The existing 
literature is fragmented and inconsistent in its definition and tends to focus on the IS 
strategic planning process.  Therefore, research is needed to examine what constitutes IS 
strategy and how to define it.  Further research is also needed to understand the role of IS 
strategy in the alignment process.  
7.2 Final Comments 
Research on TAGA provides a theoretical basis for changing the way the IS 
community views the role of information technology in a business organization.  
Alignment has been viewed traditionally as “fit” or “synchronization” between 
information technology and the business strategy and structure (Henderson and 
Venkatraman 1993; Sabherwal et al. 2001; Smaczny 2001).   TAGA, on the other hand, 
indicates that IS alignment can be viewed as the ability of information systems to enable 
the organizational adaptation process.  From this perspective, firms can view themselves 
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as in alignment as long as their information systems are sufficient to support their 
organizational goals.   
To conclude, this research indicates that the goal of information systems should be 
that of enabling business goals and the goal of IS management should be to maximize the 
period during which IS enables the organization and to minimize the constraining 
periods.  The key to alignment is in understanding that, in the short-run, the information 
system can be viewed as its own subsystem, decoupled from the overall alignment 
system.  Of course an enabling IS structure is not without cost.  It is necessary to consider 
the nature of the environment and determine the proper investment required to maintain 
this enabling relationship. Thus the role of managers is to structure their information 
systems in a way that balances the cost of maintaining an enabling relationship with the 
business’s need to remain adapted to its environment.   
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Appendix A – Semi-Structured Interview Guide and 
Follow Up Surveys 
 
This document is intended to serve as a guide for data collection and interviewing 
subjects in conjunction with a multi-site (3) case study being conducted for a dissertation.  
The purpose of this case study is threefold.  First, the generalizability of TAGA will be 
assessed by testing TAGA in additional organizational settings.  Second, dimensions of 
external change are developed to determine the impact of external change on the 
alignment factors.  Third, data will be collected on the role of IS in enabling 
organizational adaptation.  The goal is to understand how IS enables an organization to 
adapt to its environment.  The questions are open ended, designed to allow the response 
to provide insight and minimize the risk of interviewer bias in the data collection.    
 
This case study will collect evidence from both interviews and archival documents. 
 
Evidence to collect: 
• Interviews – information concerning specific variables (IS strategy, IS planning, 
etc.), process, and descriptions of change events of significance to the 
organization over the last 10 years.  
• Documents – SEC filing documents such as quarterly, annual, and special event 
reports (10K, 10Q, and S4) 
 
The interviews are to be conducted with the top-level managers that have knowledge 
of, or responsibilities for, the areas under study.     
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Semi-Structured Interview Guide 
 
Interviewee: _________________   Date: ______________________  
 
Title: _________________________  Company: __________________  
 
Job Description/Area of Expertise: _________________________________________ 
  
 
 
1. Introduction 
a. Explain Project 
i. Background of Researcher(s) 
ii. Project addresses IS alignment 
1. Compares traditional alignment model with TAGA 
2. Assess generalizability of TAGA 
3. Developed the dimensions of external change 
4. Examines the role of IS in enabling organizational 
adaptation 
iii. Discuss Human Subjects Committee Form 
1. All interviews are VOLUNTARY 
2. All interviews are CONFIDENTIAL 
3. Have interviewee sign and date form 
4. Provide interviewee with copy 
b. Interview Overview 
i. This interview will ask questions related to IS alignment in your 
organization.   
ii. Questions will address the alignment factors 
1. External Environment 
2. Management Decisions (data collection only) 
3. Strategic Intent (goals) 
4. Strategic Initiatives (means) 
5. Organizational Structure 
6. IS Strategy 
7. IS Structure 
iii. Interviewees will be asked to identify and describe change events 
in each of the alignment factors, including what triggered the 
changes and any relationships between the changes and other 
alignment factors. 
iv. Interview should take 60 to 90 minutes. 
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2. Interview Questions 
 
Phase I 
Interview Data to Collect for Proposition 2 
Degree of Formal IS Planning Process (H2) Answer 
Is there a formal IS Planning Process? Yes No 
Policies and procedures greatly influence the process of 
strategic information systems planning within our firm. (Segars 
and Grover 1999) 
1….2….3….4….5 
We utilize formalized planning techniques in our strategic 
information systems planning process. (Segars and Grover 
1999) 
1….2….3….4….5 
Our process for strategic planning is very structured. (Segars 
and Grover 1999) 1….2….3….4….5 
Written guidelines exist to structure strategic IS planning in our 
organization. (Segars and Grover 1999) 1….2….3….4….5 
The process and outputs of strategic IS planning are formally 
documented. (Segars and Grover 1999) 1….2….3….4….5 
 
 
Degree of Formal IS Strategy (H3) Answer 
Is there a formal IS strategy? Yes No 
Policies and procedures greatly influence the formulation of IS 
strategy within our firm. (adapted from Segars and Grover 
1999) 
1….2….3….4….5 
We utilize a formalized process for developing our IS strategy. 
(adapted from Segars and Grover 1999) 1….2….3….4….5 
Our process for developing our IS strategy is very structured. 
(adapted from Segars and Grover 1999) 1….2….3….4….5 
Written guidelines exist to establish an IS strategy in our 
organization. (adapted from Segars and Grover 1999) 1….2….3….4….5 
The IS strategy is formally documented. (adapted from Segars 
and Grover 1999) 1….2….3….4….5 
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List change events that have occurred in the last 10 years. (Important for all 
Phases)(A change event is defined as any change that resulted in a strategic or 
structural change to the organization) 
1.  
2.  
3.  
4.  
5.  
6.  
7.  
8.  
9.  
10.  
11.  
12.  
13.  
14.  
15.  
16.  
17.  
18.  
19.  
20.  
 
Complete for each change event listed 
 
Describe the change event. 
 
 
 
 
 
What caused the change (Trigger)? 
 
 
 
 
 
Why was the change significant to the organization (impact)? 
 
 
 
 
Did the change event impact other alignment factors? (Use back of page if additional 
space is needed) 
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Additional comments? 
 
 
 
 
Alignment Factor Impact on Factor 
Management Event (for data collection 
purposes only) 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategic Intent  
 
 
 
 
Strategic Initiative  
 
 
 
 
Organizational Structure  
 
 
 
 
IS Strategy  
 
 
 
 
IS Structure  
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Phase II  
Level of Change (Proposition 3) (Based on alignment factor level in which change 
initiated.  To be determined by model.)  
Magnitude of Change (Proposition 4) 
Describe the success of the company/subunit at the time of the 
change.  (Stress) (Huff, Huff, & Thomas 1992) High Average Low 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Describe the success of the company/subunit during the five 
year period prior to the time of the change. (Stress) (Huff, 
Huff, & Thomas 1992) 
High Average Low 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pace of Change (Proposition 5) (The count of change events per level per episode.  To 
be determined from model) 
 
Dynamic Nature of Change (Proposition 6) (To be determined from combination of 
Propositions 3, 4, & 5.) 
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Follow Up Magnitude Surveys 
 
PartCo 
This brief questionnaire is a follow-up to the research I conducted at PartCo during 
November of last year in which you were a participant.  I am seeking further information 
on the events interviewees identified at that time.  The questionnaire should take less than 
10 minutes to complete.  Please email the completed questionnaire to me at 
kwward@indiana.edu or fax it to 402-554-3400.  Your prompt attention is greatly 
appreciated.  If I do not hear from you within two weeks, I will contact you to determine 
if there is a more convenient way to get your feedback such as via a telephone call. 
 
The survey has two purposes.   
 
The first purpose is determine the accuracy of a list of events representing the most 
significant events at PartCo from 1995-2004, inclusive, based on a compilation of all 
interviews and other data sources.  This review process gives those who participated an 
opportunity to examine the list of events and provide feedback on its accuracy.  Please 
provide any feedback in the space provided following the survey.  Please feel free to use 
additional space if necessary.   
 
The second purpose is to determine the magnitude of each of the events.  In completing 
your response for each event, please consider issues such the stress on the company’s 
financial health and the company’s resistance to the change.  
 
The list of events appears below. 
 
Please indicate as High, Medium, or Low, the magnitude of each change on your 
company. 
Year Event Answer 
1995 Proliferation of  Big Box Retailers  High Medium Low 
1995 Consolidation of Wholesalers High Medium Low 
1995 
Strategic Long Range Planning Process 
resulted in a primary corporate goal of grow 
with a secondary focus on reducing costs. 
High Medium Low 
1995 Development of Technology Infrastructure  High Medium Low 
1995-7 Consolidated Distribution from 15 to 4 Warehouses High Medium Low 
1996 Moved from Divisional Structure to a Matrix/Functional Structure High Medium Low 
1996 Maintain a Technologically Up-to-date IS Infrastructure High Medium Low 
1997-8 Implemented SAP R/3     
1998 Increasing Competition from Foreign High Medium Low 
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Manufacturers 
1998 Leveraging Technology Infrastructure for Cost Savings High Medium Low 
1999 Buyback of Family-owned Stock High Medium Low 
1999 Introduction of ecommerce High Medium Low 
1999 Upgraded to SAP Version 4.0b High Medium Low 
2000 Increasing Regulation of Hazardous Materials Content High Medium Low 
2000 Go Live on SAP Human Resources Module High Medium Low 
2001 Upgraded to SAP Version 4.6c High Medium Low 
2002 Inflation in Raw Materials  High Medium Low 
2002 Growth via Acquisitions High Medium Low 
2002 Acquired HangCo High Medium Low 
2002 Go Live with SAP at Poland Subsidiary High Medium Low 
2002 Converted Acquisition (HangCo) to SAP High Medium Low 
2003 Updated SLRP:  Growth, Lean, and MAX High Medium Low 
2003 Innovation Via New Product Development High Medium Low 
2003 Focus on Content Delivery High Medium Low 
2003 Implemented SAP Business Warehouse  High Medium Low 
2004 Upgraded to SAP Version 4.7 High Medium Low 
 
Please indicate any additional events that you believe should be included on the list and 
indicate why you believe they should be included.    
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________  
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Please indicate any events that you believe should not be included on the above list of 
events and brief explanations for why they should be excluded. 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________  
 
Please provide any other information you think may be relevant. 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________  
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
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PartCo 
This brief questionnaire is a follow-up to the research I conducted at PartCo during July 
and August of last year in which you were a participant.  I am seeking further information 
on the events interviewees identified at that time.  The questionnaire should take less than 
10 minutes to complete.  Please email the completed questionnaire to me at 
kwward@indiana.edu or fax it to 402-554-3400.  Your prompt attention is greatly 
appreciated.  If I do not hear from you within two weeks, I will contact you to determine 
if there is a more convenient way to get your feedback such as via a telephone call. 
 
The survey has two purposes.   
 
The first purpose is determine the accuracy of a list of events representing the most 
significant events at PartCo from 2000-2004, inclusive, based on a compilation of all 
interviews and other data sources.  This review process gives those who participated an 
opportunity to examine the list of events and provide feedback on its accuracy.  Please 
provide any feedback in the space provided following the survey.  Please feel free to use 
additional space if necessary.   
 
The second purpose is to determine the magnitude of each of the events.  In completing 
your response for each event, please consider issues such the stress on the company’s 
financial health and the company’s resistance to the change.  
 
The list of events appears below. 
 
 
Please indicate as High, Medium, or Low, the magnitude of each change on your 
company. 
Year Event Answer 
2000 The merger of company A and Company B High Medium Low 
2000 New EPA emission standards to take effect in 
2007 High Medium Low 
2000 Strategic goal to become the number 1 
supplier to the automotive OEMs High Medium Low 
2000 Strategic focus on cost cutting following the 
merger High Medium Low 
2000 
The consolidation of management and 
organizational structures immediately 
following the merger 
High Medium Low 
2000 The consolidation of the IT infrastructures 
immediately following the merger High Medium Low 
2000 The de-implementation of J. D. Edwards and 
return to legacy mainframe system at the 
Exhaust Technologies division  
High Medium Low 
2001 Strategic move to assembly of  modules High Medium Low 
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2001 The development of emission products for 
new EPA standards (Commercial Segment) High Medium Low 
2001 Moving plants closer to customer plants High Medium Low 
2001 Establishment of IS convergence strategy (consolidation and standardization) High Medium Low 
2002 Inflation in raw materials prices (steel, etc.) High Medium Low 
2002 Reorganization of company structure to three divisions (CVS, LVS, and LVA) High Medium Low 
2002 Acquisition of remaining interest in ABC Company High Medium Low 
2003 Failed attempt to acquire WXYZ High Medium Low 
2003 Divestiture of ABC division High Medium Low 
2004 Proposed sale of  LVA High Medium Low 
 
Please indicate any additional events that you believe should be included on the list and 
indicate why you believe they should be included.    
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________  
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Please indicate any events that you believe should not be included on the above list of 
events and brief explanations for why they should be excluded. 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________  
 
Please provide any other information you think may be relevant. 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________  
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
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MotorCo 
This brief questionnaire is a follow-up to the research I conducted at MotorCo during 
October of last year in which you were a participant.  I am seeking further information on 
the events interviewees identified at that time.  The questionnaire should take less than 
10 minutes to complete.  Please email the completed questionnaire to me at 
kwward@indiana.edu or fax it to 402-554-3400.  Your prompt attention is greatly 
appreciated.  If I do not hear from you within two weeks, I will contact you to determine 
if there is a more convenient way to get your feedback such as via a telephone call. 
 
The survey has two purposes.   
 
The first purpose is determine the accuracy of a list of events representing the most 
significant events at MotorCo from 1995-2004, inclusive, based on a compilation of all 
interviews and other data sources.  This review process gives those who participated an 
opportunity to examine the list of events and provide feedback on its accuracy.  Please 
provide any feedback in the space provided following the survey.  Please feel free to use 
additional space if necessary.   
 
The second purpose is to determine the magnitude of each of the events.  In completing 
your response for each event, please consider issues such the stress on the company’s 
financial health and the company’s resistance to the change.  
 
The list of events appears below. 
 
 
Please indicate as High, Medium, or Low, the magnitude of each change on your 
company. 
Year Event Answer 
1983 Continuing Best Cost Strategy High Medium Low 
1996 Proliferation of the Internet High Medium Low 
1997 Shift in Corporate Level Strategic Initiatives High Medium Low 
1997 Initiating an eBusiness Strategy High Medium Low 
1997 Shifting Manufacturing Plants to Mexico High Medium Low 
1998 Concerns over Y2K High Medium Low 
1998 
Stated Strategic Importance of IS and 
Development of Corporate-wide Procurement 
System 
High Medium Low 
1998 Focus on Y2K Compliance High Medium Low 
1999 Reorganization of Corporate Business Segments High Medium Low 
2000 Establishment of Corporate-wide Internet Connectivity Service High Medium Low 
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2000 Crash in Technology Market and Recession in U.S. Economy High Medium Low 
2000 Increasing Foreign Competition High Medium Low 
2000 Shift in Business Unit Level Strategic Goal from Growth to Profitability High Medium Low 
2000 Focusing on End Customer High Medium Low 
2000 Creation of Commercial Industrial Motors Division High Medium Low 
2000 Off-Shoring of Manufacturing High Medium Low 
2000 Establishment of eBusiness Group High Medium Low 
2001 Creation of Corporate-wide IT Shared Services. High Medium Low 
2001 Adoption of Oracle as Corporate-wide Enterprise Application High Medium Low 
2001 Reductions in SG&A Costs High Medium Low 
2001 Outsourcing of SG&A Tasks High Medium Low 
2001 Centralization/Leveraging Corporate-wide IS Resources High Medium Low 
2001 Formation of IT Shared Services High Medium Low 
2001 Initial Implementation of Oracle as MotorCo’s Standard Enterprise Application High Medium Low 
2002 Legislative Response to Corporate Scandals (Sarbanes Oxley Act) High Medium Low 
2002 Increased IS Security and Compliance with Sarbanes Oxley Act High Medium Low 
2003 Inflation in Raw Material Prices High Medium Low 
2003 Reorganization of CIM into Four Business Units High Medium Low 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please indicate any additional events that you believe should be included on the list and 
indicate why you believe they should be included.    
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________  
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Please indicate any events that you believe should not be included on the above list of 
events and brief explanations for why they should be excluded. 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________  
 
Please provide any other information you think may be relevant. 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________  
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix B – Chain of Evidence 
A chain of evidence is a case study research tool that increases reliability (Yin 1004).  
The purpose is to create a logic flow or “chain” from the initial research question to 
conclusions from the research similarly to the way evidence in a criminal 
investigation is tracked.  This is accomplished by mapping out the research to be 
conducted from the research questions to the data to collect ultimately to how the data 
will be interpreted.  Any outside observer should be able to examine the Chain of 
Evidence and be able to trace the steps the researcher took to reach conclusions 
presented in the research.   
 
 
Overall Research Question: How does IS enable organizations to adapt to change? 
 
Phase I 
 
Research Question 1 How does the organization’s contextual setting impact the pattern of 
change in the internal alignment factors? 
 
Proposition 1 Firms exhibit decoupled patterns of IS alignment, independent of 
firm size. 
 
Hypothesis 1  H1a: Large firms exhibit traditional patterns of alignment as 
synchronization where a change in one factor is related to changes in 
all four internal alignment factors. 
H1b: Large firms exhibit decoupled patterns of change among the 
four internal alignment factors. 
 
Data to Collect Firm size (Independent Variable) will be determined by gross 
revenues (sales).  Respondents will be asked to identify and describe 
change events for all factors of alignment (Dependent Variable).   
 
How to Analyze Data Firms with gross revenues between 20 million dollars and 1 billion 
dollars will be considered midsized.  Firms with gross revenues in 
excess of 1 billion dollars will be considered large.  The pattern of 
change will be coded into tables consistent with Table 4.1 and will 
be analyzed as discussed in the Data Analysis section, consistent 
with Figure 4.2. A linear alignment pattern or stair step pattern as in 
the first two examples of Figure 4.2 will support alignment as 
synchronization (H1a), while patterns without direct links to changes 
in other alignment factors, as represented by the remaining three 
examples in Figure 4.2, will support TAGA (H1b)    
 
Implications/Link Large firms are the focus of proposition 1.  The pattern of change 
events will be examined for organizations with gross revenues of 1 
billion dollars or more to determine whether the pattern matches 
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alignment as synchronization or alignment as guided adaptation.  If a 
pattern of alignment as synchronization is observed, the data 
provides disconfirming evidence of H1b and support for H1a.  
Disconfirming H1b indicates that firm size is an important element 
in the synchronization of IS with the business strategy and structure.  
Support for H1a establishes boundary conditions for both alignment 
as synchronization and alignment as guided adaptation.  
Alternatively, if a pattern of alignment of guided adaptation is 
observed (less structured, apparently random change pattern), it will 
provide disconfirming evidence of H1a, indicating TAGA is more 
explanatory than alignment as synchronization in large firms.   
 
 
Research Question 1 How does the organization’s contextual setting impact the pattern of 
change in the internal alignment factors? 
 
Proposition 2 Firms with a strategic view of IS will exhibit decoupled patterns of 
IS alignment.  
 
Hypothesis 2 H2a: Firms with a formal IS planning process exhibit traditional 
patterns of alignment as synchronization where a change in one 
alignment factor is related to changes in all four internal alignment 
factors. 
H2b: Firms with a formal IS planning process exhibit decoupled 
patterns in change among the four internal alignment factors. 
 
Data to Collect Questions will be asked of the respondents to determine whether a 
formal IS planning process exists or not (Independent Variable).  
The respondents will be asked five questions from Grover and 
Segars’ (1999) validated instrument for formalized IS planning.  
Respondents will be asked to identify and describe change events for 
all factors of alignment (Dependent Variable).  
 
How to Analyze Data13 A way to analyze the data would be to require affirmative responses 
to the question of “is there a formal IS planning process” from the 
majority of the interviewees and a yes to three out of the five formal 
IS planning process questions by each of the interviewees. The 
pattern of change will be coded into tables and will be analyzed as 
discussed in the How to Analyze Data Section of Hypothesis 1, 
consistent with Figure 4-1. 
                                                 
13
 TAGA is a process model, and is therefore based on probabilistic relationships.  The propositions are 
guided not by certainty of relationship, but by increased likelihood (correlation not causation).  
Additionally, case study research, while allowing for the collection of quantitative data, does not lend itself 
to statistical analysis that would provide for statistical generalizability.  Therefore, as discussed in Section 
4.5, a “preponderance of the evidence” will be used to make determinations about to analyze and determine 
whether the data support the hypotheses and propositions.  The explanation described in the How to 
Analyze Data Section provides a detailed example of how the data may be analyzed. 
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Implications/Link If a formal IS planning process exists and a pattern of alignment as 
synchronization is observed, it provides disconfirming evidence of 
H2b and supports H2a.  Disconfirming H2b will indicate that a 
formalized IS planning process is an important element in the 
synchronization of IS with the business strategy and structure.  
Disconfirming H2b establishes boundary conditions for both 
alignment as synchronization and alignment as guided adaptation.  
Alternatively, if a pattern of alignment of guided adaptation is 
observed (less structured, apparently random change pattern), it will 
provide disconfirming evidence of H2a, indicating TAGA is more 
explanatory than alignment as synchronization in firms with a formal 
IS planning process.   
 
 
Research Question 1 How does the organization’s contextual setting impact the pattern of 
change in the internal alignment factors? 
 
Proposition 2 Firms with a strategic view of IS will exhibit decoupled patterns of 
IS alignment.  
 
Hypothesis 3  H3a: Firms with a formal IS strategy exhibit traditional patterns of 
alignment as synchronization where a change in one alignment 
factor is related to changes in all four internal alignment factors. 
H3b: Firms with a formal IS strategy exhibit decoupled patterns of 
change among the four internal alignment factors. 
 
Data to Collect Questions will be asked of the respondents to determine whether a 
formal IS strategy exists (Independent Variable).  The respondents 
will be asked five questions adapted from Grover and Segars’ (1999) 
validated instrument for formalized IS planning.  Respondents will 
be asked to identify and describe change events for all factors of 
alignment (Dependent Variable).   
 
How to Analyze Data A way to analyze the data would be to require affirmative responses 
to the question of “is there a formal IS strategy” from the majority of 
the interviewees and a yes to three out of the five formal IS strategy 
questions by each of the interviewees. The pattern of change will be 
coded into tables consistent with Table 4.1 and will be analyzed as 
discussed in the How to Analyze Data Section of Hypothesis 1, 
consistent with Figure 4-1. 
 
Implications/Link If a formal IS strategy exists and a pattern of alignment as 
synchronization is observed, the data provides disconfirming 
evidence of H3b and support for H3a.  Disconfirming H3b indicates 
that a formalized IS strategy is an important element in the 
synchronization of IS with the business strategy and structure.  
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Support for H3a establishes boundary conditions for both alignment 
as synchronization and alignment as guided adaptation.  
Alternatively, if a pattern of alignment of guided adaptation is 
observed (less structured, apparently random change pattern), it will 
provide disconfirming evidence of H3a, indicating TAGA is more 
explanatory than alignment as synchronization in firms with a formal 
IS strategy.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Phase II   
Research Question 2 What characteristics of change in the outer environment impact the 
adaptation of an internal alignment factor? 
 
Proposition 3 The higher the level in the alignment hierarchy at which change 
occurs, the greater the likelihood that the internal structure of an 
alignment factor will need to be altered. 
  
Hypothesis  None 
Data to Collect The evidence collected on change events at each of the factor levels 
will be used.   
 
How to Analyze Data The independent variable (level of alignment) will be determined 
based on the hierarchical model presented in Figure 2.2 and 
described by TAGA.  Each initiating change event at each level will 
be analyzed.  The dependent variable will be the number of related 
changes in the levels surrounding the initiating change event (both 
higher and lower levels).  A way to analyze the data is to examine 
each episode based on the dimension of level to determine the 
number of related changes in the levels above and below the 
initiating change event.  For example, consider change events S3, 
ISS4, and IS5 in Figure 4-1.  S3, ISS4, and IS5 are the first 
(initiating) change events in a series of related changes.   
 S3 is related to SI4, OS4 and ISS5.  The number of lower level 
change events associated with S3 is therefore 3.  The number of 
higher level change events associated with S3 is 0.   
 ISS4 is related to IS6; therefore the number of lower level change 
events associated with ISS4 is 1.  There are no (0) related change 
events at a higher level related to ISS4.   
 IS5 is related to ISS6 and therefore has 1 related higher level 
change associated with it.  There are no (0) lower level change 
events related to IS5.   
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One way of accomplishing the analysis of data and providing support 
for P3 would be to take the average number of related changes 
associated with a change that initiated at each level.  For example, 
examining Figure 4-1, the average number of related changes for 
change initiated at each level and the total number of all of the 
changes at each level can be calculated).  For example, the results for 
initiated, related changes indicate that a change in the external 
environment resulted on average in 2.167 related changes in lower 
alignment levels.  The average number of related changes associated 
with a change in strategic intent is 1. The average number of related 
changes associated with a change in strategic initiative is .4 while the 
average related change for organizational structure, IS strategy and IS 
structure is 0, .167, .12 respectively. 
 
Implications/Link The key to interpreting the data will be a “preponderance of the 
evidence” to see if in the “majority” of initiating change events, the 
higher levels of change resulted in more changes in the lower 
alignment factors than change events initiating at lower levels.  
Patterns such as those associated with S3 and ISS4, where the related 
changes associated with S3, a higher level in the alignment 
hierarchy, resulted in three lower level changes while ISS4, a lower 
level in the alignment hierarchy was associated with only one lower 
level change, may be interpreted as providing support for 
Proposition 3.  Patterns such as IS5, where the change in a lower 
level is related to a later change in a higher level (ISS6), or in 
situations where lower level changes are related to a greater number 
of related changes than are the changes that initiate in the higher 
alignment levels may be interpreted as not supporting P3.  A decline 
in the average number of related changes may also provide support 
for P3, while an alternative pattern where the average increases as 
the level decreases may be interpreted as not supporting P3 
 
 
Research Question 2 What characteristics of change in the outer environment impact the 
adaptation of an internal alignment factor? 
 
Proposition 4 The greater the magnitude of change in the outer environment, the 
greater the likelihood that the internal structure of an alignment 
factor will need to be altered. 
 
Hypothesis  None 
 
Data to Collect Proposition 4 will be examined based on notions of stress (Huff & 
Huff 1995; Huff, Huff & Thomas 1992) derived from the interview 
data.  Stress is defined as “a summarizing concept that expresses 
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ways in which current strategy is not satisfactory; it reflects the 
dissatisfactions of the individual actors and imperfections in the fit 
between the organization and its environment.”  (Huff, Huff, & 
Thomas 1992.)  Evidence of stress will be collected by asking 
respondents to evaluate the level of stress that the organization was 
experiencing related to the change event. Stress will be 
operationalized as the respondent’s perception of the company’s 
success during the episode in question.  The respondents will be 
asked to estimate the level of stress as low, medium, or high.   
 
Additionally, secondary sources of data will be collected to allow for 
triangulation of evidence in the current study and to develop 
quantitative measure for utilization in future research.  A secondary 
source of data for stress will be collected from publicly-available 
financial statements to determine whether the firm was profitable 
(Net Income) and had a positive cash flow in the five-year period 
prior to the identified related change events.   
 
How to Analyze Data The interview data will be the primary data and will be analyzed 
based on a “preponderance of the evidence.”  In other words, the 
interviews will be reviewed to determine whether the respondents 
indicated that, in their perceptions, the firm was under stress and 
how strong the influence of stress was on the firm.  The dependent 
variable will be the number of related change events as in P3.  The 
number of related change events will be examined as they relate to 
the magnitude of the initiating change.   
 
The primary data from the interviews will be triangulated with the 
secondary sources of data (the data from the financial statements).  A 
five year period prior to the change events will be examined to 
consider potential time lags between the firm performance and the 
change events.  A decrease in net income or in cash flow during the 
five year period prior to the change event will be interpreted as an 
indication of organizational stress.  Additionally, an exploratory 
aspect to the quantitative data collection is to determine whether the 
quantitative measures could be further developed for use in 
additional methodological approaches to researching TAGA. The 
data will be collected, but the exploratory development of 
quantitative measures will not be analyzed as part of the dissertation. 
 
Implications/Link Once the magnitude of the change is estimated, the single change 
events and related lower level change events identified in assessing 
P3 will be examined to determine whether P4 is supported.  The 
magnitude of each initiating change event may be compared to the 
number of related change events associated with each initiating 
change event.  P4 will be supported if change events of greater 
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magnitude are more likely related to other change events than 
change events of lesser magnitude.  An average of the number of 
related changes, as utilized in P3, linked to the different magnitudes 
of change may also be used for determining support for P4. 
 
 
Research Question 2 What characteristics of change in the outer environment impact the 
adaptation of an internal alignment factor? 
 
Proposition 5 The greater the pace of change in the outer environment, the greater 
the likelihood that the internal structure of an alignment factor will 
need to be altered. 
 
Hypothesis  None 
 
Data to Collect Same as for P2 
 
How to Analyze Data The pace of change at each level of alignment factor will be 
analyzed by episode. Pace may be measured by the number of 
changes at each alignment level that occurs during a change episode. 
It may be possible to create a comparison based on the ratio of 
change events (EE:S:SI:OS:ISS:IS).  For example, the changes that 
occur at each alignment level of the first episode represented in 
Figure 4.2 is EE1, S1, OS1, ISS1, and IS1 which represents a ratio 
among the alignment levels within the episode of 1:1:1:1:1:1.  The 
fifth alignment episode has the following change events: EE5, EE6, 
SI5, OS5, OS6, OS7, ISS6, IS7, IS8.  This translates into a ratio of: 
2:0:1:3:1:2.  The overall ratio for each episode may also be broken 
down into four ratios to represent a ratio of external changes to each 
internal alignment factor (strategic initiatives, organizational 
structure, IS strategy, and IS structure).  For example the ratio 
1:1:1:1:1:1 can be viewed as a series of ratios of all the external 
changes to each internal alignment factor.  The first would be 2:1, 
representing the ratio of external changes to changes in strategic 
initiatives.  The second would be 3:1 representing all the changes in 
the environment of the organizational structure and then, 4:1 
representing the ratio of changes in the IS strategy’s environment 
and finally 5:1 the changes in the environment of the IS structure.  
The example ratio 2:0:1:3:1:2 would likewise be viewed as a series 
of environmental to internal change ratios of 2:1, 3:3, 6:1, 7:2.  
Additionally, the overall ratio for each episode may be compared to 
create an across episode analysis of frequency that compares the 
alignment ratios (1:1:1:1:1:1 to 2:0:1:3:1:2).   
 
Implications/Link P5 will be considered supported if, given the preponderance of the 
evidence, the rate of change of an internal alignment factor appears 
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to be related to the rate of change in its environment as measured by 
the rate of change in alignment factors external to the internal 
alignment factor.  For within episode examination, individual 
alignment factor ratios may be compared.  If based on a 
preponderance of the evidence, it appears that an increased rate of 
external change is more likely to result in changes to an internal 
alignment factor, P5 will be considered supported.  The ratios may 
be examined to determine if the greater the first number, the more 
likely the second number will be greater than 0.  For example event 
ratios of changes in the alignment factor to changes in the internal 
alignment factor such as 6:3 or 3:3 may be considered as supporting 
P5.  Alternatively, ratios such as 3:0 or 6:0 may be considered as 
contrary to P5.  For the across episode analysis, ratios of change 
events by episode will be compared.  The across comparison will be 
examined for consistent patterns where episodes with a high rate of 
change at one alignment level are more likely to have high rate of 
change at the other levels and episodes with low rates of change at 
one level are more likely to have low rates of change at the other 
levels.  For example, patterns across episode ratios such as 
1:1:1:1:1:1 and 6:5:7:6:5:5 will be interpreted as supporting P5 while 
patterns across episodes such as 1:0:0:1:6:1 and 8:0:0:0:1:0 will be 
interpreted as not supporting P5  
 
 
Research Question 2 What characteristics of change in the outer environment impact the 
adaptation of an internal alignment factor? 
 
Proposition 6 The more dynamic the outer environment (greater the level, 
magnitude, and pace of change), the greater the likelihood that the 
internal structure of an alignment factor will need to be altered.  
 
Hypothesis  None 
 
Data to Collect Same as for P3, P4, and P5 
 
How to Analyze Data The analysis for change events from the other propositions (P3, P4, 
and P5) will be examined in their totality to determine whether there 
is an interaction effect among the level, magnitude, and pace of 
change and the likelihood of adaptation of the other internal 
alignment factors.  The theory suggests that the factors may be 
combined by considering the magnitude and pace at each alignment 
level of each episode.  One way to do this is to quantify the three 
measures in order to combine them into one.  For example, 
magnitude may be assigned a number based on either being high, 
medium, or low as assessed by the perceptions of the interviewees 
(see P4). A high magnitude may be assigned a point value of 5 while 
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medium 3 and low 1.  Pace may be based on the number of change 
events at each level.  The magnitude of each event at a level could be 
added together and the sum multiplied by the level of alignment (see 
Figure 2.2) based on the following point assignments: external 
environment-6, strategic intent-5, strategic initiatives-4, 
organizational structure-3, IS strategy-2.  For example in the 5th 
episode in figure 4-1, assume EE5 has a medium magnitude while 
EE6 is a high magnitude change event.  Thus the combined score 
would be 3+5=8*6 (level) for a total of 46.  This could be compared 
to the number of related changes in the lower alignment factors 
again creating a ratio where the numerator represents the dynamic 
rating and the denominator is the number of related changes.    
 
Implications/Link P6 will be considered supported if changes of greater magnitude, 
pace, and level are more likely to result in changes to internal 
alignment factors than are changes of lower magnitude, pace, and 
level.   The greater the numerator and denominator, the stronger the 
support for P6.   Ratios such as 46:6 and 25:6 may be interpreted as 
supporting P6 while ratios such as 25:1 or 60:2 may be interpreted as 
not supporting P6 
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Appendix C – PlumbCo Write-up 
 
The purpose of this confidential report is to provide an overview of the 
information derived from research conducted at PlumbCo.  It reflects aggregate findings 
based on all interviews and publicly available documentation.  The report takes the form 
of a summary write-up of the company with a focus on the ten-year period starting in 
1995 and ending in 2004.  This report is therefore a vehicle for sharing our understanding 
of PlumbCo as well as a means for confirming the accuracy and completeness of our data 
collection.     
The next step is for the researcher to learn from the interviewees if there are any 
errors or important omissions in this report. Feedback to the researcher from the 
primary contact at PlumbCo is therefore an important part of our research method. 
Please review the write-up and the attached documents for accuracy.  We will set up 
phone interviews to capture your comments, and will then prepare a revised version of 
this report that can be distributed to all company participants.   
Please note the company name is used in this report.  The purpose of this report is 
for your internal viewing only.  Any academic documents will not contain the name of 
PlumbCo or any PlumbCo brands without PlumbCo’s express agreement in order to 
protect the confidentiality of PlumbCo.  Please address any questions to Kerry Ward via 
email at kwward@indiana.edu or by phone at 812-340-4621. 
Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to XXXX XXXX, my principal 
contact, and the other PlumbCo participants.  
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Introduction 
PlumbCo provided a unique opportunity to study the alignment process in a mid-
sized, closely-held organization that has a reputation as an industry leader in the use of 
technology.  On-site interviews with ten employees were conducted at the World 
Headquarters.  The interviews occurred during November of 2004 and inquired into the 
major events that occurred in business and IS strategy and structure over the ten-year 
period from 1995 to 2004.   
The purpose of this report is to describe the information derived from research 
conducted at PlumbCo.  This report reflects information from interviews, internal 
documents, and other publicly available sources such as the company web site and 
practitioner publications.   
A brief overview of the company is provided based on current operations.  Then a 
historical account of events important to understanding alignment at PlumbCo is 
presented, focusing on the event’s impact on the company’s strategy, structure, and 
information systems. 
Overview of PlumbCo 
Established in 1904 as XXXXXXXXXX, PlumbCo is an international leader in the 
manufacturing of flow control products.  These products include plumbing values, 
fittings and pipe products used in commercial and residential construction.  Since 
inception, PlumbCo has been a closely-held corporation owned by family members and 
employees.  The company is led by CEO XXXX XXXX, a descendent of the original 
founders.  During its one hundred years in business, PlumbCo has grown to 
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approximately $450 million in annual revenue and today employees over 3400 people, 
manufacturers over 20,000 SKUs, and services more than 9000 customers.   
  The market for PlumbCo’s flow control products is mature, characterized by low 
profit margins and low growth, resulting in fierce competition for market share. PlumbCo 
sells its products through wholesalers and directly to major retailers.  Currently, a few 
large wholesalers such as F. W. Webb and large “big box” retailers such as Home Depot 
dominate the market.  While the industry trend is towards the larger distributors and big 
box retailers, there remain a substantial number of local and regional distributors.   
The vision of PlumbCo is to “lead the world in flow control solutions.”  PlumbCo 
accomplishes this by producing a product that is superior to their competition on four 
dimensions: quality, performance, service, and cost.  These flow control products are 
manufactured in a variety of metals and plastics.  Metal products are forged, machined 
and assembled from bronze, iron and steel. The plastic products use injection molding to 
convert PVC and ABS resins into plastic pipes and plumbing fixtures.  The raw materials 
are purchased from a large number of vendors and fluctuations in raw material prices 
impact PlumbCo’s profitability.   
The business is structured by function, but is considered a matrix organization due to 
the use of product-oriented business management teams.  These teams contain 
representatives from the functional areas and serve to manage the three key product 
areas: metals, plastics, and specialty  (see Figure 1).  PlumbCo has 12 manufacturing 
facilities including facilities in Mexico and Poland and distributes their product from four 
distribution centers strategically located across the U.S..   
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PlumbCo Company History (1995-2004) 
This research covers a period of 10 years beginning in 1995 and ending in the fall of 
2004, the date of data collection.  The data collected from interviews and other 
documentary sources was coded into change events of significance that represent changes 
in the business strategies and structures and the information systems strategies and 
structures over the ten-year period.  Each change event has been identified with the 
following codes, both in the text and in the tables:  EE – External Environment, SG – 
Strategic Intent (Goals), SI – Strategic Initiative, OS – Organizational Structure, IS – IS 
Strategy, and IT – IS Structure.  Definitions for each event can be found in Table 1 and a 
list of each event by event type is presented in Appendix A.   
The events were determined based on a compilation and review of all interviews and 
other documentary sources.  The events are grouped into time-based episodes, 
demarcated by a change in PlumbCo’s business strategy (intent or initiative).  Each 
episode is summarized in Appendix B. 
Episode 1: Developing an Infrastructure for Growth  
During 1995, the initial period covered by this research, PlumbCo was at a critical 
juncture.  The industry was changing and PlumbCo was in need of a strategy adapted to 
the changing environment.  Traditionally, PlumbCo’s customer base consisted of 
thousands of small plumbing supply wholesalers.  These wholesalers were frequently 
local, family-owned businesses. PlumbCo, although mid-sized by revenue standards, held 
a leveragable position over the small local wholesalers.  The leverage over the small 
wholesalers and quality of PlumbCo products, had, in the past, allowed PlumbCo to 
maintain a reasonable profit margin. 
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During the mid-nineties, however, the market structure for plumbing supplies was 
quickly changing due to two forces.  First, the introduction and proliferation of the “big 
box” retailers introduced a “direct to retail” distribution channel, bypassing the local 
wholesalers (EE-1).  By 1995, big box retailers such as Lowes and Home Depot 
represented over $130 billion in annual construction and hardware retail sales.  Second, 
in reaction to the big box retailers, the large number of small, local wholesalers was 
consolidating, developing into a small number of larger, regional and national 
wholesalers (EE-2). Companies such as F. W. Webb, Ferguson, Hughes, and Hajoca were 
emerging as large consolidated wholesalers, some of which were many times larger than 
PlumbCo.  Ferguson, for example, is part of a $6 billion company, with over 17,000 
associates at over 1,000 locations in 49 states.   
The changing market structure was altering the power distribution of the value chain.     
PlumbCo was no longer in a dominant position over the wholesalers and, instead, found 
its profit margins thinning as the growing size of PlumbCo’s customers put pressure on 
product prices.  Traditionally, plumbing products were priced based on a set price list; 
prices were, however, supplemented with a rebate program to the wholesalers.  The 
rebate was tiered so that the greater the product volume a wholesaler purchased from the 
manufacturer, the greater the per piece rebate.  The goal was to lock a wholesaler into 
carrying only your part as opposed to carrying similar parts from multiple manufacturers.   
While the distribution channel was changing, the pricing model was not.  The big box 
retailers, as they grew in volume, were buying in large quantities and demanding price 
concessions from the manufacturers.  Likewise, large wholesalers whose sales volumes 
qualified for the highest per piece rebate pricing were replacing the traditionally lower 
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volume, higher margin ma and pa wholesalers.  This combination of distribution channel 
changes was turning plumbing products into a commodity, but without the commodity 
market pricing mechanisms to pass along rising costs.  For example, other commodity 
products have fluctuating pricing models that allow manufacturers to pass along increases 
in cost, thus maintaining a consistent profit margin.  Because the commodity nature of the 
product is a relatively new phenomenon in the plumbing products business, the pricing 
model has not adapted, resulting in the manufacturers’ losing profit margin.    
PlumbCo realized the need to develop a strategy for succeeding in the changing 
environment and decided to develop a new strategic plan.  In 1995, management 
conducted a strategic long range planning (SLRP) process and established a cross-
function team tasked with reengineering the supply chain.  The consensus was that 
PlumbCo needed to grow in order to compete and compensate for the leverage of the 
consolidated distributors and the big box retailers.  The long-range strategic plan called 
for aggressive growth (SG-1) with a specific goal for PlumbCo to grow from a $450 
million company to a billion dollar company within 10 years.  At the same time, but 
secondary to the growth goal, PlumbCo also realized that the decreasing profit margins 
required them to reduce costs.   
During the strategic planning process and the cross-functional team’s investigation, it 
became clear that PlumbCo’s infrastructure could not support their strategic goals.  
Several strategic initiatives such as changing the inventory process and developing 
metrics to track customer satisfaction were promoted by teams involved in the process.  
Each team, however, qualified their suggestions indicating that the initiatives required 
supporting technology, which PlumbCo lacked.  
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The company’s current legacy systems were deficient for several reasons.  First, there 
was, for all practical purpose, no IS strategy when the systems in question were put in 
place.  The legacy systems were transactional systems implemented by autonomous 
divisions.  Second, the existing legacy systems were aging and disjointed.  The company 
had four major systems that supported different functional areas.  They used different 
databases and none of the systems were integrated so that they could not communicate 
with each other.  The SLRP and cross-functional team concluded that in order for 
PlumbCo to accomplish its new strategic growth goal, the first thing required was a 
supporting technology infrastructure.   
PlumbCo retained the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) to develop a strategic 
information system plan.  BCG performed a detailed examination of PlumbCo and 
recommended that PlumbCo replace its fragmented legacy systems with an integrated 
enterprise system.  BCG stressed the importance of developing an integrated, crossed 
functional, system that provided enterprise-wide integrated data and suggested that 
PlumbCo install the integrated system by functional areas over the next three to five 
years. 
Based upon the SLRP and recommendations of both the cross-functional team and 
BCG, PlumbCo decided to develop a technology infrastructure capable of providing a 
competitive advantage (SI-1).  PlumbCo realized they were not going to survive in the 
changing economic environment by competing on price.  Instead, PlumbCo concluded 
that they could use technology to provide services their competitors could not, and thus 
differentiate themselves from their competitors.    
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While developing an IS infrastructure may seem like an IS strategy, in essence, the 
new strategic long-range plan elevated the role of technology to a business-level strategy.  
This strategy was to enable PlumbCo to reach its goals by making technology a 
competitive edge for PlumbCo.  The key to PlumbCo’s strategy is not simply the 
development of an IS infrastructure, but maintaining a technologically advanced, up-to-
date, infrastructure that would allow them to stay ahead of their competitors in their 
ability to provide technology-enabled services.  Some companies implement new 
technology that provides a competitive edge immediately after implementation; but then 
this competitive advantage decays as the technology ages and competitors implement 
newer technology.  The differentiator for PlumbCo was viewing the technology as a 
corporate-wide strategic asset to be leveraged, and not just a supporting infrastructure. 
PlumbCo developed an IS strategy to support the business strategy.  PlumbCo’s IS 
strategy was to maintain an up-to-date system capable of providing the most current and 
effective business processes thereby allowing them to maintain a technological edge on 
their industry competitors.  PlumbCo’s IS strategy also included the caveat that the 
technology must have a cost justified business purpose (IS-1). The business cost 
justification was based on a holistic view of total cost of ownership that considered IS as 
a strategic asset and as such, they did not seek to buy the cheapest technology.  Instead, 
they wanted to purchase what was necessary to keep their strategic asset up to date, and 
to be able to cost justify it based on its strategic purpose and expected business benefits. 
A search committee was established to find the best integrated system for PlumbCo.   
After reviewing several systems including SAP, Oracle, and BAAN, the committee 
recommended that PlumbCo purchase an integrated system from SAP, the leader in 
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enterprise resource planning (ERP) software.  The committee recommended SAP for its 
robust functional integration and its flexibility to accommodate PlumbCo’s current and 
anticipated business needs.  SAP was the industry leader and was known for its built in 
“best in class” business processes. This was an important factor because the need to keep 
the systems current and up to date drove the decision to keep the implementation simple.  
By implementing the basic “plain vanilla” processes built into SAP, they could avoid the 
complication of customization that would hinder the ability to upgrade to new releases of 
the software.   
During the mid-nineties, there were not a lot of mid-sized companies implementing 
SAP because SAP’s robust capabilities were expensive.  PlumbCo, however, consistent 
with its strategic initiative, viewed SAP as a strategic asset whose flexibility, robustness 
and excess capacity would allow them to leverage R/3’s capabilities to grow the company 
and justified its expense based on its importance to PlumbCo’s strategic initiative. 
In preparation for the SAP implementation and related to the strategic long range 
planning, recommendations of the cross-functional team and BCG, PlumbCo restructured 
its organization, moving from a divisional structure, to a functional, matrix structure (OS-
1). Prior to this restructuring, PlumbCo was structured by end market with one division 
for the commercial market and a second division for the residential market (see Figure 2).  
The two divisions operated autonomously with redundant back office functions, separate 
sales and marketing functions, and little shared information.   
The reorganization eliminated the two divisions and focused on functional processes. 
This consolidated the back office functions of the separate divisions and eliminated the 
     178 
divisional duplication.  It also enabled standardization.  All of these changes set the stage 
for reengineering the supply chain and implementing the integrated information system.   
The functional structure by itself, however, was also problematic in that there was no 
focus on the end markets.  The solution was the implementation of cross-functional teams 
called Business Management Teams (BMT) to create a matrix structure (see Figure 1).  
The cross-functional BMT teams were oriented around the three main product lines:  
metal products, plastic products, and specialty products (hangers, etc.).  Each team had a 
business leader that focused on the product and members on each team represented each 
functional group: sales, marketing, manufacturing, logistics, finance, and human 
resources/payroll. 
Under the old divisional structure, each division maintained their own distribution 
systems.  This resulted in PlumbCo maintaining multiple distribution centers, frequently 
within close proximity to each other in major markets.  As part of the reorganization, 
PlumbCo restructured the distribution process (OS-2).  The 15 distributions centers were 
consolidated down to four strategically located regional distribution centers that handled 
all of PlumbCo’s products.  This not only reduced redundancy, but the reduced 
complexity aided in the implementation of the new integrated information system and 
reengineering of the inventory process. 
With the organizational restructuring underway an implementation team was formed 
during 1996.  The team was composed of 26 individuals from within PlumbCo, most with 
business backgrounds.  The team implemented several functional areas (software 
modules) including: sales and distribution, materials management, production planning, 
finance/controlling, and fixed assets.  On December 30, 1997, PlumbCo implemented 
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SAP R/3 (IT-1) as a “big bang”, going live across the organization at 10 manufacturing 
plants and four distribution centers.    
Episode 2: Leveraging the Technology Infrastructure for Cost 
Savings 
Once the IT infrastructure was in place, it was anticipated that PlumbCo would move 
forward with its primary strategic goal of growth.  Instead, PlumbCo entered a period that 
can be described as leveraging the newly implemented infrastructure, primarily to reduce 
costs (SI-2).  PlumbCo did not overtly shift its primary strategic goal of growth to cost 
reduction following the implementation.  Instead, management, out of necessity, simply 
placed a higher priority on the more immediate need:  the need to stabilize and leverage 
the R/3 implementation, and to counter converging environmental forces with cost 
cutting.   
Following an ERP implementation, most organizations go through two post-
implementation phases.  The first is a “shakedown” period characterized by the need to 
fix any problems from the implementation and assimilate the new system into the 
organization.  Once the organization has achieved somewhat normal operations following 
the implementation, most organizations move to a second post-implementation phase that 
typically seeks to leverage the system to achieve the benefits expected.  PlumbCo was no 
exception. 
There were also several converging environmental influences affecting PlumbCo’s 
need to leverage the technology infrastructure to reduce costs.  First, the proliferation of 
the big box retailers and consolidation of distributors was continuing to pressure profit 
margins (EE-1 and EE-2).  Second, as PlumbCo moved into the late nineties, foreign 
competition (EE-3) placed even greater stress on profit margins.  The foreign 
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manufacturers had improved their quality and held a cost advantage, which allowed them 
to produce similar quality products at a lower cost.   
Third, several family members wanted to divest ownership in the business (EE-4).  
PlumbCo is a fourth generation family-owned business and several family members 
wanted to sell their interests.  The buyout of the family members required cash, placing 
an even greater need for the firm to leverage their new infrastructure to cut costs and 
generate cash flow to fund the buyout. 
The strategic initiative to leverage the new IS infrastructure and converging 
environmental pressures on their profit margins, led PlumbCo to move forward with three 
tactical initiatives that were suggested as part of the 1995 SLRP but not implemented due 
to the lack of infrastructure to support them.   
The first of these changes moved PlumbCo to a demand-pull inventory process.  Prior 
to SAP, PlumbCo relied on a demand-push, make –to-stock manufacturing process.  
Under the demand-push process, stock levels were set annually based on prior year 
aggregate customer demand.  PlumbCo set manufacturing production scheduling using 
different information systems for the different divisions.  Once produced, the product was 
shipped to the distribution centers to maintain stock levels.  This demand-push process 
used large batch runs to minimize conversion times resulting in substantial inventory-
holding requirements.   
In addition to the high inventory holding costs, this process was not responsive to 
short-term fluctuations in demand.  Under the demand-push inventory process, short term 
fluctuations in demand resulted in what is described as a bullwhip effect where the 
fluctuations magnified as the fluctuations moved up the supply chain.  The result of the 
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bullwhip effect is out-of-stock situations requiring increasing production that often 
resulted in stock overages.   
Leveraging the real-time information available from R/3, PlumbCo moved to a 
demand-pull process based on a 12-month rolling average that considered recent demand 
trends.  Inventory zones were established at the distribution centers to track SKU 
demand.  This actual rolling customer demand drove the manufacturing process resulting 
in smaller, more frequent production runs.  The result of the demand-pull manufacturing 
process is a reduction in cycle time and increase in product availability.  Although this 
has increased the number of set-ups, increased efficiency in the set-up processes has 
minimized the impact of set-up costs. 
During this period, PlumbCo also proceeded with the implementation of a set of 
customer service metrics.  In order to differentiate themselves based on service, PlumbCo 
needed to be able to measure and manage these services.  As a result, the Big Six 
measures were created.  The Big Six customer service metrics include: 
• Percent of zoned SKUs with greater than zero inventory 
• Percent of orders with zero errors 
• Percent of customer phone calls on hold less than 20 seconds 
• Percent of shipments on or before promise date 
• Percent of shipments with zero errors 
• Percent of invoices with deductions 
The ability to track these new metrics leveraged information captured in R/3 that was 
not available prior to the implementation of the new system.  The result has been an 
increase in order accuracy and increasing customer satisfaction.     
PlumbCo also used the information available from R/3 to leverage centralized 
purchasing.  R/3 captured information on vendors and purchases, which exposed the fact 
that PlumbCo was purchasing similar materials from multiple vendors.  By enabling the 
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ability to gather and monitor information on vendors, PlumbCo was able to reduce the 
number of vendors and increase the order sizes, thus reducing purchasing costs. 
 The focus on leveraging the new IS infrastructure did not drive other changes in 
the organization.  The gains were made by moving forward with plans developed during 
the 1995 strategic planning process.  This leveraged the newly implemented systems and 
prior organizational changes and did not trigger any additional structural change events or 
strategic or structural IS change events.  For example, the change to demand-pull 
inventory leveraged the new IT infrastructure and the consolidation of the distribution 
warehouses (OS-2), but did not require or trigger additional changes in the organizational 
structure. 
The only significant change event impacting IS during this period was the upgrade of 
SAP R/3 to Version 4.0b (IT-2).  This occurred during 1999, a little over a year after the 
initial implementation.  The upgrade was not triggered by any of the strategic initiatives 
during this period.  Instead, the upgrade was driven by the established IS strategy of 
keeping systems up-to-date by implementing new releases of the software.  
Episode 3: Implementing eCommerce 
While PlumbCo continued to look for ways to use their technology infrastructure to 
impact the bottom line, towards the end of 1999, the company was ready to move 
forward with leveraging the IT infrastructure for PlumbCo’s primary goal of enabling 
growth.  As in episode two, there was no overt decision made to change strategic goals.  
Instead, it was a natural progression to the implementation of the technology 
infrastructure.  Once the system was in implemented, the focus needed to be on 
stabilizing and leveraging the new system.  Now that the system was stabilized and they 
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were seeing cost savings, the next step was to use the system more strategically.  This 
manifested itself in the roll out of ePlumbCo (SI-3). 
PlumbCo was the first manufacturer in its industry to implement such a robust 
infrastructure and PlumbCo wanted to leverage the technology infrastructure to provide 
services to their clients that other manufacturers could not provide.  During 1999, 
PlumbCo rolled out its ePlumbCo e-commerce suite (SI-3).  ePlumbCo represents three 
information technology enabled services that leverage the SAP R/3 infrastructure and the 
recent upgrade (IT-2).   
The first of these services is PlumbCoPartner.  PlumbCoPartner is a secure customer 
web portal that allows customers to access their information such as inventory 
availability, pricing, order and shipping status, etc. in real-time.  Customers can also use 
the PlumbCoPartner web site to process orders directly over the web without requiring 
PlumbCo personnel to intervene.  The second related service represented by ePlumbCo is 
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI).  EDI allows PlumbCo’s customers to electronically 
exchange information and automate the purchasing and invoicing processes, reducing 
transaction costs.  The third initiative of ePlumbCo is Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI).  
VMI allows PlumbCo to electronically monitor and automate the reorder of the 
customer’s inventory resulting in substantial transaction cost savings and, even more 
significantly, allows the customer to reduce their inventory carrying costs.   
Using its VMI capabilities, PlumbCo identified key strategic partners and utilized the 
capabilities of SAP to integrate the inventory and ordering process of these strategic 
partners.  PlumbCo took over monitoring of the customer’s inventory and receives a daily 
update via EDI on the inventory quantities.  Purchase orders and invoices are 
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automatically triggered and created by the system and communicated between PlumbCo 
and the customer with little or no human interaction.  This VMI process extended the 
efficiency of the demand pull process integrating demand pull all the way out to the 
customers’ inventory and allowed PlumbCo to be the sole supplier of the customer’s high 
volume inventory items.   
ePlumbCo did not trigger significant changes in the organization or IS strategy or 
structure.  Rather, it was the existing technology that enabled the ePlumbCo services.  
The existing IS strategy provided a technology infrastructure that enabled the 
development of these new services.  To implement ePlumbCo, PlumbCo did purchase 
software from SAP, Net Weaver, that increased the integration with the web interface and 
R/3.  This software, however was not considered an event of any significance by those 
interviewed.  
During 2000, PlumbCo implemented SAP’s human resources module (IT-3) and then 
during 2001, PlumbCo upgrade to SAP Version 4.6c (IT-4).  As with the first upgrade, 
neither the implementation of the human resources module nor the upgrade was prompted 
by any strategic or structural changes or constraints, but by PlumbCo’s IS strategy to 
implement the most recent technology and to leverage it to stay ahead of their 
competition. 
Episode 4: Growing via Acquisition  
As previously noted, SAP provided an IT infrastructure capable of handling greater 
transactional capacity then PlumbCo currently needed. PlumbCo wanted to leverage this 
excess capacity by acquiring companies (SI-4) and assimilating them into their IS 
infrastructure.  The assimilation of acquisitions under PlumbCo’s IS infrastructure 
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eliminates duplicate overhead costs, resulting in increased efficiencies and further 
leveraging the IT infrastructure.     
The key to leveraging this excess capacity, however, is the ability to integrate the 
acquisition into the IS infrastructure.  PlumbCo decided that before they would risk 
integrating an acquisition, they would gain the needed integration skills by integrating 
their Polish manufacturing plant (IT-5).  The Polish plant was an acquisition from the 
early nineties that had continued to run autonomous information systems after the SAP 
implementation.  The fact that it was already structurally part of PlumbCo made it a 
perfect for developing the integration skills needed for future strategic acquisitions while 
minimizing the risk associated with integrating a new acquisition.  
An in-house team was assembled to integrate the Polish plant onto PlumbCo’s 
instance of R/3.  During the integration, PlumbCo was able to develop reusable 
integration templates  The Poland plant went live in May 2002 with a successful 
integration and PlumbCo believed they were ready to integrate their first acquisition into 
their IT infrastructure.  
In June of 2002, PlumbCo acquired HangCo (OS-3).  HangCo was a privately-held, 
California-based, company that produced a complimentary product line to PlumbCo’s 
existing flow control products.  HangCo thus broadened PlumbCo’s product line and 
increased PlumbCo’s sales.  Specifically, HangCo manufactured hanging devices that 
could be used with both its plastic and metal plumbing product lines.  HangCo’s products 
were sold to a similar customer base, but HangCo’s market was focused on the west cost.  
PlumbCo’s technology-enabled distribution process provided the opportunity to expand 
the market for HangCo’s products to the rest of the U.S. market.  PlumbCo move forward 
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with integrating HangCo into their R/3 instance.  The Polish plant experience and 
knowledge paid off.  HangCo was integrated within six months of the acquisition date 
(IT-6). 
Episode 5: Innovating via New Product Development 
During 2002-2003 PlumbCo updated their ten-year, strategic long range plan.  The 
situation of the company was much different from 1995 when they first attempted an 
SLRP.  The focus on technology and implementation of SAP that resulted from the first 
SLRP now provided a strong foundational infrastructure for PlumbCo.  The updated 
SLRP resulted in a restating of the growth goal with a continuing focus on creating a lean 
enterprise and an additional goal of developing products to meet new environmental 
regulation (SG-2).  While the focus of the organizational goal first stated in the 1995 
SLRP was never formally shifted from growth to cost cutting, several individuals 
interviewed referenced the 2003 SLRP to be a switch from cost cutting to growth.   
During this period, there were two additional external forces impacting PlumbCo.  
The first of these is increasing regulatory requirements for the materials used in PlumbCo 
products (EE-5).  The EPA and state regulatory agencies are increasingly regulating the 
content of potential harmful materials in plumbing fixtures.  Some state legislation, such 
as California’s Proposition 65 is forcing manufacturers to certify that their products are 
compliant with state standards.  These moves have driven the need for an additional goal 
for PlumbCo addressed in their 2004 performance management plan referred to as MAX.  
MAX stands for Materials Alternative Exploration.  PlumbCo sees the need for compliant 
products not only as a requirement, but as a strategic opportunity.  PlumbCo believes that 
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if they can beat others to market with compliant products, they can become the standard 
and thus have an advantage over their competition. 
A second environmental event is a resurgence of inflation (EE- 6). During the last 
few years the price of raw material has increased substantially, placing an even greater 
burden on profit margins.  Whereas in the past, the pressures on profit margins impacted 
the price PlumbCo received for its products, the inflation in raw materials impacts the 
cost side.  Given the pricing model of standard prices with volume rebates, PlumbCo 
currently is unable to pass along the additional raw materials costs.  The combination of 
loss of pricing power and inflation in raw materials makes it important for PlumbCo to 
continue to find ways to operate as a lean enterprise as stated in the updated SLRP.     
Based on the environmental factors and the current goals of PlumbCo (SG-2: growth, 
lean enterprise, MAX), the 2004 performance management plan indicated that a new 
strategic initiative was to focus on innovation (SI-5).   Innovation addresses all of 
PlumbCo’s current strategic goals.  Product innovation will allow PlumbCo to generate 
new regulatory-complaint products and these new products can drive growth.  Innovative 
products likewise allow PlumbCo to differentiate their products and charge a premium 
over commodity products relieving pricing pressures.   
The IS strategy was also updated with the new SLRP. The IS infrastructure and desire 
to keep it current has proved its value and has become a standard process that is 
routinized.  PlumbCo’s IS strategy, therefore, is shifting to focus on content delivery (IS-
2).  Content delivery focuses on leveraging the current information captured by their ERP 
infrastructure.  The strategy is to deliver the information to those who can use it, when 
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they need it, by converting the stored data into actionable information that can be 
leveraged to enable the business goals.  
Currently the organizational structure has not changed for the updated SLRP.  To 
support the updated IS strategy, PlumbCo implemented SAP’s Business Warehouse (IT-
7). The Business Warehouse is a data warehouse that compiles the information captured 
in R/3 and provides a set of tools to manipulate and query the information.  The business 
warehouse was not triggered by changes to the business strategy or the company 
structure.  Instead, this was somewhat of a unique addition to the IS capabilities in that it 
supports the new IS strategy.  It was initially suggested by the IT department as it 
continued to look for ways to update the IT infrastructure and leverage the latest 
technology.   
The IT department became aware of SAP’s business warehouse product and realized 
there was a lot of information captured by their R/3 system that was not being used.  The 
IT department queried the business people to determine whether there this would be a 
useful tool for them.  The business users concurred that this would be a valuable strategic 
asset and the business warehouse was implemented. 
The business warehouse will allow improved access to key business analytics.  For 
example, PlumbCo is taking the data on customer ordering and using it to develop a more 
accurate product demand forecast and further refining its demand-pull process.   
PlumbCo believes that the information provided by SAP will also allow them to 
develop new metrics to better manage their company.  For example, PlumbCo currently 
tracks lines on an order shipped.  Although this has been a key metric enabled by SAP 
that they did not have in the past, it only tells part of the story.  A line may represent a 
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large number of pieces and even though they may have shipped 99 of 100 lines on an 
order, the 1 line may represent a substantial number of pieces of the order.  Therefore 
they want to improve their metrics by tracking actual pieces shipped.  
Consistent with maintaining an up-to-date infrastructure, PlumbCo recently upgrade 
to R/3 Version 4.7 (IT-8).  As in the past, there was no overriding strategy or structural 
change that drove the upgrade.  The upgrade was driven by the normal policy of keeping 
the infrastructure current. 
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Table 2: Event Timeline 
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Table 1: Definition of Events 
SG Strategic intent Changes in company goals  
SI Strategic 
initiatives  
Changes in business strategy that represent 
significant changes in the way the company 
does business 
OS Organization 
structure 
Changes in the way the organization is 
structured; defined as changes in organizational 
structure (as represented, for example, in the 
organization chart) or changes in significant 
management responsibilities 
IS IS strategy Changes in strategic initiatives that represent 
significant changes in the way the company 
utilizes IS 
IT IS structure Changes in IS structure and/or processes 
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Appendix C-1: Event Tables 
 
Table 3a:  Changes in External Environment 
Label Year14 Description 
EE-1 1995 Proliferation of  Big Box Retailers  
EE-2 1995 Consolidation of Wholesalers 
EE-3 1998 Increasing Competition from Foreign Manufacturers 
EE-4 1999 Buyback of Family-owned Stock 
EE-5 2000 Increasing Regulation of Hazardous Materials Content 
EE-6 2002 Inflation in Raw Materials  
 
 
 
Table 3b:  Changes in Business Strategic Intent (Goals) 
Label Year               Description 
SG-1 1995 Strategic Long Range Planning Process resulted in a primary corporate goal 
of grow with a secondary focus on reducing costs. 
SG-2 2003 Updated SLRP:  Growth, Lean, and MAX 
 
 
 
Table 3c:  Changes in Business Strategic Initiatives 
Label Year Description 
SI-1 1995 Development of Technology Infrastructure  
SI-2 1998 Leveraging Technology Infrastructure for Cost Savings 
SI-3 1999 Introduction of ePlumbCo 
SI-4 2002 Growth via Acquisitions 
SI-5 2003 Innovation Via New Product Development 
 
 
 
Table 3d:  Changes in Organizational Structure and Process 
Label Year             Description 
OS-1 1996 Moved from Divisional Structure to a Matrix/Functional Structure 
OS-2 1995-7 Consolidated Distribution from 15 to 4 Warehouses 
OS-3 2002 Acquired HangCo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 The dates on the events are an approximation based in the combined interviews and review of publicly 
available data 
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Table 3e:  Changes in IS Strategy 
Label Year                Description 
IS-1 1996 Maintain a Technologically Up-to-date IS Infrastructure 
IS-2 2003 Focus on Content Delivery 
 
 
 
Table 3f:  Changes in IS Structure and Processes 
Label Year                  Description 
IT-1 1997-8 Implemented SAP R/3  
IT-2 1999 Upgraded to SAP Version 4.0b 
IT-3 2000 Go Live on SAP Human Resources Module 
IT-4 2001 Upgraded to SAP Version 4.6c 
IT-5 2002 Go Live with SAP at Poland Subsidiary 
IT-6 2002 Converted Acquisition (HangCo) to SAP 
IT-7 2003 Implemented SAP Business Warehouse  
IT-8 2004 Upgraded to SAP Version 4.7 
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Appendix C-2: Episodes in IS Adaptation 
 
Table 4:  Episodes in IS Adaptation 
 
  
“Alignment 
Factor” 
Episode 1 – Developing an Infrastructure for Growth 
  Date 
Initiated 
Description Trigger 
External 
Environment 
Early 
Nineties and 
Continuing 
Proliferation of Big Box Retailers (EE-1)  
 
Mid-nineties 
and 
Continuing 
Consolidation of Wholesalers (EE-2)  
Strategic Intent 
(Goals) 
1995 Growth (SG-1) Changes in Market Distribution Channels 
(EE-1)(EE-2) 
Business 
Strategy/ 
Initiatives 
1995 Development of Technology Infrastructure 
(SI-1) 
Growth Strategy (SG-1) 
Organization 
Structure 
1995 Eliminated Divisional Structure and Moved 
to a Functional Matrix Structure (OS-1) 
Development of Technology Infrastructure 
(SI-1) 
 
1995-1997 Consolidated Distribution from 15 to 4 
Warehouses (OS-2) 
Development of Technology Infrastructure 
(SI-1)  
IS Strategy 1996 Maintain a Current Technology 
Infrastructure (IS-1) 
Development of Technology Infrastructure 
(SI-1) 
IS Structure 1997 Implemented SAP R/3 (IT-1) Development of Technology Infrastructure 
(SI-1)  
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“Alignment 
Factor” 
Episode 2 – Leveraging IS Infrastructure for Cost Savings 
  Date 
Initiated 
Description Trigger 
External 
Environment 
Late 
Nineties  
Increasing Competition from Foreign 
Manufactures (EE-3) 
 
 
1999 Buyback of Family-Owned Stock (EE-4)  
Strategic Intent 
(Goals) 
 No Change  
Strategic 
Initiatives 
1998 Leveraging Technology Infrastructure for 
Cost Savings (SI-2) 
Price Pressures (EE-1)(EE-2)(EE-3) and 
Buyout(EE-4)  
Organization 
Structure 
 No Change  
IS Strategy 1998 No Change  
IS Structure 1999 Upgraded to SAP Version 4.0b (IT-2) Initial IS Strategy (IS-1) 
 
 
 
  
“Alignment 
Factor” 
Episode 3 – Implementing eCommerce 
  Date 
Initiated 
Description Trigger 
External 
Environment 
 
 
 
Strategic Intent 
(Goals) 
 No Change 
 
Business 
Strategy/ 
Initiatives 
1999 Introduction of ePlumbCo (SI-3) Up-to-date IT Infrastructure (IT-2) 
Organization 
Structure 
 No Change  
IS Strategy  No Change  
IS Structure 2000 Go Live on SAP Human Resources (IT-3) Initial IS Strategy (IS-1) 
 
2001 Upgraded to SAP Version 4.6c (IT-4) Initial IS Strategy (IS-1) 
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“Alignment 
Factor” 
Episode 4 – Growing Via Acquisition 
  Date 
Initiated 
Description Trigger 
External 
Environment 
 
 
 
Strategic Intent 
(Goals) 
 No Change 
 
Business 
Strategy/ 
Initiatives 
2002 Growth via Acquisition (SI-4) IT Infrastructure (IT-1) 
Organization 
Structure 
2002 Acquired HangCo (OS-3) Strategic Initiative for Growth Via 
Acquisition (SI-4 ) and Experience 
Converting Polish Sub(IT-5) 
IS Strategy  No Change  
IS Structure 2002 Go Live with SAP at Poland Subsidiary (IT-
5) 
Acquisition Strategy (SI-6) and Acquisition 
of HangCo (OS-3) 
 
2002 Converted Acquisition (HangCo) to SAP 
(IT-6) 
Acquisition of HangCo (OS-3) 
 
 
 
  
“Alignment 
Factor” 
Episode 5 – Innovating via New Product Development 
  Date 
Initiated 
Description Trigger 
External 
Environment 
2000 Increasing Regulation of Hazardous 
Materials Content (EE-5) 
 
 
2002 Inflation in Raw Material Prices (EE-6)  
Strategic Intent 
(Goals) 
2002 Updated SLRP: Growth, Lean, and MAX 
(SG-2) 
 
Business Strategy/ 
Initiatives 
2003 Innovation via New Product Development 
(SI-5) 
Continued Price Pressures (EE-6), 
Increasing Regulatory Requirements (EE-5) 
and New Strategic Goals (SG-2) 
Organization 
Structure 
 No Change  
IS Strategy 2003 Focus on Content Delivery (IS-2) Updated SLRP (SG-2) 
IS Structure 2003 Implementation of Business Warehouse (IT-
7) 
Content Delivery (IS-2) 
 
2004 Upgraded R/3 to Version 4.7 (IT-8) Normal Maintenance 
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Appendix D – PartCo Write-up  
The purpose of this confidential report is to provide an overview of the information 
derived from research conducted at PartCo.  It reflects aggregate findings based on all 
interviews and publicly available documentation.  The report takes the form of a 
summary write-up of the company with a focus on the five-year period starting in 2000 
and ending in 2004.  This report is therefore a vehicle for sharing our understanding of 
PartCo, as well as a means for confirming the accuracy and completeness of our data 
collection.     
The next step is for the researcher to learn from the interviewees if there are any 
errors or important omissions in this report. Feedback to the researcher from the 
primary contact at PartCo is therefore an important part of our research method. 
Please review the write-up and the attached documents for accuracy.  We will set up 
phone interviews to capture your comments, and will then prepare a revised version of 
this report that can be distributed to all company participants.   
Please note that the company name is used in this report.  The purpose of this report is 
for your internal viewing only.  Any academic documents that use this information will 
not contain the name of PartCo or any PartCo subsidiaries or brands without PartCo’s 
express agreement in order to protect the confidentiality of the company.  Please address 
any questions to Kerry Ward via email at kwward@indiana.edu or by phone at 812-340-
4621. 
Finally, we would like to express our gratitude to XXXX XXXXX, our principal 
contact, and the other PartCo participants.  
 
 
     200 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this report is to describe the information derived from research 
conducted at PartCo.  This report reflects information from interviews and other publicly-
available sources such as the company web sites, practitioner publications, SEC filings, 
and Annual Reports.  PartCo provided a unique opportunity to study the IS alignment 
process in an organization that had recently gone through a merger of equals.  On-site 
interviews with ten employees were conducted at the XXXXXXXXXX and at the 
XXXXXXXX facility.  The interviews were conducted during the fall of 2004 and 
inquired into the major events that have occurred in business and IS strategy and structure 
since the merger.   
A brief overview of the company is provided based on current operations.  Then a 
historical account of events important to understanding the alignment periods at PartCo is 
presented, focusing on their impact on the company’s strategy, structure, and information 
systems. 
Overview of PartCo 
This section provides an overview of PartCo, including contextual information that 
led to the merger.  The first section provides a current overview of the company.  This is 
followed by information on the historical context of the industry and both companies 
leading up to the merger. 
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Current Company Overview 
  Headquartered in XXXXXX, PartCo is a publicly held company with $8 billion in 
annual revenues and is traded on the New York Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol 
PartCo.  PartCo has a global presence with over 31,000 employees and 120 
manufacturing facilities located in 25 countries.  PartCo provides integrated systems, 
modules, and components for passenger, light truck, and commercial vehicles to the 
major automotive original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and to consumers via 
aftermarket replacement products. PartCo is currently structured into three divisions: 
Light Vehicle Systems (LVS), Commercial Vehicle Systems (CVS), and Light Vehicle 
Aftermarket (LVA) (see Figure 1).   
The largest division is the Light Vehicle Systems with $4.8 billion in sales for 2004.  
LVS employees over 17,000 people at 75 facilities in 23 countries.  LVS supplies 
apertures (sunroofs and doors, etc.), undercarriage (suspensions and wheel systems, etc.), 
and air and emission systems (filters, mufflers, catalytic converters, etc.) to the leading 
automotive OEMs.  Most new passenger vehicles and light trucks sold today include 
PartCo products.  While LVS is the largest segment of PartCo, it is in a very competitive 
marketplace experiencing substantial change and continuous downward pressure on 
profit margins.   
The Commercial Vehicle Systems (CVS) division provides drive train components 
and systems to the commercial vehicle market.  CVS, with revenues of $3.2 billion, has 
8,500 employees and 65 facilities in 19 countries.   This market serves OEMs that 
produce commercial vehicles such as semi-tractors, buses and other medium or heavy-
duty trucks and vehicles.  While CVS is smaller in total sales than LVS, CVS has 
stronger profit margins and is viewed as a strategic asset for the future.   
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The Light Vehicle Aftermarket (LVA) division, with just under $1 billion in annual 
sales is the smallest division.  LVA employees 5,000 at 21 facilities located in seven 
countries.  LVA supplies replacement parts for passenger vehicles and light trucks to end 
consumers via automotive parts suppliers and other distributors.  PartCo has several 
aftermarket brands that are well known including XXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXX.  
LVA is no longer considered a strategic asset and management has publicly indicated its 
intent to divest LVA.   
Historical Context Prior to Merger 
Because of its relatively short history, it is essential to understand the historical 
context of the two merged companies that evolved into PartCo.  This section thus 
provides an overview of the history of PartCo prior to the period covered by the research.  
This includes a brief, high-level description of the automotive industry and the 
environment in which PartCo operates. An overview of the environmental context is 
followed by a discussion of the motivation for the merger and a brief overview of each of 
the merging companies. 
The Environment 
All interviewees classified PartCo’s environment as dynamic citing three main 
reasons for this dynamism: 1) The relationship of the automobile industry to the U.S. 
economy; 2) Foreign automobile manufacturers have taken substantial market share from 
the U.S. manufacturers; 3) The automotive industry is heavily influenced by changes in 
government regulations.  
First, the automobile market is cyclical and parallels the U.S. economy.  When the U. 
S. economy is doing well, people buy new vehicles.  Likewise, when the economy is 
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doing well, goods are moving, requiring more commercial vehicles to transport those 
goods.  The alternative, however, is also true.  When the economy is slow, so is the 
market for passenger and commercial vehicles. 
The interviewees described the economic environment going into the merger as a 
down cycle.  The U.S. economy was in recession and as expected, the automobile 
industry closely paralleled the U.S. economy.  With the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001, the recession was exacerbated and the economic environment continues to be 
difficult into 2005.  The difficult economic environment contributed to the need for the 
merger by squeezing profit margins and reducing operating cash flow.   
No specific changes identified in the strategies and structures of PartCo were 
specifically triggered by the poor economic climate.  The impact appeared to make it 
more difficult for PartCo to move forward with the business strategies that were in place.  
In other words, the poor economic environment did not trigger changes, but it did hinder 
the ability to execute the strategies in place and slowed down the pace of structural 
change.    
Second, the proliferation of foreign automobile manufacturers, particularly in the U.S. 
market, has increased the dynamism of the environment over the last 35 years. The U.S. 
automobile manufacturers faced little competition until the late 1970’s.  Prior to that 
period, the “Big Three” (General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler) were considered an 
oligopoly and dominated the U.S. market place.      
The dominance of the Big Three led to a maturity, and lack of flexibility, that allowed 
the foreign automotive manufacturers to establish a foothold in the U.S.  The maturity of 
the Big Three made it difficult for them to adapt and their foreign competitors were able 
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to compete on price and quality due to innovative manufacturing techniques and lack of 
constraints related to prior history and structure. For example, the Big Three, were 
constrained by substantial legacy costs due to well-established agreements with labor 
unions to fund pensions and health care for retirees.  The foreign automotive 
manufacturers do not have the same legacy costs and thus have a lower labor cost. The 
foreign manufacturers also adopted a focus on continuous quality improvement 
introduced by Charles Deming, which the U.S. manufacturers were late to adopt, giving 
the foreign manufacturers a lead in quality. 
Third, the regulatory environment impacts the automotive industry.  In the U.S., the 
automotive industry is subject to several different regulatory influences.  First, the 
Department of Transportation regulates automobile safety requirements and frequently 
mandates standards that the automobile manufactures are required to meet.  Second, the 
Environmental Protection Agency influences the automotive industry via the regulation 
of emissions from fossil fuel engines and other environmental related issues.  Third, 
federal labor regulations have a substantial impact on the automotive industry due to the 
large number of employees and the highly unionized work force. 
Precession to the Merger 
PartCo was created July 7, 2000 by the stated “merger of equals” of Company A, a $3 
billion supplier of exhaust systems to the automobile industry, and Company B, a $4 
billion supplier of drive-train, apertures, and other systems to the commercial and 
passenger vehicle markets.   
The industry structure in which the two companies existed played a substantial part in 
triggering the merger of Company A and Company B.  As noted, 35 years ago, the Big 
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Three dominated the automotive industry.  At that time, they focused on vertical 
integration, with the OEMs owning everything from the vehicle design facilities all the 
way down to, in some situations, steel producers.  Initially, the vertical integration 
allowed for lower manufacturing costs by eliminating middleman profits from the supply 
chain, and allowed the Big Three to control the process.  As the industry evolved, and 
foreign competition put pressure on the Big Three, the benefits to vertical integration 
eroded.   
Several factors contributed to the erosion of the benefits to vertical integration in the 
automotive industry.  First, the management of this long supply chain proved difficult as 
the increased market competitiveness required flexibility to compete with the foreign 
manufacturers.  The manufacturing of vehicles is a sophisticated process and innovation 
in continuous improvement and supply chain techniques pioneered by the foreign 
manufacturers such as “just-in-time inventory” required flexibility, a characteristic not 
designed into the tight vertical integration of the Big Three’s supply chains.  Second, 
owning multiple levels of manufacturing facilities tied up working capital that potentially 
could provide greater return if applied to other uses.  Third, the unions had gained 
strength to the point that costs for the Big Three were no longer competitive with those of 
the foreign manufacturers.  Each level of the supply chain represented another level of 
expensive unionized labor costs for the Big Three.  In summary then, the extensive 
vertical integration of the American automobile manufacturers was too expensive and 
slow for them to compete with more nimble, leaner foreign manufacturers.  The U. S. 
manufacturers divested the vertical integration, thus supporting the “tiered” structure of 
suppliers.     
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The increasing competition and innovation from the foreign auto manufacturers put 
continuous pressure on the Big Three to reduce costs, which the Big Three passed down 
to the tiered suppliers. The Big Three built into their contracts with the suppliers, price 
decreases for each year of the contract that required the suppliers to find ways to reduce 
costs.  This approach put continuous pressure on profit margins, making it difficult for 
suppliers to be profitable.  Additionally, the high labor costs of unionized labor led the 
Big Three to outsource not just manufacturing, but increasingly, the labor-intensive 
assembly processes.  By pushing assembly to the suppliers, the Big Three reduced the 
amount of high-cost unionized labor incurred and pushed the union labor issues to the 
suppliers. The pricing pressure pushed firms not dependent on the automotive industry to 
exit the market.  Firms that were dependent on the automotive industry were pushed 
towards consolidation.  Company B’s spin-off from Company BBB is representative of 
the former pressure.  Company A’s position prior to the merger is representative of the 
second.    
Company BBB was a large multinational conglomerate with a presence in many 
industries, particularly government contracting, aerospace, and automotive.  The return 
on investment in the low margin automotive supplier industry was not consistent with 
Company BBB’s corporate goals.  Further, Company BBB realized that profitability in 
the automotive industry required a focus on the industry that was not consistent with 
Company BBB’s portfolio.  In 1997, Company BBB spun off their automotive division to 
shareholders as a stand-alone company, forming Company B then focused on the 
automotive industry while the rest of Company BBB focused on more profitable 
industries. 
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The evolution of Company A followed a different route.  Company A was an early 
supplier to the automotive industry, first supplying mufflers in 1927.  Company A grew 
through product development and acquisitions to be a tier one supplier with the majority 
of their $3 billion in annual revenues being dependent on the automotive industry.  
Although it had grown into a larger company, it was still managed like a small one. 
For companies such as Company A, already focused and dependent on the 
automotive industry, divestiture was not an option.  The best strategy for Company A to 
survive was to become an even larger player in the automotive industry, leveraging their 
industry focus and expertise.  Company A initially moved to increase their product 
portfolio and also began to assemble parts.  The organic growth, however, was not 
enough to keep up in the consolidating automotive supplier market.  
Looking at the situations of both Company A and Company B, there were good 
reasons to consider a merger.  First, both companies were of similar size with Company 
B being slightly larger with around $4 billion in sales compared with Company A’s $3 
billion in annual sales.  The size of each company independently made them relatively 
small players in the tier one supplier arena.  Their relative size was a disadvantage in the 
current environment where the tier one suppliers were being taxed to provide more and 
more assembly and subsystems.  Together Company A and Company B have almost $8 
billion in annual sales, moving them into the top twenty automotive suppliers in terms of 
revenues.  Although PartCo did not become the largest tier one supplier, the merger 
positioned the combined company to capture more of the business that was being 
consolidated among fewer players. 
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Second, there were synergies between the product lines of each company. Company 
B’s primary products were in suspensions with the largest part of their products being 
related to the vehicle undercarriage such as brakes and axles, products not produced by 
Company A. Company A produced exhaust systems, a product line not produced by 
Company B, and had a shock absorber product line, which fit with the suspension 
products of Company B. 
Third, the combined markets of Company A and Company B provided synergies.  On 
the light vehicle side, Company A and Company B shared common customers.  More 
important, Company B had a strong presence in the higher-margin commercial vehicle 
market including an existing distribution channel while Company A did not.  Combining 
Company A’s technical product knowledge of exhaust technologies with Company B’s 
commercial market relationships and distribution channels therefore made strategic sense. 
Finally, efficiencies were expected to be gained by reducing duplicate administrative 
overhead.  For example, it was believed that the two companies’ pension systems could 
be merged into a single program, eliminating administrative costs.  This type of cost 
reduction was believed to be possible in multiple areas such as IT and Human Resources 
and was viewed by industry experts as necessary for companies to survive in the low 
margin, quick-changing economics of the automotive industry. 
PartCo Company History (2000-2004) 
This research covers a period of five years beginning with the merger in 2000 and 
ending in the fall of 2004, the time of data collection.  The data collected from interviews 
and other documentary sources was coded into change events of significance that 
represent changes in the business unit strategies and structures and the information 
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systems strategies and structures over the five-year period.  Each change event has been 
identified with the following codes, both in the text and in the tables:  EE – External 
Environment, SG – Strategic Goal, SI – Strategic Initiative, OS – Organizational 
Structure, IS – IS Strategy, and IT – IS Structure.  A list of each event by event type is 
presented in Appendix A.   
The events were determined based on a compilation and review of all interviews and 
other documentary sources.  The events are grouped into time-based episodes, 
demarcated by a change in PartCo’s business strategy (goal or initiative).  Each episode is 
summarized in Appendix B. 
Episode 1: Merging Company A and Company B  
The decision to consider the merger (EE-1) as the beginning point for the research 
period is based upon the consensus of those interviewed that the merger represented a 
new company.  The merger was considered a merger of equals and as such, neither 
company was considered to exist in its prior form after the merger.  The originating 
company and function of those interviewed varied, which would have made it difficult to 
isolate any one of the companies for a detailed pre-merger focus. 
Prior to the official merger, extensive planning took place to ensure the merger’s 
success and to minimize stress on the ongoing business of the merging companies.  The 
merger team created an executive office to plan the merger that included high-level 
executives from both Company A and Company B.  The executive office designed a plan 
to bring together the two companies over time, and without any initial major 
reorganizations or changes.  The merger of the two multi-billion dollar companies 
represented a substantial risk of business disruption and there was concern that too much 
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immediate change would negatively affect the ability to conduct ongoing business 
operations and potentially cause the merger to fail.  The initial changes were, therefore, 
focused on the elimination of redundant costs and on the integration of management and 
the basic infrastructure required to operate the merged company as one.   
The first act of the merger plan was to reconcile the management structures.  The new 
company could not run with separate executive branches; so agreements had to be 
reached at the highest levels as to who would take charge of which domains.  The 
existing boards of directors from Company B and Company A consolidated to form a 
new board.  The new board elected the CEO of Company B as the CEO of the combined 
company and named the CEO of Company A to the position of COO of the combined 
company.  Similarly, the new board and executive officers assigned responsibilities for 
the rest of the high-level management structure. 
The strategic goal for the merged company was to become the “supplier of choice for 
the global motor vehicle industry” (2000 Annual Report).  Internally, a more succinct 
goal was stated; “to be the number one supplier to the automotive industry by 2010 (SG-
1).”  This was an aggressive goal.  The combined revenue of approximately $8 billion 
placed PartCo in the middle of the pack in terms of their peer group, with total revenues 
far short of the industry leading, $29 billion, Delphi Corporation, the vertical spin-off of 
GM.   
The new management established basic business strategies for the merged company 
focusing on growth either through internal growth of products and services or via 
acquisitions and joint ventures.  The 2000 10K filed with the SEC outlines the following 
business strategies for the new company: 
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• Improve core business processes 
• Capitalize on customer outsourcing 
• Expand sales via higher value modules 
• Leverage geographic strengths 
• Increase sales to commercial markets 
• Introduce new systems  and technologies 
• Expand the aftermarket business 
• Pursue strategic opportunities (acquisitions, divestitures and other joint 
ventures and partnerships) 
 
Immediately after the merger, however, the primary strategic initiative (SI-1) was on 
realizing cost savings from integration and elimination of immediate duplication in 
business processes.  The merger plan targeted initial cost savings of $30 million during 
the first 100 days.  Because the merger occurred in July, there was little time in 2000 for 
the company to focus on business strategy other than cost cutting from consolidation of 
the two companies.  Substantial steps towards the implementation of the basic strategic 
initiatives outlined in the 10K, therefore, were not taken at that time.   
At the time of the merger, management combined the prior structures of Company A 
and Company B under the new corporate management structure (OS-1).  Company A’s 
pre-merger organizational structure was divided into four divisions, primarily by product 
(see Figure 2).  The exhaust technologies, Company A’s core business, represented the 
primary division.  The exhaust technologies division represented approximately 75% of 
Company A’s sales and focused on OEM markets.  Because of the focus on OEMs, the 
exhaust division was organized into three customer groups focusing on Ford, GM, and 
Chrysler.  Company A’s other divisions were much smaller.  One division produced 
shock absorbers while the aftermarket division sold replacement parts to the end 
consumer through auto parts stores and other similar distributors.  Company A had a 
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fourth division, ABC, which was a very small, but profitable, vertical specialty company 
that coated metal used in the making of automotive and other products. 
Company B, at the time of the merger, was comprised of three divisions, structured 
around their end markets (see Figure 3).  The heavy vehicle systems division 
manufactured and sold parts to OEMs that produced heavy duty trucks, buses, and other 
industrial and commercial vehicles.  The light vehicle systems sold parts to OEMs that 
produced passenger vehicles and light trucks, while the aftermarket division supplied 
products to the end consumer through distributors for both commercial and light vehicles. 
Immediately after the merger, the two companies were combined under one corporate 
umbrella, with few changes to the operational organizational structure (see Figure 4).  All 
of Company A’s exhaust technologies, including the aftermarket and the fledgling 
commercial vehicle exhaust technologies were placed under a Light Vehicle Systems 
structure with the Light Vehicle Group from Company B.   Company A’s exhaust 
technologies’ customer focused grouping was abandoned for a product focus structure, a 
structure consistent with Company B.  The consolidation of the Company B LVS group 
with the Company A exhaust technologies group was largely superficial.  No functional 
or operational integration or consolidation of the two divisions occurred and the groups 
continued to act independently. 
From the interviews and other documentation, it appears that the initial IS focus was 
on integration to reduce redundancies and costs.  It is unclear, however, whether this 
approach was a formal IS strategy resulting from the merger or simply the resulting 
impact of the merger on the IS structure.  Prior to the merger, it was stated that Company 
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A did not have a strategic view of IS and saw IS as a utility.  Company B’s strategic view 
of IS prior to the merger was not addressed by any of those interviewed. 
The IS structure did require integration (IT-1); there were two IT infrastructures, with 
two incompatible email systems, two help desks, etc.  It was not possible to integrate and 
manage the company as one with two separate IS infrastructures hindering 
communication, given the need to consolidate financial data for the merged entity.   The 
elimination of the duplicate IT infrastructure also represented part of the expected cost 
savings of the merger.  A single standard for email was selected, which moved Company 
B from Lotus Notes to Microsoft’s Outlook, the standard used by Company A.   
The other IS structural change that occurred within a few months after the merger was 
the discontinued use of J.D. Edwards (JDE) at the Company A divisions (IT-2).  In 1995, 
five years prior to the merger, Company A made a decision to replace their aging legacy 
system.  It was highly customized to the point where it could not be upgraded and 
management believed it would be difficult to continue running the company on the 
existing system.  However, Company A did not view IS as a strategic asset and did not 
want to spend the money to implement an expensive system such as SAP.  At the time, J. 
D. Edwards, an IBM AS400 based ERP targeting manufacturing, which did not have a 
presence in the automotive industry, approached Company A and IBM, suggesting a 
partnership.  JDE offered Company A the JDE software at a substantially reduced cost, 
making the solution very attractive to Company A.  Given that Company A was already 
heavily invested in IBM systems, using IBM mainframe, database and operating system, 
collaborating with J.D. Edwards and IBM seemed like the perfect solution. 
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Unfortunately, J.D. Edwards was unable to port the software to the IBM mainframe 
as initially promised by JDE, and IBM eventually dropped out of the partnership.  J.D. 
Edwards provided Company A with an AS400 to run the software.  Finally, late in 1999, 
Company A went live on the financial module.  Approximately two months later, 
management announced the merger with Company B.   
After the merger, the consolidated management decided to pull the plug on the JDE 
implementation.  First, management was concerned with problems in the implementation 
of the financial module and therefore with the risk of implementing additional modules.  
Second, none of the Company B divisions were using JDE and the combined company’s 
experience and knowledge with JDE was limited.  Finally, the limited financial 
investment in the system made it easy to justify removing the recently implemented 
financial module.  The Company A divisions rolled back the J.D. Edwards financial 
module and moved back on to Company A’s legacy systems until the merged company 
could stabilize and management was ready to make a more informed decision as how to 
proceed.   
Episode 2: Assembling Modules  
During 2001, the second alignment episode was initiated by the execution of a 
strategic initiative to grow organically via expansion of the products and services offered 
to the OEMs.  The primary focus of this initiative was to capture additional assembly 
processes outsourced by the OEMs and to increase “content per vehicle,” that is the 
amount of PartCo product included in each new vehicle produced.   
Historically, suppliers produced parts and shipped them to the OEMs.  The OEMs 
then performed the assembly of the vehicle from parts provided by the tier one suppliers.  
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During the nineties, the trend was for suppliers to provide more of the labor component 
and to manufacture and assemble systems to leverage the suppliers’ typically lower labor 
costs.  For example, Company A originally manufactured mufflers and shipped them to 
the OEMs, which attached them to the vehicles on the OEM vehicle assembly line.  
Company A then extended its products to produce exhaust systems, which included 
mufflers, catalytic converters, and exhaust pipes, delivering the exhaust system to the 
OEMs, and not just mufflers alone.  This evolution continued to expand the role for tier 
one suppliers such as PartCo as the OEMs continued to look for opportunities to 
outsource.   
Combined with the desire of the OEMs to push more labor-intensive assembly down 
to the tiered suppliers and the desire for PartCo to become the number one supplier to the 
automotive industry, PartCo made a strategic decision to initiate assembly of modules 
(SI-2).  This decision meant that PartCo moved from assembling systems from parts they 
manufactured to assembling entire sections or “modules” that included parts and 
components produced by other manufacturers.  Hence PartCo needed to coordinate with 
the lower tier suppliers to assemble their own and third-party manufactured parts and 
components into completed modules.  For example, PartCo moved from the production 
of the electric window assemblies from self-manufactured parts to the assembly of a door 
module that included audio speakers and other parts manufactured by other companies.  
PartCo assembles parts and components from multiple suppliers and provides a 
completely assembled door ready to be hung on the auto frame to the OEM. 
A consequence of the move to module assembly is that the size of the modules makes 
them expensive to transport to the OEMs.  This added transportation cost initiated a 
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structural change at PartCo.  PartCo built small assembly plants close to the OEMs’ final 
assembly plants (OS-2).  PartCo coordinates the delivery of the parts they manufacture 
and the delivery of parts from third party manufacturers to their assembly plants.  PartCo 
then assembles the individual parts and subassemblies into modules and transports the 
completed modules the short distance to the OEM final assembly plant.   
In the summer of 2002, a major structural reorganization of the divisions occurred 
(OS-3).  The reorganization consolidated the manufacture and assembly of parts and 
modules by market. One reason for the reorganization was the merger itself.  As part of 
the merger plan to reduce operating costs, merging organizational structure reduced 
redundant overhead.  A second reason was related to the move to modules.     
Company A’s exhaust technologies was merged with the light vehicle division of 
Company B to form the Light Vehicle Systems (LVS) division.  Note that they were 
placed under the same umbrella of LVS at the merger, but left autonomous.  The 
reorganization integrated the two into one division merging administrative, marketing, 
engineering, and other functions.  The exhaust technologies and the products of the light 
vehicle division from the old Company B supplied products to the same customers and 
were strategically focused on the development of modules for OEM customers.  The 
combined LVS division allowed for a single point of contact for the OEMs and made it 
easier to coordinate the design and engineering of modules.  The restructuring facilitated 
the elimination of duplicate marketing structures and other overhead such as human 
resources and accounts payable, etc.  The small piece of exhaust technologies that had 
been initiated to look at the commercial exhaust market prior to the merger was moved 
into the commercial vehicle systems.  
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A final piece of the structural reorganization was to move the light vehicle 
aftermarket segments of both Company A and Company B into one division.  Again the 
common trigger was that both light vehicle aftermarket divisions have different 
distribution channels from those that provide products to OEMs, and efficiencies could 
be gained by grouping the two aftermarket segments. 
The result of this reorganization was the creation of a commercial vehicle systems 
division, a light vehicle systems division, and a light vehicle aftermarket division (see 
Figure 4).  The roll coater division was targeted for divestiture due to its lack of strategic 
importance to the current organization and was sold during 2003.  
The strategic initiative to supply modules contributed to a change in IS strategy.  
Assembling modules from parts produced by PartCo divisions and by third parties 
required increased coordination and orchestration of production and inventory 
information.  In order to support efficient tracking and transfer of parts among different 
plants and manufacturers, management realized the need for harmonizing the data (e.g. 
consistent part numbers, etc.) and standardizing processes and systems across the 
organization.  This approach was referred to as a “convergence strategy” (IS-1).   
Multiple systems were in operation throughout PartCo.  The North American based 
Company A facilities were using a highly customized mainframe-based system centrally 
hosted at the Columbus facility.  Company A’s Europe based facilities were standardized 
on a manufacturing system referred to as AIMS, hosted in the Netherlands.  The AIMS 
system did not include financial capabilities, requiring each of the European facilities to 
maintain separate financial systems.  Company B’s systems were more diverse.  
Company B had made several acquisitions and their philosophy on IS was to give the 
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subdivisions autonomy regarding the systems they used.  It was apparent that maintaining 
the 25-30 different systems would be expensive to support and maintain and would 
hinder the ability to transfer and track manufacturing, inventory, and assembly 
information.   
Management decided to standardize the systems and data, but not on one system.  The 
CVS division of Company B, just prior to the merger, had successfully implemented the 
Oracle ERP suite.  CVS was happy with Oracle, but it was expensive to implement and 
maintain.  The cost was acceptable to CVS because the higher profit margins in the 
commercial markets allowed them to absorb the cost.  On the LVS side, however, Oracle 
was not seen as a realistic solution because of the lower profit margins.   
Prior to the merger, Company B had a few subdivisions that had successfully 
implemented a product called MFG Pro by QAD.  Several of the tiered automotive 
suppliers used MFG Pro and it was considered close to a standard for the automotive 
industry suppliers.  The fact that some of Company B’s subdivisions had already 
implement MFG Pro meant that they knew it could be successfully implemented and 
PartCo had existing familiarity and knowledge with the implementation and use of the 
package.  Management therefore decided to standardize on MFG Pro on the LVS side 
and on Oracle on the commercial side.   
Episode 3: Meeting New Federal Emission Regulations  
Environmental concerns about the emissions from fossil fuel engines have resulted in 
increasingly strict requirements on the processing and release of such emissions, 
particularly in the U.S. and the European Union.  On December 21, 2000, the EPA signed 
into federal regulation strict new standards for diesel engine emissions (EE-2).  The first 
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of these new standards take effect in 2007, with a second tightening of the standards 
going into effect in 2010.  The new EPA regulation increases demand for emission 
conversion products to meet regulatory requirements.  PartCo is well positioned to meet 
these requirements due to their expertise in emission technology, which reduces the 
amount of harmful elements in the exhaust.  PartCo thus considers developing products to 
help the OEMs to meet the strict new EPA standards to be an important strategic 
initiative (SI-3). 
Prior to the merger, Company A chose to ignore the commercial segment because of 
the differences between the light vehicle and commercial markets.  Products for 
passenger vehicles and light trucks were mass produced in lots of hundreds of thousands 
while commercial vehicles were produced in much smaller numbers.  Although there 
were a few common customers, in large part, the passenger vehicles and light truck 
OEMs were not the same as the commercial vehicle OEMs, requiring additional sales 
channels to market to the commercial vehicle OEMs.  Company A management feared 
that the resources required to properly enter the commercial market could detract from 
the ability to remain competitive in their demanding core passenger vehicle business. 
A few months before the merger, however, in light of the then proposed EPA 
regulations; Company A rethought its strategy and decided to investigate the commercial 
arena.  Company A realized that not only are the diesel OEMs required to meet these 
standards, none of the commercial vehicles currently on the roads met this requirement 
and would need to be brought into compliance through retrofitting of the diesel engines 
currently in service.  Company A’s expertise in exhaust systems combined with the 
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higher profit margins in the commercial segment made the market sufficiently attractive 
for Company A to explore. 
After the merger took place and the regulations were approved, the new emission 
standards took on an additional strategic importance to PartCo.  As previously noted, the 
merger combined Company A’s exhaust technologies and expertise with the existing 
commercial market channels of Company B.  This combination put PartCo in a good 
position to take advantage of the demand for new diesel engine exhaust technologies.      
An additional factor also reinforced the strategic importance of the new regulations 
and the position of PartCo to leverage the opportunity.  When Company A was a stand-
alone company, it produced over 75% of Chrysler’s emission products.  In 1998, Chrysler 
merged with Daimler-Benz to form Daimler-Chrysler.  Daimler-Benz, however, received 
most of its emission products from a German Company, ZZZ.   
ZZZ was a relatively small, family-owned company with approximately $450 million 
in sales, mostly to high-end, European-based automobile manufacturers such as Daimler-
Benz, BMW, Volkswagen, and Volvo.  ZZZ had a reputation as the top-quality producer 
and a technology leader in emission technologies in Europe.  After the merger of 
Daimler-Chrysler was announced, a deal was struck for Company A to purchase 49 
percent of Zeuna-Starker.  This ownership helped to cement Company A’s continuing 
role with Chrysler and to help Company A establish a relationship with Daimler.   
Company A’s investment in ZZZ took on added importance for PartCo in light of the 
new EPA emission standards.  In Europe, the use of diesel engines in passenger vehicles, 
as well as commercial vehicles, is commonplace.  ZZZ’s reputation as a technology 
leader in the emissions arena included expertise in controlling emissions from diesel 
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engines.  Recall that an important aspect of the PartCo merger was the ability to port 
Company A’s emission technology to commercial vehicles, which frequently use diesel 
engines.  In 2002, PartCo purchased the remaining 51 percent of ZZZ (OS-4) to become 
the sole owner of the diesel emission technology. 
Episode 4: Attempting to Acquire WXYZCo  
Given the disparity between PartCo’s $8 billion in annual revenues and the $29 
billion in annual revenue of its largest competitor, it is unlikely that internal growth alone 
could result in the growth necessary for PartCo to accomplish its strategic goal to be the 
number one supplier to the automotive industry by 2010.  Recall, however, that one of the 
initial publicly stated strategic initiatives was to “pursue strategic opportunities,” which 
included acquisitions, divestitures, and other opportunities.  With the merger completed 
and stabilized, management became more focused on finding an acquisition (SI-4) to help 
them grow.   
One such opportunity was presented by WXYZCO, a company quite similar to 
PartCo.  WXYZCO was a tier one supplier to the automotive industry, which served the 
same segments as PartCo (light vehicles, commercial vehicles, and aftermarket).   
WXYZCO was slightly larger than PartCo from an annual revenue standpoint -- just 
under $9 billion.  PartCo and WXYZCO combined, however, would be the seventh-
largest supplier to the automobile industry.  While still short of being the number one 
suppler, this would move PartCo from the top 20 to the top 10 with a further 7 years to 
achieve their strategic goal to be the number one supplier by 2010. 
PartCo’s first contact with WXYZCO was in 2001 when the companies entered into 
private discussions regarding a joint venture to combine the two companies’ Aftermarket 
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divisions.  The joint venture fell through.  However, in early 2003, PartCo attempted to 
acquire WXYZCO.  WXYZCO was opposed to the bid from the start, resulting in a 
hostile takeover attempt, which lasted several months.  On November 24, 2003, PartCo 
withdrew its bid to acquire WXYZCO.   
While the failed attempt at the merger did not result in changes to the organizational 
structure or information systems of PartCo, it is likely that the future direction of PartCo 
has been altered by the failed acquisition.  It will be very difficult for PartCo to grow fast 
enough internally to become the number one supplier to the automotive industry in the 
remaining five years.   
In early 2004, the CEO of PartCo announced his retirement and a new CEO from a 
former competitor was announced to fill the PartCo CEO position.  At the time of this 
research, the impact of the new CEO was uncertain.  It is suspected that the strategic goal 
will have to change because PartCo is unlikely to achieve its current strategic goal.   
The new CEO faces a difficult environment.  For the past two years, inflation has 
been a serious issue, putting even greater pressure on already tight profit margins.  To 
this point, no strategic or organizational changes have resulted from the inflation.  It is, 
however, an issue PartCo and the new CEO must deal with.  Whatever the direction, the 
new CEO is highly regarded and everyone is universally enthusiastic about the future of 
PartCo.     
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Figure 1: PartCo Current Company Structure 
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 Figure 2: Company A Industries Corporate Structure 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Company B Automotive, Inc. Corporate Structure (Pre-
merger) 
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 Figure 4: PartCo Corporate Structure Immediately Post Merger 
 
 
 
Table 1: Definition of Events 
SG Strategic intent 
(goals) 
Changes in company goals  
SI Business strategy Changes in strategic initiatives that represent significant changes 
in the way the company does business 
OS Organization 
structure 
Changes in the way the organization is structured; defined as 
changes in organizational structure (as represented, for example, in 
the organization chart) or changes in significant management 
responsibilities 
IS IS strategy Changes in strategic initiatives that represent significant changes 
in the way the company utilizes IS 
IT IS structure Changes in IS structure and/or processes 
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Appendix D-1: Event Tables 
 
Table 3a:  Changes in The External Environment 
Label Year15 Description 
EE-1 2000 Merger of Company A Industries and Company B Automotive 
EE-2 2000 Passing of New EPA Emission Standards to Take Effect 2007 
EE-3 2002 Inflation in Raw Material Prices  
 
 
 
Table 3b:  Changes in Business Unit Strategic Intent (Goals) 
Label Year Description 
SG-1 2000 Become the # 1 Supplier to the Automotive Industry 
 
 
 
Table 3c:  Changes in Business Unit Strategic Initiatives 
Label Year Description 
SI-1 2000 Focus on Cost Cutting 
SI-2 2001 Assembly of  Modules 
SI-3 2001 Development of Commercial Products for New Federal Emission Regulations 
SI-4 2003 Failed attempt to acquire WXYZCO 
 
 
 
Table 3d:  Changes in Organizational Structure and Process 
Label Year Description 
OS-1 2000 Merged Company A and Company B Management and 
Organizational Structures 
OS-2 2001 Move to Market – Move Plants Next to OEM Plants 
OS-3 2002 Reorganization of Structure to Three Divisions (Merged ET into 
LVS and Created LVS, CVS, and LVA) 
OS-4 2002 Acquired Remaining Interest in ZZZ      
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 The dates on the events are an approximation based on the combined interviews and review of publicly 
available data.  In general there was a time lag between the time a strategic initiative was introduced at the 
corporate level and the impact or action taken at the division level.  For example, the 2000 annual report 
introduced the strategic goal of being a dominant supplier to the automotive industry and mapped out 
strategic initiatives for reaching the goal.  However, it was 2001 before the interviewees acknowledged the 
strategic initiatives. 
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Table 3e:  Changes in IS Strategy 
Label Year Description 
IS-1 2001 Convergence Strategy (Consolidation and Standardization) 
 
 
 
Table 3f:  Changes in IS Structure and Processes 
Label Year Description 
IT-1 2000 Consolidation of IT Infrastructures 
IT-2 2000 Removal of J. D. Edwards at Company A Divisions and Move Back 
to Legacy Mainframe System 
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Appendix D-2: Episodes in IS Adaptation 
Table 4:  Episodes in IS Adaptation 
 
 
 
 
 
  
“Alignment 
Factor” 
Episode 1 –Merging Two Well-Established Suppliers 
  Date 
Initiated 
Description Trigger 
External 
Environment 
2000 Merger (EE-1)  
Strategic 
Intent (Goals) 
2000 Become the #1 Supplier to the Automotive 
Industry (SG-1) 
  
Strategic 
Initiatives 
2000 Focus on Cost Cutting (SI-1) Merger (EE-1) 
Organization 
Structure 
2000 Merged Management and Organizational 
Structures (OS-1) 
Merger (EE-1) 
IS Strategy  None   
IS Structure 2000 Consolidation of IT Infrastructures (IT-1) Merger (EE-1) 
 
2000 Removal of J. D. Edwards at Exhaust 
Technologies Division and Move Back to 
Legacy Mainframe System (IT-2) 
 Merger (EE-1)  
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“Alignment 
Factor” 
Episode 2 – Move to Assembly of Modules 
  Date 
Initiated 
Description Trigger 
External 
Environment 
 None 
 
Strategic Intent 
(Goals) 
 No Changes  
Strategic 
Initiatives 
2001 Assembly of  Modules (SI-2) Goal to be #1 Supplier (SG-1) 
Organization 
Structure 
2001 Move to Market – Move Plants Next to 
Customer Plants (OS-2) 
Assembly of Modules (SI-2) 
 
2002 Reorganization of Structure to Three 
Division (Merged ET into LVS and Created 
LVS, CVS, and LVA) (OS-3) 
Merger (EE-1) and Assembly of Modules 
(SI-2) 
IS Strategy 2001 Convergence Strategy (Consolidation and 
Standardization)  (IS-1) 
Merger (EE-1) and Assembly of Modules 
(SI-2) 
IS Structure  No Change  
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“Alignment 
Factor” 
Episode 3 – Meeting New Federal Emission Regulations 
  Date 
Initiated 
Description Trigger 
External 
Environment 
2000 Passing of New EPA Emission Standards to 
Take Effect 2007 (EE-2) 
 
Strategic Intent 
(Goals) 
 
No Changes  
Strategic 
Initiatives 
2001 Development of Commercial Products for 
New Federal Emission Regulations (SI-3) 
New EPA Emission Standards (EE-2) 
Organization 
Structure 
2003 Acquired Remaining Interest in ZZZ (OS-4) Develop Products to Meet 2007 EPA 
Requirements (SI-3) 
IS Strategy  No Change  
IS Structure  No Change  
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“Alignment 
Factor” 
Episode 4 – Attempting to Acquire WXYZCO 
  Date 
Initiated 
Description Trigger 
External 
Environment 
2002 Inflation in Raw Material Prices (EE-3)  
Strategic Intent 
(Goals) 
 No  Change  
Strategic 
Initiatives 
2003 Failed Attempt to Acquire WXYZCO (SI-4) Goal to be the #1 Supplier by 2010 (SG-1) 
Organization 
Structure 
 No Change  
IS Strategy  No Change  
IS Structure  No Change  
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Appendix E – MotorCo Write-up 
The purpose of this confidential report is to provide an overview of the 
information derived from research conducted at MotorCo.  It reflects aggregate findings 
based on all interviews and publicly available documentation.  The report takes the form 
of a summary write-up of the company for the ten-year period starting in 1995 and 
ending in 2004.  This report is therefore a vehicle for sharing our understanding of the 
motor company as well as a means for confirming the accuracy and completeness of our 
data collection.     
The next step is for the researcher to learn from the interviewees if there are any 
errors or important omissions in this report. Feedback to the researcher from the 
primary contact at MotorCo is therefore an important part of our research method. 
Please review the write-up and the attached documents for accuracy.  We will set up 
phone interviews to capture your comments, and will then prepare a revised version of 
this report that can be distributed to all company participants.   
Please note the company name is used in this report.  The purpose of this report is 
for your internal viewing only.  Any academic documents will not contain the name of 
MotorCo or of MotorCo without MotorCo’s express agreement in order to protect the 
confidentiality of MotorCo and the MotorCo.  Please address any questions to Kerry 
Ward via email at kwward@indiana.edu or by phone at 402-554-3369. 
Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to XXXX XXXX, my principal 
contact, and the other MotorCo participants.  
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Introduction 
The purpose of this report is to describe the information derived from the research 
conducted at MotorCo.  This report reflects the information from the interviews and from 
other publicly available sources such as the company web sites, practitioner publications, 
SEC filings, and Annual Reports.  The MotorCo provided a unique opportunity to study 
the alignment process in a division of a Fortune 500 company known for its business-
technology innovation.16  On-site interviews at the XXXX headquarters were conducted 
with ten employees of the motor division.  The interviews occurred in September 2004.  
A brief overview of the company is provided based on current operations.  Then a 
historical account of events important to understanding the alignment episodes at the 
motor company is presented, focusing on their impact on the motor company’s strategy, 
structure and information systems. 
Current Overview of MotorCo Corporate and MotorCo 
MotorCo is a Fortune 500 global conglomerate that provides a variety of solutions for 
industrial, commercial and consumer markets.  Headquartered in XXXX, MotorCo is a 
publicly held company, listed on the New York Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol 
XXX.  Founded 114 years ago, MotorCo Corporate grew through diversification via 
acquisitions and new product development.  Today, MotorCo Corporate is a global leader 
in manufacturing and marketing of electrical, electromechanical and electronic products 
and systems with 245 plants located around the world.  MotorCo Corporate has a 
presence in 150 countries focusing on emerging markets, such as Asia-Pacific, and 
                                                 
16 MotorCo was recently ranked second on InformationWeek’s Annual List of the Top 
500 Business –Technology Innovators (InformationWeek, Sept. 20, 2004, Issue 1006). 
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employs 107,800 people worldwide. Taking a conservative, but innovative management 
approach, MotorCo Corporate has steadily grown to over $15 billion in annual revenues.   
Currently, MotorCo Corporate is separated into five business segments17:  Process 
Control, Industrial Automation, Electronics and Telecommunications, HVAC, and 
Appliances and Tools (see Figure 1).  MotorCo Corporate’s structure is market-focused 
to leverage its brand name with eight brand platforms.  These brand platforms are Process 
Management, Network Power, Climate Technologies, Industrial Automation, Appliance 
Solutions, Storage Solutions, Professional Tools, and Motor Technologies.  Note that the 
detailed organizational structure is considered confidential, therefore the information 
provided in this case write-up is an approximation of the corporate structures based on 
publicly available information and the interviewees. 
This research focuses on the MotorCo located within the XXXXXXXXXXXXX 
segment representing the Motor Technologies brand platform.  MotorCo (MC) is one of 
over 60 divisions of MotorCo Parent.  It produces a variety of electrical motors used in 
appliances, HVAC equipment and other products.  These motors range in size from 
small, fractional horsepower motors to the largest industrial and commercial electrical 
motors produced today.  These motors sell under a variety of brands including:  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX. 
The motor division is the cornerstone of the global corporation.  MotorCo began 
when XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX.  The company was 
successful from its inception and has grown and diversified to become the world’s largest 
producer of electrical motors.  MotorCo’s innovation and engineering skills have kept 
                                                 
17 XXXXXXXXX 
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them at the forefront of the electric motor industry and today MC produces over 300,000 
electric motors a day.   
Today, the maturity of the product and ability to mass produce the motors has 
resulted in electric motors becoming a commodity with low profit margins.  The 
interviewees characterized the environment for MC as dynamic over the last ten years.  
Economic fluctuations and increased competition led to further commoditization of 
electric motors putting pressure on costs, profitability, and market share.  
Company History for Period Covered by Research     (1995-2004) 
This research covers a period of ten years starting in 1995 and ending with 2004.  The 
data collected from interviews and other documentary sources was coded into change 
events that represent changes of significance in the business unit strategies and structures 
and the information systems strategies and structures over the ten-year period.  Each 
change event has been identified with the following codes, both in the text and in the 
tables:  EE – external environment, SG – strategic intent (goals), SI – strategic initiative, 
OS – organizational structure, IS – IS strategy, and IT – IS structure.  The events were 
determined based on a compilation and review of all interviews and other documentary 
sources.     
The events are grouped into time-based episodes.  A change in the motor company’s 
business unit strategy demarcates episodes.  Because this research focuses on the motor 
company division, changes that occurred at the corporate level are considered to have 
occurred in the external environment of the motor company division and are thus coded 
as external environment events (EE). Events are listed by date of occurrence in Appendix 
A.  The episode write-ups provide a more integrated discussion based on the strategic 
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events of the motor company and therefore, the appearance of the events, particularly 
events related to MotorCo Corporate are integrated with their impact on the motor 
company and may not, therefore, appear in chronological order as presented in Appendix 
A. 
Prior to the First Episode: Continued Record Setting Performance 
The first episode of this company write-up represents the period from 1995 to 1996.  
This episode represents the initial period from the date first covered by the research to the 
time of the first strategic change at the motor company.  There was no change in MC 
level strategy that triggered this period.  Episode 1 provides an overview of MotorCo 
Corporate and the motor company at the start of the research up to Episode 2 when the 
first change in motor company strategy occurred.   
MotorCo Corporate 
As MotorCo Corporate moved into the ten-year period covered by this research, the 
company was extending a long period of record setting growth and profitability.  The 
success was fueled by international sales, which increased 35% during 1995 to account 
for over 44% of the total revenues.  Net income also reached record levels to over $900 
million in 1995.   
The success of MotorCo Corporate was consistent with their strategic goals of 
creating shareholder value by focusing on growth, with a secondary focus on profitability 
via cost reduction.  To accomplish their growth objectives, MotorCo Corporate had 
several strategic initiatives in place that focused on new product development, targeted 
acquisitions, and international sales.  Since 1983, MotorCo Corporate has used a “best 
cost” strategy to support the cost reduction goal.  The best cost strategy focused on 
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providing high quality products at the lowest possible cost, placing a constant pressure to 
increase quality, efficiency, and to reduce costs.   
Structurally, entering the ten-year period, MotorCo had two business segments:  
Commercial and Industrial Components, and Appliance and Construction-Related 
Components (see Figure 2).  MotorCo Corporate’s focus on growth resulted in numerous 
acquisitions and the company structure had evolved to the point where there were 64 
divisions operating largely as 64 separate companies.  Each division was largely 
autonomous with different brands, ways of doing business, and information technology 
infrastructures.  The only demands corporate placed on the divisions were financial in 
nature, requiring each division to present standardized, aggregate financial data to 
corporate.   
MotorCo Corporate placed little focus on information technology entering into this 
ten-year period.   Due to the autonomous nature of each division, MotorCo Corporate did 
not interfere with each division’s selection and use of technology.  Each division was free 
to implement whatever information systems they determined would best meet their 
divisional needs.   
MotorCo 
At the start of the ten-year period, the motor company (MC) enjoyed a competitive 
advantage based on its cost/quality ratio.  The motors they produced were similar in price 
to those of other manufacturers, but few other manufacturers could meet the quality and 
reliability of MotorCo’s motors.  As a result, MC enjoyed strong relationships with its 
customers, a significant portion of which were OEMs that required highly reliable motors 
to place into consumer products such as household appliances and power tools.    This 
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competitive advantage was a result of the best cost strategy initiated by corporate in 1983 
and adopted by the motor company (SI-1). 
Structurally, the manufacture of electric motors was dispersed throughout the 
MotorCo organization (again, see Figure 2).  Electric motors used for industry and heavy 
commercial applications were produced under the Commercial and Industrial 
Components segment, while small fractional electric motors such as those used in 
household appliances and tools were manufactured under the Appliance and Construction 
segment.  The Appliance and Construction business segment of MotorCo produced the 
largest number of electric motors.   
The Appliance and Construction business segment included two motor divisions:  
specialty motors and air-moving motors.  XXXX, a manufacturer of large industrial and 
commercial motors, and the hermetic motors division, which produced sealed electric 
motors, were separate from the other electric motor divisions but were still located under 
the Appliance and Construction business segment.  XXXX and the hermetic motors 
division were autonomous business groups that operated with little or no divisional level 
influences.  XXXX was autonomous because the size and nature of the large electric 
motors lent itself to continued autonomy after it was acquired.  The hermetic division was 
largely tied to an internal customer, a division that manufactured compressors, and was 
therefore more closely associated with the compressor division than with the specialty or 
air-moving divisions. 
Consistent with the overall view of technology at MotorCo, technology up to this 
point was less strategic and more transaction oriented for the motor divisions.  
Information systems were largely viewed as an overhead cost to be controlled and not as 
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a strategic asset.  Each motor division had their own legacy systems.  Acquired divisions, 
such as XXXX, brought their existing legacy systems into the technology mix while the 
preexisting divisions’ systems evolved based on individual needs, independent from any 
direct corporate influence.  
The period between 1995 and 1996 was a period of stability for the motor 
company.  The economic environment was stable and strong.  The market for motors, 
although considered mature in the U.S., was stable with few threats to MC’s dominate 
market position.  Sales in foreign markets were strong and growing and MotorCo was the 
world’s largest producer of electric motors.   
Episode 1: Initiating an eBusiness Strategy 
By 1996 the development and proliferation of the internet was generating a lot of 
attention (EE-1) and there was speculation in the business community about how the 
internet was going to impact the business environment.  The speculation focused on how 
the internet would impact the way a business interfaced with its customers and how the 
internet would impact the efficiency of markets.  The primary concern for MC was the 
potential the internet represented for reducing profit margins in an already low margin 
industry.   
In response, the motor company undertook an ebusiness strategic initiative to explore 
the impact of the internet on the motor company (SI-2).  This ebusiness initiative was 
tasked with positioning the motor company to take advantage of any changes by 
developing an ebusiness strategy.  A group of people were selected and tasked with not 
only identifying how the internet would impact the motor company, but also ensuring that 
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the motor company was ready for any changes that the internet might bring to the 
marketplace.     
The ebusiness initiative did not immediately impact the organizational structure.  
There was, however, a change in the organizational structure related to the best cost 
strategy (SI-1) during this period.  The motor company moved plants to Mexico to take 
advantage of lower costs (OS-1).  Prior to this, MC had moved plants from urban areas to 
rural areas of Arkansas and Mississippi where labor and other costs were lower.  With the 
best cost strategy, it was a natural progression for MC to move plants to Mexico where 
they could access even lower cost labor than in the rural areas of the states.   
Neither the ebusiness strategic initiative nor the placing of plants in Mexico had a 
direct effect on MC’s information systems.  The impact of these events on the 
information systems, however, may have been mediated by Y2K concerns (EE-3).  The 
potential inability of information systems to function after the conversion to the year 
2000 was of great concern to the business community during the late nineties.  The risk 
of catastrophic failure required businesses to ensure their systems were ready for Y2K.  
MC was no exception and for a two year period (1998 to 2000) MC’s IS strategy was to 
prepare their systems for Y2K and to ensure they were Y2K compliant (IS-1). 
In planning for Y2K there had been discussions about whether existing systems 
should be replaced, but the consensus was to make sure that their existing systems 
worked before confounding the problem with new system implementations.  Note, 
however, that due to the degree of divisional autonomy, there were some exceptions to 
this approach among the different divisions that manufactured electric motors. Both 
XXXX and the hermetic motor divisions chose to replace aging legacy systems with 
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XXXX implementing J.D. Edwards and the hermetic division implementing Fourth Shift 
ERPs. 
Episode 2: Focusing on End Customer 
After Y2K, MC moved forward with a strategic initiative to focus on the end 
customer (SI-3), an initiative first introduced at the corporate level during the late 
nineties.  The corporate level initiative was driven by management’s concern about the 
corporation’s ability to meet its primary strategic goal of growth.  Although MotorCo was 
experiencing substantial growth in foreign markets, the majority of sales were still 
focused in the U. S. where the mature market and MotorCo’s corporate structure were 
limiting growth. 
Corporate was receiving feedback from customers that MotorCo’s organizational 
structure was difficult to do business with.   Because of the high degree of autonomy of 
the divisions, each of MotorCo’s divisions maintained their own marketing and sales 
forces.  Large customers doing business with multiple divisions of MotorCo had to deal 
with separate sales representatives for each division.  Likewise, the autonomy of the 
technology meant that each division generated separate invoices that could not be 
combined or consolidated, resulting in companies receiving multiple invoices. 
For example, a washing machine appliance manufacturer that purchases electric 
motors from MotorCo may also purchase controller assemblies and timers from MotorCo 
to be used in the same washing machine.  Each of the products comes from an 
autonomous division and the manufacturer receives three different invoices for the three 
different products.  If the manufacturer wants to design a new washing machine, the 
design has to be orchestrated with three separate divisions, complicating product design.  
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The customers (manufacturers) wanted a single point of contact, one person, one 
engineering contact, one invoice, etc. This autonomous corporate structure created a high 
transaction cost for customers and, as a result, low switching costs for each MotorCo 
product. 
MotorCo management also realized that this structure constrained growth by 
limiting cross selling of products.  There was no collaboration or cooperation among the 
divisions in terms of marketing and market coordination. Customers doing business with 
one division may not be aware of additional products and services other MotorCo 
divisions could provide. If a manufacturer purchased motors for use in their washing 
machines, but not the controls and timers, there was no way for the timer division or the 
control division to know that a potential customer for their products was already using 
MotorCo electric motors, or vice versa.   
Management’s response was to introduce a strategic initiative at the corporate level to 
expand the relationship with existing customers (EE-2).  The purpose behind the shift in 
strategy by MotorCo’s management was to enable growth by making it easier to do 
business with MotorCo.  Management announced initiatives to move towards a 
“solutions” approach. The solutions strategy focused on markets as oppose to products.  
The idea was to approach customers with bundles of MotorCo’s products and services 
that help the customers solve problems, not just sell the customer products.  Corporate 
management planned this corporate initiative as more of an evolutionary shifting of 
strategy and structure that occurred over a three year period, rather than a radical change 
that occurred all at once. 
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To further support this approach, MotorCo announced integration across the divisions 
and business segments to present a “single face to the customer.”  The changes were 
designed to increase the number of products MotorCo could provide to each customer, 
leveraging MotorCo’s size and product portfolio.  This integration across divisions was 
extended during 1998 when, MotorCo Corporate introduced a focus on three primary 
vertical markets: process industries, power generation, and telecommunications.  
Management also announced a formal branding strategy to identify with MotorCo 
Corporate, the multiple autonomous products and brands under the MotorCo product 
portfolio.  This branding strategy was designed to broaden product awareness of 
MotorCo’s existing customers. 
It was at the same time as MotorCo Corporate was making these strategic changes 
that MotorCo first publicly acknowledged information technology as being of strategic 
significance to MotorCo(EE-4) by stating that technology and ecommerce could help in 
“communicating the value of MotorCo’s products and services to customers 
(XXXXXXXX).”  MotorCo announced the development of a technology road map to 
identify technology areas of strategic significance to the firm and announced the 
development of a company-wide procurement system to leverage the consolidated buying 
power of MotorCo. 
The announcement signaled a subtle, but important shift in the corporate view of how 
to manage MotorCo as a corporate entity.   Corporate management was indicating that 
they were looking beyond divisional autonomy to leverage corporate level efficiencies 
and the corporate-wide procurement systems signaled a willingness by corporate to 
consider centralization of certain tasks.   
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MotorCo corporate continued the strategic evolution and repositioning initiatives and 
during 1999, they reorganized the corporate structure (EE-5).  They eliminated the two 
existing business segments, Commercial and Industrial Components and Systems, and 
Appliance and Construction Related Components, to reflect the current strategic focus on 
end markets and bundled products and services.  Five new business segments were 
established:  Process Control, Industrial Automation, Electronics and 
Telecommunications, HVAC, and Appliances and Tools (see Figure 1).   The motor 
company was aligned under the Appliance and Tools division.   
Management also created eight distinct product groups or brand platforms for 
purposes of targeting the solutions concept to specific markets.  As mentioned in section 
2, these brand platforms are Process Management, Network Power, Climate 
Technologies, Industrial Automation, Appliance Solutions, Storage Solutions, 
Professional Tools, and Motor Technologies.  MC’s products largely fall under Motor 
Technologies brand platform, but MC’s products are cross sold under most of the other 
brand platforms as well. 
It was also during this episode that MotorCo Corporate recognized that a global 
company required a global IT infrastructure.  This realization combined with the need for 
a strong technology infrastructure to support the company-wide procurement systems and 
the need to control costs in a difficult economic environment, prompted MotorCo 
management to centralize corporate-wide internet connectivity (EE-6).   
Prior to corporate’s new initiative, each division, consistent with the prior divisional 
autonomy, had initially set up its own internet access, IT infrastructure, firewalls, virus 
protection, and other internet-related technology.  Each division maintained separate 
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support staffs to take care of the infrastructures.  This divisional autonomy created 
unnecessary redundancy and caused difficulty in communicating across incompatible 
systems and standards.  MotorCo thus established the Internet Connectivity Services unit.  
The Internet Connectivity Service unit provided a standardized internet access that 
increased the ability to communicate across the corporation and reduced costs.   
The employees at the MC level did not indicate a business unit impact of the 
corporate level strategy shift and restructuring until 2000.  It is not clear why the change 
at MC did not occur when MotorCo announced the initiatives at the corporate level.  It is 
possible that Y2K tied up so many resources that other changes were not made until after 
Y2K.  It is also possible that there is simply a normal time lag between the initiation of a 
corporate level strategic initiative and the impact of that initiative at the business unit 
level. 
During 2000, in response to the strategic initiative to focus on the end customer (SI-3) 
MC reorganized the motor company structure (OS-2).  The motor division was 
reorganized to form the commercial industrial motors division (CIM).  The 
reorganization combined the specialty motors division, air moving motors division, 
hermetic motor division, and XXXX into a single umbrella organization with three 
subdivisions underneath it:  air moving, specialty, and industrial solutions (see Figure 3). 
The three new subdivisions represented three primary end markets served by the motor 
company.  
An additional benefit of the restructuring was that grouping the manufacturing of 
similar items led to cost reductions. Although the different types of motors varied in the 
way they were manufactured and in the size of production runs, there was a lot of 
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similarity in the manufacturing process, the material used, the engineering, and other 
overhead.   
A second change to the organizational structure during this same time was the move 
to “off-shoring” of manufacturing (OS-3).  This structural shift was driven by the best 
cost strategy.  Off-shoring is the purchase or manufacture of parts, components and, 
potentially, complete products in foreign locations where there are substantial cost 
advantages.  For example, the manufacturing of a product can be contracted to foreign 
factories for less than the motor company can manufacture the product in its North 
American plants.  Off-shoring supports best cost because quality can be maintained and 
the product can be produced at a lower cost.  
As an alternative to contracting out the manufacturing, another trend in off-shoring is 
for  U.S. companies to build their own plants in these low cost countries, further 
leveraging the lower labor and production costs.  MC established plants in Asia in order 
to compete with the cost structures enjoyed by the foreign manufacturers.  The motor 
company also, at the invitation of its customers, built plants next to the plants of its 
customers (OEMs, for example).  This provided lower transportation cost benefits and 
further integrated MC’s product into the customers’ supply chain, increasing switching 
costs.  
During 2000, in response to the 1997 initiative to look into the strategic value of the 
internet (SI-2), MC established a formal ebusiness group (OS-4).  People were taken 
from both the IS side and the business side and located together to share technology and 
business knowledge.  There were a lot of potential projects so the ebusiness group 
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prioritized the projects and, working with an ebusiness steering committee, focused on 
the highest priority projects. 
Episode 3: Reducing SG&A Costs 
In the aftermath of Y2K, there was a substantial reduction in technology spending 
that triggered a crash in the technology industry.  This crash ended a long cycle of 
economic expansion and preceded a recession in the U.S. economy (EE-7).  The 
technology crash and recession had a major impact on MotorCo.  The telecom business 
segment, which had become the largest business segment over the prior two years, saw 
sales fall dramatically.   During fiscal 2001, for the first time in 43 years, MotorCo 
Corporate failed to increase earnings.  Sales, cash flow and return of capital all decreased 
after lengthy periods of record setting results (see Table 1).  The recession resulted in a 
difficult environment for all of MotorCo’s business segments including MC.  
Specifically, for MC, the U.S. recession resulted in lower sales in their primary U.S. 
market.   
Compounding the impact of the recession on MC, the foreign manufacturers were 
improving their product quality.  By 2000, not only were the foreign competitors able to 
provide lower prices, they also were able to meet MC’s quality, offering a similar quality 
product with a lower cost (EE-8).  This posed a threat to MC, not only to their ability to 
grow in foreign markets, but also domestically where MC had a dominant market share 
and had previously faced little competition.     
The environmental stress triggered a shift in the strategic goals of the motor company.  
Prior to this, and consistent with MotorCo corporate level strategy, MC’s strategic goals 
had focused on growth with a secondary focus on profitability.  With the low growth in 
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the U.S. market, recession, and increased foreign competition, growth was increasingly 
difficult to achieve and there was downward pressure on price.  Management at the motor 
company shifted the focus to profitability via cost reduction (SG-1) to counter the 
environmental threats.  Growth was not abandon as a goal; it was just viewed as 
secondary to the primary goal of being profitable.      
During 2001, and triggered by the shift in strategic goals, the motor company enacted 
a strategic initiative to shift focus from reducing cost of goods sold to reducing the 
selling, general, and administrative costs (SG&A) (SI-4).   SG&A costs represent the 
non-manufacturing costs of doing business and include overhead costs such as 
information technology, marketing, and administration.  In the past, the search for cost 
cutting at MC focused on reducing the costs in the manufacturing process; for example, 
reducing costs in raw materials, reengineering products to reduce the amount of raw 
materials used, finding lower cost alternative materials, or developing more efficient 
manufacturing techniques.  Management was concerned that the best cost strategy had 
already leveraged the cost of goods sold and thought few big opportunities remained for 
reducing these costs further.  Management decided instead to focus on an area not 
targeted for cost cutting in the past – SG&A costs.   
A key to implementing cost cutting in SG&A was centralization which was enabled 
by the reorganization of the motor company (OS-6) and the centralization of the internet 
at the corporate level (EE-6).  By combining the multiple divisions into CIM, the motor 
company was able to pull out redundant overhead costs duplicated in each autonomous 
division, and centralize them under CIM. For example, by centralizing travel services via 
the internet, MC eliminated services duplicated at each division, reducing head count and 
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other related overhead costs.  Employees, instead of having someone at their division 
search and book travel plans, simply access a central service via the internet and, using a 
portal, access the service 24 hours a day from anywhere in the world, in effect, increasing 
the level of service and lowering the cost. 
Another avenue for reducing SG&A cost was outsourcing (OS-5).  Following a 
popular trend, MC investigated outsourcing and believed outsourcing held the potential to 
significantly reduce SG&A costs.  MC first outsourced engineering to lower cost 
locations in India and China.  This allowed more expensive services in the US to be 
replaced with lower cost services, reducing SG&A costs.  The outsourcing of engineering 
was successful and MC moved to outsource IS functions and other SG&A costs. 
Communicating around the globe with multiple languages, time zones, and cultural 
differences as required by outsourcing, is complex, requiring a substantial technology 
infrastructure.  The centralized, global, IS infrastructure created by the centralized 
internet access allowed 24 hour access to engineering information by people in the US, 
Asia, and India. Without the technology, the outsourcing would not have been possible.   
The benefits and success of cutting SG&A cost by leveraging centralization such as 
corporate-wide internet access prompted the continuation of centralizing of information 
systems and ultimately the development of IT Shared Services (EE-9) at the corporate 
level.  The first step toward more IS centralization was the selection of a standard 
software suite for web development.  A corporate-wide committee formed with 
representation from multiple divisions and tasked with selecting software and 
establishing processes for web development.  The committee negotiated, as a $15 billion 
company, with the software vendor for corporate-wide access to web development 
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software.  Whereas before, the smaller divisions did not have access to the more 
sophisticated and expensive technology, by moving to corporate wide shared IT services, 
the smaller divisions could afford the more sophisticated technology and total cost was 
reduced. 
The focus on centralization to reduce SG&A costs and creation of IT Shared Services 
directly affected the motor company.  The strategic focus of information systems shifted 
to centralization and the leveraging of corporate resources (IS-2).  More services and 
overhead tasks moved from the motor company level to a corporate-wide level.  As 
noted, the web presence for the motor company divisions consolidated under corporate 
directives and additional services such as web conferencing and employee portals were 
supported at the corporate level.  This required the shifting of personnel and IS resources 
away from the division level to the corporate level shared services (IT-1). 
MotorCo built upon the success and cost savings from the IT Shared Services by 
negotiating with Oracle for a corporate-wide license making Oracle the sole ERP vendor 
for the entire organization (EE-10).  A group was formed with the primary purpose of 
implementing Oracle throughout the motor company (IT-2).   
There were several advantages to this corporate-wide standard Oracle suite.  First, the 
investigation and selection process for a new enterprise system is costly unto itself.  
Documenting “as is” and “to be” processes, determining requirements, and comparing 
different vendors is a costly and time-consuming process.  The mandated corporate 
standard eliminated this package selection process.  Second, implementing a new system 
requires substantial organizational learning.  The corporate-wide standard and permanent 
implementation group allows MotorCo to learn from each implementation and to apply 
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that knowledge to the next implementation, making future implementations more 
efficient and effective.  Third, maintaining multiple data centers is expensive.  
Implementing a single suite allows MotorCo to reduce the number of data centers 
reducing costs.  Finally, the fewer software instances simplify issues of security and 
disaster recovery, by minimizing the numbers of backups.  
The selection of Oracle as a corporate standard did not dictate that divisions had to 
adopt Oracle.  Instead, the corporate mandate was to eliminate the choice for divisions 
who decided to replace their legacy ERP system.  A division did not have to move to 
Oracle, but if they decided they needed to move from their existing systems, they needed 
strong justification for choosing a route other than Oracle.  The division would also have 
to bear the additional expense, which would likely dissuade most divisions from 
implementing anything but Oracle. 
During this period, a number of business scandals resulted in increased government 
regulation (EE-11).  Specifically, congress passed the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 
increasing the reporting requirements of publicly held corporations.  SOX included 
documentation on system security and increased system auditing requirements.  Increased 
system auditing requirements, in turn, impacted the motor company’s information 
systems.  It altered the way the systems were structured and documented in order to 
provide increased transparency to transactions (IT-3).  The business strategy did not 
change, nor did the IS strategy, only the IS structure and processes were impacted 
because the additional external regulatory requirements increased the need for security 
and documentation for information assurance.   
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Additional restructuring of CIM occurred during 2004 (OS-6).  The CIM group was 
subdivided into four business units: ventilation, HVAC, industrial, and fluids.  The 
purpose of the reorganization was related to the objective of better aligning products to 
customer segments and branding.  The hermetic and appliance divisions are very 
different from the larger (interval) motors in terms of the markets.  Hermetic and 
appliance divisions sell directly to OEMs.  There are only a few major OEMs and they 
have sophisticated demand forecasting capabilities.  The major OEMs require 
standardized motors that are mass-produced.  Interval motor sales, on the other hand, are 
manufactured on a per order basis for a large number of customers, with greater product 
customization.  The larger number of customers making smaller orders makes it difficult 
to forecast production scheduling.  The larger number of customers also requires a 
different distribution channel, mainly the use of wholesalers and distributors to aid in 
reaching the end customers.   
A second objective of the current reorganization of CIM was to provide better 
accountability for profit and loss.  A stated corporate level initiative tied to the strategic 
goals is to make selected divestitures of product lines that are not as profitable as desired 
or that are not able to meet the growth goals of MotorCo.  This reorganization will aid in 
the evaluation of the product lines by providing a stronger focus on product line 
profitability.  
Information systems are proving to be a difficult issue for the reorganization.  There 
are still multiple ERP systems within CIM that were carried over from the prior 
reorganization while other parts of CIM have implemented Oracle.  None of the systems 
are easy to reconfigure, nor do they allow easy communication between systems, making 
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it difficult to properly create the four new subdivisions for accounting purposes.  It is 
difficult to take business units out of the existing structures and regroup them.  It was 
noted that it was easier to add groups together as was done during the 2000 
reorganization than it was to break them apart which was occurring now.  As one person 
indicated, implementing an ERP is similar to pouring wet concrete on your organizational 
structure.  Initially you can shape it any way you want, but it is much more difficult to 
reconfigure. 
As the time period for the research neared the end, MotorCo was still adjusting to the 
changes and reorganization of the last few years.  The centralization of IS services, was 
successfully moving forward.  The selection of Oracle was viewed as a positive move 
that would save money and allow smaller divisions to have access to better technology, 
and therefore, to leverage the size of MotorCo.  
For the past two years, inflation (EE-12) has been a serious issue, putting even greater 
pressure on already tight profit margins.  The competitive nature of MC’s markets has not 
allowed them to pass the inflation in raw materials prices on to their customers, causing 
MC’s profit margin to be caught in the middle. Because inflation has impacted everyone 
in the industry and not just MC, to this point, no strategic or organizational changes have 
resulted from the inflation. It is, however, an issue that was recognized by all interviewed 
as of significance to MC and will require some reaction if the inflation continues.   
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   Table 1: Financial Summary 
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Appendix D-1: Event Tables 
 
Label Year18 Description 
EE-1 1996 Proliferation of the Internet 
EE-2 1997 Shift in Corporate Level Strategic Initiatives 
EE-3 1998 Concerns over Y2K 
EE-4 1998 Stated Strategic Importance of IS and Development of Corporate-wide 
Procurement System 
EE-5 1999 Reorganization of Corporate Business Segments 
EE-6 2000 Establishment of Corporate-wide Internet Connectivity Service  
EE-7 2000 Crash in Technology Market and Recession in U.S. Economy 
EE-8 2000 Increasing Foreign Competition 
EE-9 2001 Creation of Corporate-wide IT Shared Services. 
EE-10 2001 Adoption of Oracle as Corporate-wide Enterprise Application 
EE-11 2002 Legislative Response to Corporate Scandals (Sarbanes Oxley Act) 
EE-12 2003 Inflation in Raw Material Prices 
Table 3a:  Changes in External Environment  
 
 
Label Year Description 
SG-1 2000 Shift in Business Unit Level Strategic Goal from Growth to Profitability  
Table 3b:  Changes in Business Unit Strategic Goals (Intent) 
 
 
Label Year Description 
SI-1 1983 Continuing Best Cost Strategy 
SI-2 1997 Initiating an eBusiness Strategy 
SI-3 2000 Focusing on End Customer   
SI-4 2001 Reductions in SG&A Costs  
Table 3b:  Changes in Business Unit Strategic Initiatives 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18
 The dates on the events is an approximation based in the combined interviews and review of publicly 
available data.  In general there was a time lag between a strategic initiative was introduced at the corporate 
level and the impact or action taken at the division level.  For example, the 1997 annual report introduced 
the concept of end-customer focus, but it was 1999 at the earliest before interviewees at the divisional level 
mentioned the strategy. 
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Label Year Description 
OS-1 1997 Shifting Manufacturing Plants to Mexico 
OS-2 2000 Creation of Commercial Industrial Motors Division 
OS-3 2000 Off-Shoring of Manufacturing 
OS-4 2000 Establishment of eBusiness Group 
OS-5 2001 Outsourcing of SG&A Tasks 
OS-6 2003 Reorganized CIM into Four Business Units  
Table 3c:  Changes in Organizational Structure and Process 
 
Label Year Description 
IS-1 1998 Focus on Y2K Compliance 
IS-2 2001 Centralization/Leveraging Corporate-wide IS Resources 
Table 3d:  Changes in IS Strategy 
 
Label Year Description 
IT-1 2001 Formation of IT Shared Services 
IT-2 2001 Initial Implementation of Oracle as Motor Company’s Standard 
Enterprise Application 
IT-3 2002 Increased IS Security and Compliance with Sarbanes Oxley Act 
Table 3e:  Changes in IS Structure and Processes 
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Appendix D-2: Episodes in IS Adaptation 
 
 
  
“Alignment 
Factor” 
Episode 1 – Initiating an eBusiness Strategy 
  Date 
Initiated 
Description Trigger 
External 
Environment 
1996 Proliferation of the Internet (EE-1) Technological Innovation 
 
1998 Concerns over Y2K (EE-3) 
 
Strategic Intent 
(Goals) 
  No Change   
Strategic 
Initiatives 
1997 Initiating an eBusiness Strategy (SI-2)  Proliferation of the Internet (EE-1) 
Organization 
Structure 
1997 Shifting Manufacturing Plants to Mexico 
(OS-1) 
Continuing Best Cost Strategy (SI-1) 
IS Strategy 1998 Focus on Y2K compliance (IS-1) Concerns over Y2K(EE-3) 
IS Structure   No Change   
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“Alignment 
Factor” 
Episode 2 – Focus on End Customers 
  Date 
Initiated 
Description Trigger 
External 
Environment 
1997 Shift in Corporate Level Strategic Initiatives 
(EE-2) 
Slowing Growth and Customer Feedback 
 
1998 Stated Strategic Importance of IS and 
Development of Corporate-Wide 
Procurement System (EE-4) 
 
 
1999 Reorganization of Corporate Business 
Segments (EE-5) 
 
 
2000 Establishment of Corporate-wide Shared 
Internet Connectivity (EE-6) 
 
Strategic Intent 
(Goals) 
 No Change  
Strategic 
Initiatives 
2000 Focusing on End Customer (SI-3) Shift in Corporate Level Initiatives (EE-2) 
Organization 
Structure 
2000 Creation of the Commercial Industrial 
Motors Division (CIM) (OS-2) 
Shift in Corporate Level Initiatives and 
Focus on End Customer (EE-2 and SI-3) 
 
2000 Off-Shoring of Manufacturing  (OS-3) Continuing Best Cost Strategy (SI-1) 
  
2000 Establishment of eBusiness Group (OS-4) Initiating an eBusiness Strategy (SI-2) 
IS Strategy  No Change  
IS Structure  No Change  
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“Alignment 
Factor” 
Episode 3 – Focus on Cutting SG&A Costs 
  Date 
Initiated 
Description Trigger 
External 
Environment 
2000 Crash in Technology Market and Recession 
in U.S. Economy (EE-7) 
 
 
2000 Increasing Foreign Competition (EE-8)  
 
2001 Creation of Corporate-wide IT Shared 
Services (EE-9) 
 
 
2001 Adoption of Oracle as Corporate-wide 
Enterprise Application (EE-10) 
 
 
2002 Legislative Response to Business Scandals 
(Sarbanes Oxley Act)  (EE-11) 
 
 
2002 Inflation in Raw Material Prices (EE-12)  
Strategic Intent 
(Goals) 
2000 Shift in Business Unit Level Strategic Goal 
from Growth to Profitability (SG-1) 
Crash in Technology Market and Recession 
in U.S. Economy (EE-7) and Increasing 
Foreign Competition (EE-8) 
Strategic Initiatives 2001 Reductions in SG&A (SI-4) Shift in Business Unit Level Strategic Goal 
from Growth to Profitability (SG-1)  
Organization 
Structure 
2001 Outsourcing of SG&A Tasks (OS-5) Shift in Business Unit Level Strategic Goal 
from Growth to Profitability.  Reduction in 
SG&A (SG-1 and SI-4) 
 
 2003 Reorganization of CIM into Four Business 
Units (OS-6) 
Consistent with Corporate Level Initiatives 
(EE-2 and EE-5) 
IS Strategy 2001 Centralization/Leveraging Corporate-wide 
IS resources (IS-2) 
Stated Strategic Importance of IS and 
Development of Corporate-Wide 
Procurement System (EE-4) and Creation of 
Corporate-wide IT Shared Services (EE-9)  
IS Structure 2001 Formation of IT Shared Services (IT-1) Creation of Corporate-wide IT Shared 
Services (EE-9) and Centralization/ 
Leveraging Corporate-wide IS resources 
(IS-2) 
 
2001 Initial Implementation of Oracle as Motor 
Company’s Standard Enterprise Application 
(IT-2) 
Move to Corporate-Wide IT Shared Services 
and Selection of Oracle (EE-9 and EE-10) 
 
2002 Increased IT Security and Compliance with 
Sarbanes Oxley Act (IT-3) 
Business Scandals and Sarbanes Oxley Act 
(EE-11) 
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